The United Arab Emirates announced on Tuesday its withdrawal from the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and the OPEC+ alliance, in a move carrying heavy implications for both groupings and for Saudi Arabia’s position as their de facto leader. The decision comes amid the repercussions of the Iran war on Gulf countries, which has caused a shock in the energy sector and disrupted the global economy.
The sudden withdrawal—issued by one of OPEC’s veteran members—is likely to destabilize the organization and reduce its ability to maintain the image of a unified front, an image it has long sought to uphold despite recurring divisions among its members, whether over geopolitical issues or disputes regarding production quotas.
Ali Al-Riyami, an oil expert and former Director General of Oil and Gas Marketing at Oman’s Ministry of Energy and Minerals, told Alhurra that the UAE’s withdrawal came unexpectedly in terms of its method, timing, and surrounding circumstances, making it a surprise for markets, traders, and even OPEC members themselves.
Nevertheless, Al-Riyami explained that the idea of an exit was not entirely out of the question—not only for the UAE but for other countries as well. However, the core issue, in his view, lies in the timing of the decision, and why it came specifically from the UAE at this moment, especially since its reasons remain unclear, and speculation at this stage would not be useful.
Al-Riyami noted that the full picture requires more time to become clear, both in terms of the direct motives and the possibility that the decision is linked to political circumstances in the Gulf region. Regarding market reactions, he pointed out that oil prices recorded a slight increase of between 2.5 and 3 percent, expecting this effect to remain short-term, while it could differ over the long term after the war’s repercussions subside, with a likely slight negative impact.
He attributed this to the fact that the UAE’s exit from OPEC frees it from the quota system, granting it greater flexibility in production and exports. He believes this factor may be among the drivers of the decision, particularly in light of the challenges Abu Dhabi has previously faced related to production quotas, including its demands to adjust the baseline and the arrangements and exemptions that followed.
Al-Riyami added that the short-term impact may remain limited, with the possibility of slight price movements, while the longer-term effect could be relatively negative, particularly with continued competition in global markets. He clarified that the UAE’s exit does not necessarily mean an immediate escalation in competition, as competition already exists and will continue as long as oil production persists.
Within OPEC itself, he said the organization will be affected by the UAE’s departure, given its weight and influential role in meetings, noting that OPEC+ had previously responded to its request to adjust its quota, reflecting its level of influence within the alliance. He added that the exit will leave a gap in the short term, while noting that other countries have previously withdrawn, including Qatar and Indonesia.
He concluded that the step does not necessarily imply direct commercial or political consequences, but it raises significant questions about its timing, especially under exceptional circumstances that include war, supply disruptions, and challenges related to the Strait of Hormuz. He stressed the need to refrain from interpreting the reasons prematurely, considering that any reading at this stage remains speculative until official clarifications are issued by the Emirati side.
As part of clarifying the background of the decision, UAE Energy Minister Suhail bin Mohammed Al Mazrouei said in an interview with CNBC that the withdrawal came after a careful review of the country’s strategies in the energy and petroleum sectors. He noted that the UAE, despite its long-standing membership in OPEC and OPEC+, believes that global demand for energy is expected to rise in the future, and that it is acting at an appropriate time that takes into account market sensitivity and constraints related to the Strait of Hormuz.
He added that the move allows the UAE to expand cooperation with partners and investors to ensure meeting future global demand for crude oil and petrochemicals, as well as gas, thereby enhancing its ability to adapt to transformations in global energy markets.
The divergence intensified as it moved into the media sphere. Political science professor and founder and president of the Emirates Policy Center, Ebtesam Al-Ketbi, wrote in a post on X that the UAE’s decision does not represent a technical withdrawal from OPEC and OPEC+, but rather a strategic repositioning within the global energy market.
She added that the move grants Abu Dhabi greater flexibility in managing production and responding to potential disruptions—such as those related to the Strait of Hormuz—thus strengthening its role as an influential producer in global supply balances, even if that gradually weakens OPEC’s cohesion.
Emirati journalist Mustafa Al-Zarooni posted on X that the UAE does not want to be part of “organizations afflicted by aging and moodiness,” considering that prioritizing national interest has become a sovereign matter after what Abu Dhabi has contributed within OPEC.
Al-Zarooni added that any U.S. effort to manage oil flows and control production instead of OPEC or OPEC+ would require extensive influence over oil transit routes, starting with permanently securing navigation in the Strait of Hormuz.
This is not the first time OPEC has witnessed Emirati dissent.
In July 2021, OPEC+ talks on production collapsed after ministers canceled meetings following a dispute that erupted a week earlier, when the UAE objected to a proposal to extend production cuts for an additional eight months, leading to a failure to reach an agreement on increasing supplies.
At the height of that crisis, Saudi Energy Minister Prince Abdulaziz bin Salman called for “a degree of compromise and rationality” to overcome the deadlock, after two days of negotiations failed to achieve notable progress, in a stance interpreted at the time as a rare sign of open disagreement between the two Gulf allies, Saudi Arabia and the UAE.
At that time, Riyadh had pushed for a plan to contain rising prices by gradually increasing production while extending the agreement until the end of 2022, with support from Russia and several OPEC+ members. In contrast, Abu Dhabi rejected a long-term extension, favoring a short-term increase, and at the same time sought to reset its 2022 production baseline by raising it by about 0.6 million barrels per day to 3.8 million barrels, instead of the 3.2 million barrels it considered “too low.”
The article is a translation of the original Arabic.
Sakina Abdallah
A Saudi writer, researcher, and TV presenter
