A ‘Gulf NATO’: Ambition Meets Reality

Former Qatari prime minister Hamad bin Jassim has called for the creation of a Gulf “military alliance” modeled on the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), with Saudi Arabia playing the central role because of its geographic, political, and military weight.

In a post that drew wide engagement on the platform X, bin Jassim said that the ongoing confrontation with Iran offers “lessons and insights that the Gulf Cooperation Council states must draw, foremost among them solidarity, alliance, and unity of word and position.”

He urged Gulf states not to wait until the fighting ends to begin building the foundations of defensive strength, but instead to move “immediately” toward establishing a base of advanced military and electronic industries that would strengthen the Gulf’s ability to protect its security and “deter threats before they occur.”

Peninsula Shield

The idea of a “Gulf NATO” is not new, says writer and political researcher Mohammed Khalfan Al-Sawafi. “It is often revived whenever the region faces a security crisis.”

Al-Sawafi notes that the first serious proposal for a unified Gulf army came after the liberation of Kuwait in 1991, when the late Sultan of Oman, Qaboos bin Said, tasked officials with developing a vision for a joint force that would protect GCC states from any external threat. The idea, however, never evolved into a practical reality.

He adds that the proposal resurfaced at the Manama summit in 2000. Although some Gulf states ratified the related agreement, it failed to generate sufficient enthusiasm among the remaining states, causing it to stall once again.

The concept appeared again later as Iranian influence expanded in several Arab countries, particularly in Yemen. But that proposal also failed to achieve tangible progress, according to Al-Sawafi.

This time, too, he believes the idea will likely face the same fate as “previous attempts.”

In his view, Gulf enthusiasm for such initiatives tends to fade as crises subside. In addition, disagreements persist over defining the nature of threats and identifying a common adversary.

The Gulf Cooperation Council established the Peninsula Shield Force in 1984, headquartered in Saudi Arabia, as the joint military force of GCC states.

The force includes around 40,000 soldiers organized into two divisions. Its primary mission is to provide “rapid response to any external aggression” and to support internal stability when necessary.

The most prominent intervention by the Peninsula Shield Force took place in Bahrain in 2011. Gulf states, including Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, also participated in military operations in Yemen beginning in March 2015.

The joint defense agreement signed by GCC states in 2000 established the principle of collective security, stipulating that any attack on one member state is considered an attack on all.

However, the recent confrontation with Iran has revived questions about the effectiveness of this defensive framework after it appeared that each Gulf state dealt with its security individually.

A Turning Point

Dr. Mohammed Al-Arimi, a researcher in political and strategic affairs, believes that GCC states already possess the foundations necessary to establish an advanced defense alliance.

Al-Arimi lists these foundations as substantial financial resources, modern and well-equipped armed forces, and a pivotal geopolitical position along global energy and trade routes.

However, the “institutional structure” of such an alliance “still requires deeper development,” particularly in areas such as joint military command, unified strategic planning, and integration of defense industries.

As a result, according to Al-Arimi, “the Gulf security system in the foreseeable future remains partially linked to Western guarantees,” not only in terms of armaments but also “in terms of the political and deterrent umbrella provided by major powers.”

Al-Arimi adds that recent Iranian targeting of most Gulf states represents a turning point in Gulf security thinking. It revealed that the presence of foreign military bases, despite their importance in traditional deterrence, was not sufficient to prevent attacks on Gulf territory or fully protect its critical infrastructure.

He believes this reality may push Gulf states to reassess their defense systems and explore more diversified and effective options by strengthening their own capabilities and building more independent regional security arrangements. The experience, he notes, demonstrated the limits of relying entirely on external security umbrellas when the calculations of major powers diverge from regional security priorities.

A Strong Saudi Arabia

A Gulf defense alliance could begin gradually among a limited number of states, such as Saudi Arabia and Bahrain, before other countries — including Qatar and Kuwait, and possibly the UAE and Oman — join at later stages, according to political and military analyst Abdul Latif Al-Mulhim.

Al-Mulhim argues that establishing a joint defense system does not necessarily require the participation of all six GCC states from the outset. It could be formed by four or five countries, similar to comparable international experiences.

He notes that NATO itself has gone through periods when some countries withdrew from its military structures while cooperating with them continued.

Al-Mulhim points out that Saudi Arabia has become one of the most powerful states in terms of the integration of its defense system and its ability to move quickly, which could position it as the core of any future Gulf defense arrangements, much like the United States within NATO.

Nevertheless, all Gulf states, according to Al-Mulhim, have worked since the Iran-Iraq war to significantly develop their military capabilities, particularly in training and in building defense systems. This progress is reflected across different branches of their armed forces.

Competition and Hybrid Threats

What, then, is preventing the alliance from emerging?

Dr. Mohammed Al-Arimi says GCC states do not suffer from a shortage of resources, and the threats they face are largely shared.

The obstacle, he argues, lies in “political considerations and internal rivalries” among GCC members.

Al-Arimi notes that the Gulf experience has shown that political disputes can weaken joint institutions even when security interests converge.

However, he adds that major crises often push states to reorder their strategic priorities.

In his view, if Gulf capitals come to realize that regional risks now exceed the capacity of any single state to confront them alone, that realization could motivate the creation of a more cohesive collective security system, provided that political disputes can be separated from the requirements of security cooperation.

Al-Arimi also notes that demographic imbalances between Gulf states and larger regional powers do not necessarily translate into an imbalance of power. Modern wars are no longer measured solely by population size or the scale of armies. GCC states, in his estimation, possess important compensating advantages, most notably technological superiority and financial capabilities that allow them to build advanced weapons systems, as well as a broad network of international alliances.

However, achieving a genuine deterrence balance, Al-Arimi believes, remains tied to improving military human capital and building integrated command and control systems among Gulf states, “because technology alone is not enough unless it is supported by a shared military doctrine and unified operational capability.”

He emphasizes that shifts in the nature of warfare, including the rise of cyber warfare, drones, and forms of asymmetric conflict, have made the traditional concept of a military alliance less effective if it is limited to classical military coordination.

Al-Arimi suggests that the core value of any defense alliance modeled on a “Gulf NATO” would not lie primarily in creating joint conventional armies, but rather in building a multidimensional regional security system that includes joint air and missile defense, cybersecurity, protection of energy infrastructure and maritime routes, and intelligence sharing — ultimately producing a flexible alliance capable of adapting to the hybrid threats that increasingly define modern conflicts.

The article is a translation of the original Arabic.