It is not merely financial extortion, but a project of dominance and a “clear” violation of the law.
This is how decision-making circles in the Arab Gulf states view Iran’s demand to impose fees on transit through the Strait of Hormuz.
However, Iran may ultimately emerge as the biggest loser from this proposal. The reason: the leverage held by the Sultanate of Oman.
Restrictions and Fees
Days after the announcement of a truce between the United States and Iran, the Strait of Hormuz remains “not open,” according to Gulf states.
Access has become “restricted, conditional, and subject to oversight,” said Sultan al-Jaber, CEO of the Abu Dhabi National Oil Company (ADNOC).
Al-Jaber warned that “energy security and global economic stability” depend on reopening the Strait of Hormuz “fully, unconditionally, and without restrictions.” He also serves as the UAE’s minister of industry and advanced technology. His remarks were made in a LinkedIn post on Thursday.
Experts stress that there is no real alternative to Gulf oil exports via the Strait of Hormuz, through which 12 million barrels of crude oil pass daily. Alternative pipelines cannot handle such volumes, and developing new routes would require years of investment.
Iran had presented a 10-point proposal to end the war, one of which grants Iran and Oman a role in regulating the movement of vessels transiting the Strait of Hormuz, including “taking measures” against them.
But Oman does not want to impose fees.
Omani Minister of Transport, Communications and Information Technology Said al-Maawali said that imposing any fees on ship transit would contradict international agreements to which the sultanate is committed.
Muscat is seeking to ensure freedom of navigation and “enhance legal clarity,” according to the Omani minister, noting that the legal landscape is complex due to the “absence of some states” from the agreements. Iran has not ratified the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.
A Dominance Project
They are “negotiating tools,” said academic Abdullah Baabood, describing the disruption of the strait or attempts to impose transit fees.
Iran may be able to do so temporarily, Baabood said, but it is a legally “fragile” option and difficult to sustain in practice.
He explained that Iran “may possess the geographic capability” to “impose a partial fait accompli” in the strait, but it would face significant challenges, including the difficulty of compelling all vessels to comply, the risk of military or naval escalation, and international rejection.
Former Kuwaiti lawmaker Ali al-Duqbasi views the Iranian demand as an attempt to impose influence.
He said the Strait of Hormuz was not dug by Iran and “did not arise from investments or engineering projects,” as is the case with the Suez and Panama canals.
Therefore, the Iranian demand goes beyond the “traditional logic of managing waterways” and could lead to “broader escalation not limited to the Gulf states.”
He warned that an Iranian approach of dominance could set a precedent that might be repeated in the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, and that the solution lies in an “international stance” that restores matters to their natural framework.
According to Baabood, Iran’s approach lacks a legal basis, as it contradicts the principle of freedom of navigation.
Al-Mulla: Clarity Without Ambiguity
Prominent Emirati legal expert Dr. Habib al-Mulla said that “any fee imposed solely for passage constitutes a direct violation of international law,” whether under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea or customary law.
Al-Mulla cited several legal arguments to support his position.
He said the strait is governed by the regime of transit passage under Part III of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, specifically Articles 37 to 44. Article 44 is explicit and leaves no room for interpretation, he said, as states bordering straits may not impede transit passage or impose any conditions on it.
He explained that the only exception permitted under Article 26(2) is fees for specific services actually rendered, such as pilotage or firefighting in emergencies, not a general transit fee.
He noted that “even if the regime of innocent passage were assumed to apply, Article 26 also prohibits fees for this type of passage on the same basis.”
He added that this principle is not limited to treaty texts, but is also grounded in customary international law established by the International Court of Justice in the Corfu Channel case in 1949, when the court affirmed the right of ships to unimpeded passage through international straits regardless of the relationship between the coastal state and the flag state.
“Iran signed the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea but has not ratified it. Nevertheless, it remains bound by international law. The ruling in the Corfu Channel case became part of general international law decades before the convention and is binding even on those who have not ratified it,” he said.
Oman’s Position a “Dilemma” for Iran
Iran’s legal challenges do not end there. Geography also plays a decisive role.
At its narrowest point, the Strait of Hormuz is about 21 nautical miles wide. Ships typically travel outbound through a channel that runs mostly through Iranian waters and return via a channel that runs mostly through Omani waters near the Musandam Peninsula.
For this reason, Al-Mulla said, commercial vessels do not pass before Iran alone, but also before Oman. The separation of the two lanes through a traffic separation scheme supervised by the International Maritime Organization (IMO) makes Oman an effective partner in managing the strait, not merely a neighboring state.
Oman ratified the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea in 1989 and is committed to the transit passage regime. It also has the right to joint oversight of the return lane.
“Oman can refuse any fees imposed by Iran within its waters and could even declare its territorial waters open to free transit passage, effectively stripping the Iranian decision of much of its practical impact on traffic,” Al-Mulla said.
He noted that Oman’s position between Iran and the West has historically given it the role of a “silent mediator,” but “this does not mean the absence of a response if its direct economic interests are harmed.”
He stressed that Oman’s interest in keeping the strait open is existential, tied to its economy, security, and international relations.
If fees were imposed, Al-Mulla said, Muscat could move politically and legally and propose an alternative safe corridor, though its effectiveness would depend on the level of international support.
Even if Iran were to impose on-the-ground measures such as checkpoints, forcing ships to anchor, or demanding fees, Al-Mulla said this would face broad rejection from shipping companies and major powers, and could lead to military or naval escalation, as well as deepen the economic isolation Iran is already experiencing.
The article is a translation of the original Arabic.
Sakina Abdallah
A Saudi writer, researcher, and TV presenter
