For the second time within a single week, Kuwait has announced the dismantling of a cell and the foiling of terrorist attacks that members of Hezbollah were allegedly planning to carry out.
This comes amid ongoing Iranian missile and drone attacks targeting Gulf countries, including Kuwait.
On Wednesday, Kuwait’s Ministry of Interior said that the State Security apparatus “succeeded in thwarting a terrorist plot targeting vital facilities in the country,” explaining that “10 citizens belonging to a terrorist group affiliated with the banned Hezbollah organization were arrested. They had engaged in prior planning and coordination with external parties and sought to communicate with them to provide the coordinates of targeted locations.”
Earlier, on Monday, the ministry had revealed the dismantling of a Hezbollah-linked cell consisting of 16 individuals.
It stated that this cell was involved in an organized plan aimed at undermining the country’s security and harming its sovereignty, noting that it included 14 Kuwaitis and two Lebanese nationals.
Kuwaiti academic and political researcher Dr. Ayed Al-Manaa said that the details released about the cell on Monday, along with accompanying images and information, indicate it was preparing to carry out serious operations, “especially given the seizure of various weapons, including machine guns, pistols, rifles, rockets, grenades, and drones.” He added that this could suggest plans involving assassinations or acts of violence and intimidation.
This is not the first time Kuwait or other Gulf states have announced the dismantling of cells or the disruption of activities allegedly carried out by Hezbollah or similar groups on their territory. However, the timing of the Kuwaiti announcement—coinciding with continued Iranian attacks on Gulf states—raises further questions about the objectives and plans of the two cells.
Hezbollah in Kuwait
The Kuwaiti Ministry of Interior’s announcement of dismantling two Hezbollah-linked cells was neither isolated nor sudden; rather, it falls within a broader historical and security context stretching back years.
During the Iran–Iraq war in the 1980s, a Lebanese group linked to Iran and Iraq’s Dawa Party was accused of carrying out attacks on vital facilities and foreign embassies, as well as attempting to assassinate the late Emir of Kuwait, Sheikh Jaber Al-Ahmad Al-Sabah, in 1985, according to multiple Gulf media reports.
Hezbollah was also accused in its early years of involvement in the hijacking of two Kuwaiti aircraft. The first occurred in 1984, when four gunmen—including Mustafa Badreddine, who later became one of the group’s most prominent leaders—forced a plane to land in Tehran to demand the release of detainees involved in the 1983 bombings. The second incident took place in April 1988, when a Kuwaiti plane arriving from Bangkok was hijacked.
Later, the group’s name was also linked to the “Abdali cell,” which Kuwait announced it had uncovered in 2015, reportedly in possession of large quantities of weapons and ammunition.
Al-Manaa considers that recurring claims about Iran or Hezbollah recruiting cells within Gulf states remain a matter of debate. He noted that he does not favor addressing the issue from a sectarian perspective, “despite the existence of those who exploit emotional dimensions within some communities to influence individuals and convince them that what they are doing falls under defending their sect.” At the same time, he stressed that this factor may “push some individuals to engage in certain activities driven by emotional motives, as seen in the Abdali cell case.”
Regarding the nature and activities of the cells Kuwait recently announced dismantling, security and strategic expert Khaled Al-Sallal said that “Hezbollah-linked cells in Gulf countries rely on clandestine networks that are gradually and quietly formed, often without attracting attention in their early stages.”
“These cells typically begin by recruiting individuals either one-on-one or through tight social circles, where trust is built before any organized activity begins. There may be external direction or links, even without a clear organizational structure within the country,” Al-Sallal added.
“Chronic Activity”
In the 1980s, what became known as “Hezbollah Al-Hejaz” emerged in Saudi Arabia, according to numerous specialized Gulf reports. It was a group that adopted the same ideological approach associated with Lebanese Hezbollah and aligned with the doctrine of Wilayat al-Faqih.
Ahmed Al-Mughassil emerged as a prominent leader within it, and his name became associated with armed operations in Saudi Arabia during the 1990s, most notably the 1996 Khobar Towers bombing, which targeted a housing complex for U.S. Air Force personnel and resulted in the deaths of 19 servicemen and injuries to around 500 others.
The United States placed Al-Mughassil on its most-wanted list, offering a financial reward for information leading to his arrest. He was eventually detained in Beirut in 2015 and transferred to Riyadh after years in hiding.
In the United Arab Emirates, authorities in recent years have announced the arrest of Lebanese nationals and others on charges related to membership in or links to Hezbollah.
In Bahrain, authorities announced in 2016 the dismantling of a group accused of establishing an entity called “Bahraini Hezbollah,” with charges including fundraising and planning acts of violence.
About two years later, authorities referred 169 defendants to trial on charges related to establishing or joining a terrorist organization and training in the use of weapons and explosives. Bahraini authorities indicated that these individuals had received support and training from Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.
Against this backdrop, Gulf states collectively designated Hezbollah a “terrorist organization” in 2016.
Bahraini journalist Ahdhiya Al-Sayed says Gulf countries possess the capacity to monitor the movements of such organizations. She notes that Iran’s attempts to export its revolution since 1979 have faced continuous challenges, and that any such activities remain limited in impact given the Gulf states’ ability to contain them.
Political analyst Mubarak Al-Ati, for his part, emphasizes that there has been a qualitative shift in Iran’s strategy toward Gulf Arab states, especially amid the current direct military escalation in the region. He explained that “the exposure of these networks renews deep concerns about potential infiltration,” noting that “the tasks assigned to these networks indicate that Iranian influence has moved beyond soft power or propaganda into a phase of direct operational activity.”
Options for Gulf States
Al-Ati says that what is known as the “fifth column” is a complex issue in the Gulf context and tends to surface during periods of regional tension. He added that Gulf governments take the issue of external loyalties seriously, and that “some analyses suggest Iran seeks to build influence either through soft power or by exploiting certain social and political grievances.” He also pointed out that so-called “sleeper cells,” whether individuals or groups, may not be active at present but remain ready to mobilize during times of escalation.
Al-Sallal likewise believes that Gulf states rely on a “proactive approach in dealing with these threats, based on identifying risks in their early stages through monitoring and close follow-up, tightening oversight on funding sources, enhancing cyber and technical security capabilities, and monitoring the use of digital platforms… in addition to Gulf-level coordination.”
He stressed that “it is not possible to speak of broad Iranian influence inside Kuwait or Gulf states, but it is also not possible to deny the existence of limited attempts at influence, which often take on a security dimension through the formation of small networks or the selective recruitment of individuals. These are usually uncovered in their early stages before they develop into an actual threat.”
The article is a translation of the original Arabic.
Sakina Abdallah
A Saudi writer, researcher, and TV presenter
