In Jeddah, where leaders of the Gulf Cooperation Council countries are meeting for a consultative summit, the gathering does not appear to be a routine protocol event. Timing alone gives it particular weight: a region experiencing attacks targeting oil and vital facilities, concerns over the security of the Strait of Hormuz, and diplomatic efforts attempting to prevent escalation from turning into a broader confrontation.
The Iranian file tops the summit’s agenda—not merely as an external issue, but as a direct test of the Gulf capitals’ ability to manage a shared threat without exposing their differences. The attacks attributed to Tehran and its allies, and the damage they caused, have revived an old question within the Gulf: how can deterrence and de-escalation be combined? And does the Council act as a unified bloc, or as neighboring states, each with its own calculations, limits, and fears?
Ahead of the summit, Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Faisal bin Farhan held a call with his Iranian counterpart Abbas Araghchi, signaling that Riyadh is not closing the door to communication—even at a moment of escalation. The call was not isolated from broader diplomatic movement. Araghchi visited Muscat and met Sultan Haitham bin Tariq as part of Omani mediation efforts aimed at keeping communication channels open between Tehran and Washington.
Thus, the region appears caught between two parallel tracks: a security tension raising levels of concern in the Gulf, and active diplomacy attempting to prevent a slide into a comprehensive confrontation.
However, within the Gulf house, the picture is no longer as cohesive as it appeared in the early hours of the crisis. Initially, positions were broadly aligned in condemning the attacks. But as events unfolded, differences in tone and approach emerged. Qatar moved early to keep communication channels open with Tehran—even at the peak of escalation—following an approach based on containing escalation before it spreads. In contrast, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and Kuwait appeared, to varying degrees, more inclined toward a discourse of firmness and deterrence.
Despite Abu Dhabi’s involvement in de-escalation contacts—including communication between UAE Vice President Mansour bin Zayed and Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf—the Emirati discourse remained explicit in describing the threat. This was evident in statements by the diplomatic adviser to the UAE president, Anwar Gargash, who said that Gulf states had succeeded in overcoming the repercussions of what he described as “aggression,” noting that winning the battle begins, in part, with rejecting the opponent’s narrative. This reflects a growing awareness of the importance of the media and political dimensions in managing the conflict.
What appears in Jeddah, then, is not a passing difference in tone, but a divergence in assessing the best way to deal with Iran. Some capitals see raising the cost of escalation as the necessary entry point to containing the threat. Others lean toward a more cautious approach, betting on diplomacy and de-escalation, fearing that the entire region could pay the price of a war whose boundaries cannot be controlled.
From this perspective, the summit becomes a test for the Gulf Cooperation Council itself: can it turn differences among its members into a calculated division of roles, or will the crisis reveal the limits of Gulf cohesion when the threat becomes direct?
Researcher and political analyst Mohammed Hamoud Al-Bughaili believes that the Gulf scene is not moving in a single direction. Some countries, he says, prefer to contain escalation “to break the cycle of attacks and reduce losses,” especially given fears that any subsequent wave could be more violent. In this context, Oman’s role emerges as a balancing channel, benefiting from Muscat’s relations with Tehran and its long tradition of mediation.
However, Al-Bughaili does not see restraint as a lack of coordination. He considers the adoption of defense and strategic patience to reflect a degree of prior understanding among GCC states, with individual responses ruled out unless there are major human losses or severe damage to facilities.
Academic and political writer Aayed Al-Manaa offers a less pessimistic reading. In his view, there remains a general Gulf consensus on rejecting Iranian behavior, even if differences appear in the details. He points to the particularity of Oman’s position, tied to its historical relations with Iran and its mediating role between Tehran and Washington. For him, these differences are not evidence of division, but rather an attempt to keep communication channels open during a crisis that directly affects Gulf maritime security and the economy.
In contrast, political and strategic analyst Abdullah Ghanem Al-Qahtani offers a more cautious assessment. He believes it is still too early to speak of a unified Gulf position, whether in managing relations with Iran or in formulating a shared concept of security. He says Iranian policies have not distinguished between one Gulf state and another, as their repercussions have reached all GCC countries regardless of the nature of each state’s relationship with Tehran.
Al-Qahtani concludes that what is happening now is closer to crisis management than to building a long-term Gulf strategy. The continued tension between the United States and Iran, in addition to the presence of individual state policies, makes unifying positions difficult in the near term.
Will the War Reopen Gulf Rifts?
Relations among Gulf states, prior to the outbreak of war between the United States and Israel on one side and Iran on the other, were not in a state of complete stability. They were closer to a fragile balance governed by precise calculations and deferred tensions. The war was preceded by what appeared to be signs of disagreement between the UAE and Saudi Arabia, while the effects of the Qatar boycott crisis remain present in the region’s political memory.
Dr. Aayed Al-Manaa believes that disputes among GCC states—despite their age and diversity, ranging from border issues to political rivalries and competition for influence—have not prevented continued cooperation. These states, he says, recognize that they are bound to remain within the Gulf system and have no realistic alternative.
He expects that disputes will continue to be managed through peaceful and diplomatic channels, with the possibility that current crises could push toward greater integration. In this context, Saudi Arabia remains, by virtue of its weight, the leading actor in the region, despite attempts by other parties to play broader roles.
These tensions do not begin in the present moment. The political history of the GCC has long been burdened with border and political disputes that have often hindered the building of strong Gulf cohesion. While borders were among the most prominent sources of tension, they were not the only factor; they intersected with calculations of influence, the nature of relations between ruling families, cross-border tribal ties, and differences in interests and foreign policy orientations.
With the discovery of oil, these disputes gained greater sensitivity. Some border areas became hotspots of tension due to oil fields located in regions whose demarcation was not fully resolved, and the region witnessed skirmishes among several Gulf states over these disputes.
Al-Manaa adds that disagreements are likely to persist but will be managed quietly through containment or temporary freezing until the regional picture becomes clearer. He notes that files such as Yemen have seen a rebalancing of roles with the emergence of a stronger Saudi role, without ending overall coordination within the Council.
In his view, current security threats may push Gulf states to reduce their public disagreements and perhaps seek practical settlements or middle-ground solutions, although Gulf cohesion will remain relative rather than absolute. The interest of these states, he says, requires avoiding any direct conflict among themselves, for fear of opening the door to regional interventions that could threaten the region’s stability.
Abdullah Ghanem Al-Qahtani offers a different perspective, arguing that the essence of Gulf disputes lies not in borders but in differences in visions regarding strategic security and foreign policy, as well as the absence of a unified concept of Gulf security. In his view, it is no longer sufficient to treat the GCC as a formal or limited framework in light of recent regional transformations.
Nevertheless, Al-Qahtani considers most of these disputes solvable, as they are not deeply rooted and are often linked to external or economic issues. However, he points to the absence of political and media harmony within the system, where each state operates with its own discourse at a moment that requires higher coordination.
The article is a translation of the original Arabic.
Sakina Abdallah
A Saudi writer, researcher, and TV presenter
