With U.S.–Israeli strikes against Iran continuing, and growing discussion about the possibility that they could lead to the fall of the ruling regime of the Islamic Republic, the importance of shedding more light on the country’s non-Persian peoples is becoming increasingly apparent, as they could play a decisive role in the future of the conflict.
Among them are the Arabs of Iran — or “Ahwazis,” as they prefer to be called — who make up about 2 percent of the country’s population of roughly 90 million people, according to the latest statistics issued by the World Bank in 2024.
Ahwazis mainly live in a belt stretching from the Iraqi border in western Iran, passing along the Gulf coast and reaching areas near the spread of the Baluch minority along the borders with Afghanistan and Pakistan.
There are two main regions with an Arab majority in Iran. The first is Khuzestan province and the Gulf coastal area extending between Bushehr and Bandar Abbas. The second includes large areas of Hormozgan, Ilam, Boyer-Ahmad, and Fars provinces, in addition to some Iranian islands in the Gulf.
The Arabic dialect spoken by the Ahwazis varies from one region to another. In Khuzestan, for example, they speak a dialect close to Iraqi Arabic, while Ahwazis in the south, in Bushehr and Hormozgan, speak Gulf Arabic.
In northern Ahwaz, near the Iraqi border, there are Ahwazis belonging to both the Shiite and Sunni sects, while the Sunni sect predominates among residents in the south.
Tribal affiliations and clan identity also play a strong role among the Ahwazis, reflecting the extension of tribes found in Iraq and the Gulf. The most prominent include Bani Tamim, Bani Kaab, Tayy, Bani Tarif, Bani Mansour, Al-Khazraj, and Shammar.
Despite their relatively small proportion compared with Iran’s overall population, the Ahwazis live in one of the most important regions of the country — the heart of Iran’s oil industry, the country’s main source of income.
An estimated 70 percent to 80 percent of Iran’s oil production comes from fields located in or near Khuzestan province. The region also hosts key energy facilities such as the Bushehr nuclear reactor and oil ports along the Gulf.
“Any unrest in Ahwaz will have repercussions across the rest of Iran. Simply put, the people of Ahwaz are capable of halting oil supplies, and the Iranian government is aware of that,” Hassan Radi, director of the Ahwaz Center for Media and Strategic Studies, told Alhurra.
Since the establishment of the Iranian state in 1925, relations between the people of Ahwaz and the ruling authorities have not been harmonious.
Before that date, Ahwaz was an independent Arab emirate known as the Emirate of “Arabistan,” with its capital in Mohammerah. It collapsed at the hands of Iran’s Shah Reza Pahlavi, who annexed it to Iranian territory in 1925.
Since then, the Ahwazis’ demands for autonomy have never ceased. On the contrary, they intensified after the fall of the Shah and the rise of the clerical establishment to power in 1979.
For example, in April 2005, rumors spread that authorities in Tehran were planning to disperse Arabs in the region, leading to protests that turned violent, according to Human Rights Watch.
In 2006, the oil-rich southern province of Khuzestan witnessed clashes between police and Iranian Arabs supporting independence, leaving three people dead and more than 250 arrested.
In 2019 and 2021, Khuzestan also saw anti-government protests over water shortages, with protesters accusing authorities of marginalization and mismanagement in the province. The unrest resulted in civilian casualties.
When the latest protests erupted in Iran last January, political forces from Ahwaz began preparing for the “post-regime phase.” Eight groups announced the formation of a coordinating body for Ahwazi organizations in what became known as the “London Declaration.”
These groups are: the Ahwazi Assembly, the Arab Democratic National Current in Ahwaz, the Ahwaz Democratic Front, the Ahwazi Popular Democratic Front, the Arab Front for the Liberation of Ahwaz, the Ahwazi Arab Struggle Movement, the Arab Struggle Movement for the Liberation of Ahwaz, and the Democratic Solidarity Party.
Radi said that “all of these political organizations maintain political relations and coordination with forces from other minorities in Iran. There is also communication with the United States and other Western countries to exchange coordination, views, and information.”
“The Ahwazis have strong relations with non-Persian peoples. There is coordination with the Baluch, the Kurds, and the Azeris — not only politically, but also coordination on the ground,” he added.
This coordination has coincided with the re-emergence of Iranian Kurds in recent days and rising speculation that their areas could become a new front in the ongoing war against Tehran.
As the United States and Israel continue their military attacks on targets inside Iran, attention has begun shifting toward the Kurdish regions in western Iran, amid unconfirmed reports that Kurdish factions may be preparing to open a confrontation with the Iranian regime with U.S. support.
The speculation gained additional momentum after remarks by U.S. President Donald Trump expressing support for any attack that Kurds might launch against Iran — comments widely interpreted as potentially paving the way for a scenario that would rely on activating internal opposition movements alongside military strikes.
For this reason, Radi believes that any “internal movement” among non-Persian peoples in general — and Arabs in particular — would be decisive “given the importance of the regions where they are concentrated.”
As for Iran’s future, Radi said the Ahwazis aspire to independence. “But if this objective does not receive regional and international support, we could step back and seek to establish a federal system of governance.”
“Both options are strongly on the table, and in the end the option supported by the West will certainly prevail if the current regime falls,” Radi said.
The article is a translation of the original Arabic.
Ghassan Taqi
A journalist specializing in Iraqi affairs, he has worked with the Middle East Broadcasting Networks (MBN) since 2015. He previously spent several years with Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, as well as various Iraqi and Arab media outlets.
