A senior Iraqi government source told Alhurra that Washington has asked Baghdad to establish a clear timetable for bringing all weapons under state control and dismantling armed groups operating outside government authority, as Iraq awaits a potential U.S.-Iran agreement that could reshape the calculations of Tehran-aligned factions.
The U.S. request was delivered during a visit to Baghdad on Monday by U.S. envoy Tom Barrack, who met with Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi. Iraqi sources say the circle of factions refusing to surrender their weapons has expanded beyond Kataib Hezbollah and Harakat al-Nujaba to include Harakat al-Awfiya and Kataib Sayyid al-Shuhada.
A government official involved in the state weapons control initiative said Barrack’s message focused on moving Iraqi commitments beyond political rhetoric and toward concrete implementation.
“Barrack’s visit emphasized one essential point,” the source told Alhurra. “A timetable must be established for this issue, and it cannot remain an open-ended process without a defined deadline.”
The U.S. State Department did not immediately respond to Alhurra’s request for comment.
According to an Iraqi government statement, Barrack and al-Zaidi discussed “implementing Iraqi plans to ensure the complete disarmament and dismantling of all armed groups and formations operating outside the authority and oversight of the Iraqi state,” while consolidating the state’s exclusive control over weapons.
The American pressure comes as Baghdad awaits the outcome of expected talks between Washington and Tehran in Geneva on Friday. Iraqi sources believe any understanding between the two sides could have a direct impact on the future of the armed factions, long one of the central arenas of U.S.-Iran competition inside Iraq.
A source within the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) leadership told Alhurra that opposition to disarmament is no longer limited to Kataib Hezbollah and Harakat al-Nujaba.
“In addition to those two groups, Harakat al-Awfiya and Kataib Sayyid al-Shuhada have also rejected handing over their weapons,” the source said.
The same source said Kataib Hezbollah recently conveyed a message indicating that it could be willing to surrender its arms in the future, provided all U.S. forces leave Iraq, including those stationed in the Kurdistan Region.
Last week, the Iraqi government announced that the U.S.-led international coalition’s military mission against ISIS would formally conclude by the end of September.
The withdrawal would end an eleven-year chapter that began in 2014, when the coalition entered Iraq to assist in the fight against ISIS after the group seized large swaths of the country. Military and intelligence cooperation continued through the campaign to recapture Iraqi cities, culminating in Baghdad’s declaration of ISIS’s territorial defeat in 2017, after which the coalition’s role shifted to training, advisory, and support functions.
The inclusion of Harakat al-Awfiya and Kataib Sayyid al-Shuhada—both designated as terrorist organizations by the United States—among the factions refusing disarmament carries particular significance given allegations surrounding their activities.
Harakat al-Awfiya, led by Haider al-Gharawi, has been accused of targeting the convoy of American journalist Shelly Kittleson near Baghdad International Airport in April. Kataib Sayyid al-Shuhada, led by Abu Alaa al-Walai, has been accused by Iraqi intelligence sources of launching rockets toward Israel and Gulf states, with some landing in Jordan.
Al-Zaidi’s government has sought to frame the weapons issue as part of a broader effort to restore state authority over security decisions. But the path remains complicated by the political and military influence of the armed factions and by differing views over whether they should integrate into official institutions or relinquish the armed roles they have maintained outside government control.
Recently, two Tehran-aligned factions—Asaib Ahl al-Haq and Kataib al-Imam Ali, both designated by the United States as terrorist organizations—announced that they had transferred command of their armed brigades within the PMF structure to the state, a move widely seen as reflecting mounting pressure over the weapons file.
Security analyst Fadel Abu Ragheef believes a U.S.-Iran agreement, if reached, could strengthen Baghdad’s hand.
“The faction’s issue is unquestionably linked to any agreement Iran and the United States may sign,” Abu Ragheef told Alhurra. “I expect such an agreement to positively influence al-Zaidi’s efforts to place all weapons under state control.”
However, a senior PMF official argued that easing tensions between Washington and Tehran could deprive some factions of one of the principal justifications they have used to retain their weapons.
“The factions opposing disarmament wanted a confrontation with the United States because it reinforced their rationale for keeping their weapons and expanding their influence inside Iraq,” the source said.
Even if direct confrontation between Washington and Tehran becomes less likely, disarmament may not necessarily become easier. Some factions continue to condition any move on the withdrawal of U.S. forces, while others regard their weapons as an integral part of their political identity and regional role rather than an organizational issue that can be settled by government decree.
Political and security sources previously told Alhurra that figures linked to Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps conveyed messages to Iraqi faction leaders shortly after al-Zaidi’s government won parliamentary confidence in May, reflecting Tehran’s opposition to surrendering weapons to the Iraqi state.
Joshua Yaphe, a senior fellow at the Washington-based Center for the National Interest, said the White House would almost certainly insist that Iran make concessions regarding its proxy groups.
At the same time, Yaphe argued that Tehran has little intention of abandoning support for its regional allies, leaving Washington with familiar policy options: sanctions, arrests, and covert operations targeting those groups.
While some political forces have expressed willingness to cooperate with the government’s plans, others continue to tie disarmament to political and security guarantees or to changes in the nature of the American military presence in Iraq.
Mustafa al-Saray, director of research at the Al-Bayan Center for Planning and Studies, said some figures associated with the factions have recently begun reassessing their positions as a U.S.-Iran agreement appears increasingly likely.
“A number of faction-linked figures have come to believe that the rapid steps they took before the announcement of an agreement between Tehran and Washington were premature,” al-Saray told Alhurra. “They should have waited until the issue was settled before making decisions that could affect their organizational structures.”
He added that Washington views the weapons issue primarily as a bilateral U.S.-Iraq matter rather than simply a component of negotiations with Tehran.
“The United States appears to be handling this file independently from the Iranian issue and the anticipated peace agreement,” he said. “That suggests Washington wants to pull Iraq out of Iran’s sphere of influence. At the same time, Tehran has come to recognize that the factions’ weapons issue is fundamentally an Iraqi-American matter. Even if an agreement is reached, the two sides have yet to develop a clear shared understanding regarding Iraqi resistance factions comparable to their approach toward Hezbollah in Lebanon.”
Iraqi political assessments suggest Washington could increasingly link expanded economic and investment cooperation with Baghdad to measurable progress on bringing weapons under state control, particularly in energy, infrastructure, technology, and financial sector projects. Iraqi sources, however, caution that any such linkage would depend on the government’s ability to demonstrate tangible and verifiable progress rather than issue broad political statements.
For al-Zaidi’s government, the issue now appears to be heading down one of two paths. Baghdad could capitalize on regional de-escalation and U.S. backing to integrate some armed formations and reduce the role of weapons outside state institutions. Alternatively, factions opposing disarmament could continue obstructing the process through political pressure or by conditioning any surrender of weapons on the withdrawal of U.S. forces.
In either case, establishing a timetable alone will not resolve the issue. The true test for the Iraqi government will be whether it can translate Washington’s demand into concrete action: who will surrender weapons, when they will do so, to which institution they will be transferred, and under what oversight mechanism. Only then will it become clear whether Iraq’s long-discussed effort to place all weapons under state control has moved from political aspiration to practical implementation.
Adapted and translated from the original Arabic.
