Four years into the war on Ukraine, one of the most fruitful diplomatic channels between Moscow and Kyiv doesn’t run through Washington, Brussels, or Geneva; it runs through Abu Dhabi.
Since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the United Arab Emirates has conducted 25 rounds of mediation that has freed more than 7,000 captives held by the two sides in the conflict. The Emirates has also established itself as a bona fide political negotiator, convening two rounds of trilateral talks between the United States, Russia, and Ukraine on high-level issues since January.
The UAE’s quietly brokering of prisoner releases and its hosting of those first-ever trilateral talks offer proof, Emirati officials hope, that Abu Dhabi can convert its oil wealth into political influence far beyond the Middle East.
The Emirati Strategy
The UAE’s mediation efforts are grounded in the nation’s relatively neutral stance in the Ukraine-Russian war. Though the UAE condemned the Russian invasion of its western neighbor, it has maintained diplomatic ties and faced interventions from the U.S. and the European Union to take a tougher stance on sanctioning Moscow.
“When Russia invaded Ukraine, we took a position to be on the side of international law,” Anwar Gargash, diplomatic adviser to the Emirati president said in February. “But at the same time … not to take sides and to maintain relations with Ukraine and to maintain relations with Russia.” “What we really want to do is we want to be helpful,” he added.
Dmitry Bridzhe, researcher and director of the Russian Studies Unit at the Center of Arabic Eurasian Studies, a Cairo-based think tank, said that more independent stance is what makes the UAE useful to Russian leaders.
“Moscow does not see the UAE as a Western satellite. It sees Abu Dhabi as a sovereign, transactional power that talks to everyone and does not turn mediation into political pressure against Russia,” Bridzhe said. “For Moscow, the UAE is useful precisely because it has access to Washington, Kyiv, Moscow, and the Gulf but does not behave like Brussels or Geneva.”
“Western-led formats like Geneva are usually framed as politicized platforms designed to pressure Russia, not negotiate with it,” he added. “The UAE is presented as a mediator; the West is presented as a party to the conflict wearing the mask of diplomacy.”
Emirati leaders have built trust through personal relationships with Russian and Ukrainian officials while focusing on humanitarian issues before political concerns.
Ahmad Khalifa, a UAE-based analyst, said the country “provides a reliable communication channel and a suitable environment for dialogue, with a focus on facilitating humanitarian results more than drafting major political proposals.”
What does the UAE Want Out of This?
The Emirates has sought to use international conflict mediation to diversify its foreign policy away from the Middle East and show how the Gulf nation can play a role on the broader global stage.
A CSIS report found that UAE-Russian relations are “robust and growing.” Russian investment in the Emirates has only increased in recent years, mainly to avoid Western sanctions.
The wealthy Gulf state has inserted itself into other geopolitical disputes. In 2018, the UAE brokered a peace deal between Ethiopia and Eritrea and has been involved in Egypt-Ethiopia talks over the GERD dam dispute.
The UAE’s soft-power projection and reputation as a reliable mediator is put at some risk by its involvement in the ongoing Sudanese civil war. Reports from the United Nations and several nongovernmental groups say the UAE supports the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), a paramilitary group widely accused of involvement in war crimes in fighting the Sudanese Armed Forces.
While the UAE has repeatedly denied providing any material, financial, or political backing to the RSF, Human Rights Watch found in a May 2026 investigative report that the country had helped the insurgents recruit and supply private military companies through a company acting as a proxy. The NGO said the UAE’s role “could constitute aiding and abetting in, or otherwise substantially contributing to, the RSF’s commission of war crimes and crimes against humanity.”
Sudanese political analyst Mohammed Al-Mustafa told MBN that although condemnations are increasing against the UAE for their role in Sudan, they would likely have little bearing on its standing elsewhere.
“Emirati relations with its international partners are unlikely to be significantly affected, although calls to condemn the Emirati position in the Sudanese war are mounting,” Al-Mustafa said, pointing in particular to call s from Democratic lawmakers in the U.S. that have prompted no action from the White House.
“Geopolitics remains above all else. In other words, the UAE’s geopolitical importance to its allies overrides the moral and political motivation to condemn its position in the Sudan war,” Mustafa said.
However, he said the UAE’s soft power might be at stake.
The Limits of UAE Influence
Although the UAE claims neutrality in the Russia-Ukraine conflict, its economic entanglements with Moscow run counter to that image. According to Bridzhe, Abu Dhabi has become an alternative to Europe and Western corridors, politically and economically.
“The war turned the UAE into one of Russia’s key external corridors for trade, capital, logistics, diplomacy, and elite communication. Politically, Abu Dhabi helps Moscow show it is not isolated,” Bridzhe said. “Economically, it became a major hub for Russia’s shift away from Europe. This is not an alliance, but it is a powerful strategic partnership built on interests, not ideology.”
Reuters reported in May 2024 that the United States, Britain, and the European Union pressured the UAE to crack down on firms evading Western sanctions imposed on Russia in the Emirates.
It remains to be seen how effective the UAE can be as a negotiator on the most salient issues in the Russia-Ukraine war—including territory or a post-war settlement.
The trilateral talks of January and February were a landmark in terms of bringing the relevant parties together, but they produced little more than a routine prisoner swap. Releasing prisoners, it is worth noting, requires no one to concede territory or a red line. The political track has proven less fruitful. A third round of talks between Russia and Ukraine was postponed by the Iran war, and Kremlin sources have since told the Financial Times that Russia doesn’t expect substantive talks with anyone before February 2027.
The UAE’s simple bet for broader influence has been grounded in it not having to choose sides. That’s easier where the UAE has little at stake, such as in Ukraine. It is much harder where it does, like Sudan, Libya, or Yemen, where its own money and arms are already on one side of the fight. Whether Abu Dhabi can keep claiming neutrality may come down to how many of those closer-to-home tests it is willing to keep pursuing.
