In Jerusalem, the scene carried the feel of a rare diplomatic victory for Somaliland, the breakaway territory that declared independence from Somalia more than three decades ago but only recently gained recognition from a United Nations member state.
Last Monday, Mohamed Haji formally presented his credentials as Somaliland’s ambassador to Israel in a ceremony hosted by Israeli President Isaac Herzog. Two days later, Hargeisa announced that it would open an embassy in Jerusalem and recognize the city as Israel’s capital, while Israel prepared to establish its own mission in Hargeisa.
But the significance of the move extends far beyond bilateral relations. Thousands of miles from Jerusalem, in the port city of Berbera on the Gulf of Aden, Somaliland now sits at the center of an expanding geopolitical contest in the Horn of Africa — where Ethiopia’s search for sea access, Somalia’s fears over territorial fragmentation, Egypt’s calculations in the Red Sea, the United Arab Emirates’ port ambitions and Israel’s strategic proximity to the Bab el-Mandeb Strait all intersect.
Somaliland declared independence from Somalia more than 35 years ago and, over time, built institutions viewed by many observers as more stable than those in Mogadishu. Yet it remained without international recognition until Dec. 26, 2025, when Israel recognized it as an independent state — becoming, so far, the only U.N. member state to do so.
That recognition was followed by a January 2026 visit to Hargeisa by Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Sa’ar and the April appointment of Michael Lotem as Israel’s ambassador to Somaliland.
The developments come as the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden have returned to the center of regional security calculations. Attacks by the Houthis on commercial shipping, coupled with renewed fears of piracy, have disrupted traffic through a maritime corridor that carries roughly 12 percent of global trade via the Red Sea and the Suez Canal. In that environment, any port or logistical hub near Bab el-Mandeb acquires heightened strategic value.
That is where Berbera enters the equation. Located on the African side of the Gulf of Aden, less than 300 kilometers from southern Yemen, the city has become a focal point for Emirati influence built during years of war in Yemen. Long before Israeli recognition, United Arab Emirates had already entrenched itself in Berbera through port investments and direct ties with Hargeisa.
DP World operates Berbera Port under an investment commitment worth up to $442 million, linking it to the Berbera Economic Zone and a regular shipping route to Jebel Ali every nine days, in addition to a land corridor into Ethiopia. In 2021, the head of the UAE commercial office in Somaliland formally presented credentials to Somaliland’s presidency, giving Abu Dhabi a quasi-diplomatic foothold without extending formal recognition.
The port of Berbera, operated by DP World — (AFP)
The security dimension predates that arrangement. In 2018, Somaliland’s president announced that the UAE would train Somaliland security forces in exchange for a 30-year military base agreement in Berbera. The plan was later revised in 2019, with the airport redirected toward civilian use. But the shift did not eliminate security concerns so much as move them into a gray zone involving dual-use infrastructure, security cooperation and a potentially expandable footprint.
More recently, the French newspaper Le Monde, citing satellite imagery, reported extensive construction work at Berbera Airport between late 2025 and early 2026, coinciding with Israel’s recognition of Somaliland. The report stopped short, however, of providing evidence of any declared military deployment.
Berbera’s sensitivity has also grown amid tensions between the UAE and Mogadishu. In January 2026, Somalia’s federal government announced the cancellation of all agreements with the UAE, including port, defense and security deals, accusing Abu Dhabi of undermining Somali sovereignty. Somaliland, Puntland and Jubaland rejected the decision, exposing both the limits of Mogadishu’s authority and the depth of direct Emirati ties with Somalia’s regional administrations.
Matthew Bryden, a former U.N. official in Somalia and director of the Sahan Research Center, said the UAE’s presence in Somaliland reflected a long-standing Emirati investment in “pragmatic relationships with Somaliland, Puntland and Jubaland since long before an effective Somali government existed in Mogadishu.”
Omar Mahmood, an analyst with the International Crisis Group, argued that the UAE had benefited from Somalia’s political fragmentation by building direct ties with regional administrations, particularly during periods of strained relations with the federal government.
Israeli recognition did not create Berbera’s strategic importance, but it added new dimensions to it. A port where the UAE had already developed commercial and security influence has now become part of a broader equation linking Somaliland’s recognition drive with the security architecture of the Red Sea and Bab el-Mandeb.
“Somaliland has been waiting over 35 years to be recognized. From that perspective, where recognition comes from is less important than the fact that the taboo has been broken. But the timing, and the fact that Israel has broken the ice propel Somaliland into the midst of a geopolitical crisis that it is ill-equipped to navigate,” Bryden said.
Mahmood said the recognition “does both – it breaks a barrier for Somaliland regarding its struggle for international recognition, but that comes at a cost of creating new adversaries.”
The backlash was swift. Mogadishu described Sa’ar’s visit as “an assault on sovereignty.” The African Union called on Israel to reverse its recognition, while Turkey deemed the move illegal and China reaffirmed support for Somalia’s territorial unity. Even the UAE, despite its deep involvement in Berbera, has so far stopped short of formal recognition.
Egypt also appears uneasy. Cairo views Berbera and Somaliland through the lens of Red Sea security, Somali territorial integrity and the regional balance of power in the Horn of Africa.
Fawzi Ashmawy, Egypt’s former assistant foreign minister, told Alhurra that “Egyptian strategy is built on several principles,” including restricting Red Sea security arrangements to littoral states only — a position that, he said, excludes Ethiopia “under international law from any arrangements concerning Red Sea security.”
The reference to Ethiopia is closely tied to Addis Ababa’s growing relationship with Somaliland. Landlocked since Eritrea’s independence, Ethiopia sees Berbera as one of its most viable routes to the sea. In 2024, Ethiopia signed a memorandum of understanding with Hargeisa granting access to a maritime outlet, linking Ethiopia’s ambitions for sea access with the broader issue of Somaliland’s recognition.
For Cairo, the issue is therefore not simply an internal Somali dispute, but a potential gateway for Ethiopia to enter Red Sea power arrangements from outside the club of coastal states. Ashmawy added that Egypt remains committed to “preserving the unity of Somalia” and rejecting what he described as “Israeli schemes” in Somaliland.
Still, the question remains whether Berbera can materially alter the balance of surveillance and deterrence around Bab el-Mandeb.
Members of the Somaliland army take part in a military parade in Hargeisa to mark Independence Day — (AFP)
Bryden distinguished between the location’s strategic value and Somaliland’s actual capabilities. “Potential establishment of new dual-use facilities at Berbera could close a dangerous gap in maritime surveillance and security near the mouth of the Bab el Mandeb,” he said, noting that Somaliland lacks the resources to monitor its more than 850-kilometer coastline and remains excluded from regional maritime arrangements. “Berbera’s availability as a Port of Refuge offers another potentially strategic resource for shipping in case of Bab el Mandeb closure,” he added.
The risks are not limited to diplomatic fallout. Israeli recognition could transform from a boost to Somaliland’s sovereignty campaign into a political liability, particularly given opposition from Muslim and African states. It could also expose the territory to direct security threats. Houthi leader Abdul-Malik al-Houthi has previously said his group was “serious” about targeting any Israeli presence in Somaliland, whether “a military base or any permanent deployment.”
There is also the risk that Somaliland becomes another arena for proxy conflict — one in which recognition itself shifts from a political right rooted in self-determination into a security bargaining chip that can be granted or withdrawn. “A government in Hargeysa that attempts to trade basing rights in exchange for anything less than full political sovereignty is likely to brought down at the ballot box or even impeached,” Bryden warned
That, ultimately, is where the opportunity lies — and where the trap begins.
Adapted and translated from the original Arabic.
Ezat Wagdi Ba Awaidhan
Ezat Wagdi Ba Awaidhan, a Yemeni journalist and documentary filmmaker based in Washington, D.C., holds a master's degree in media studies.
