Israel’s Other Normalization Story

While the Abraham Accords marked five years this week amid familiar debates in the Gulf and Levant, another story is unfolding further north. From Baku to Tirana, Muslim-majority states in Eastern Europe and the Caucasus are forging ties with Israel that blend history, trade, and diplomacy in ways often overlooked.

Across this region, shaped by Ottoman legacies, European influence, and Soviet history, countries such as Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Albania, and Kosovo already maintain relations with Israel to varying degrees.

This track of normalization highlights a different dynamic than the one seen in the Gulf: it relies less on grand diplomatic accords and more on gradual, people-to-people engagement rooted in history, culture, and shared strategic interests.

Examining these cases offers insight into how normalization can take hold outside the Arab heartland, and what lessons, positive or negative, it might hold for the Middle East.

Some have gone as far as opening embassies in Jerusalem, like Kosovo. Others have cultivated strategic ties in energy, security, and intelligence. What sets these countries apart, however, is their early embrace of “popular normalization,” involving civil society, drawing on shared history (such as Albania’s and Bosnia’s rescue of Jews during World War II), and promoting ties through tourism, trade, and public campaigns

This symbolic dimension also creates indirect pressure on states that continue to reject normalization. Over time, it could generate gradual shifts, especially if these models deliver visible economic and political benefits.

“The Abraham Accords provide instant diplomatic recognition, formal frameworks for cooperation, and economic partnerships. They are effective in producing concrete outcomes such as trade deals, security coordination, and official state visits,” said Fuad Shahbazov, a regional security expert in the South Caucasus, in an interview with Alhurra.

But Shahbazov also points to the limits of this approach: its weakness lies in the lack of societal impact. “As a result, public opinion in many Muslim-majority societies remains skeptical of normalization, even when governments recognize Israel, largely because there has been no progress on the Palestinian issue,” he added.

Government-level agreements can open embassies and sign trade contracts, but they are rarely enough to build lasting peace. History offers clear lessons, particularly in Arab countries like Egypt and Jordan, where treaties with Israel remained confined to political elites and never took root in society. This is why the question of “popular normalization” has taken on greater importance in the Caucasus and the Balkans.

Azerbaijan stands out as Israel’s closest Muslim ally. Israel was among the first countries to recognize Baku after its independence from the Soviet Union in 1991. Today, Azerbaijan supplies up to 55% of Israel’s oil needs, while in return it receives billions of dollars’ worth of advanced weapons systems.

Between 2016 and 2021, Israeli arms made up 69% of Azerbaijan’s weapons imports, including missile interception systems and loitering munitions (suicide drones) that proved decisive in its 2020 victory over Armenia in the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War.

Kazakhstan is also a major supplier of oil to Israel, while Uzbekistan has stepped in to fill export gaps, such as copper, after Turkey imposed restrictions. Official data show that Israel imports about 25% of its oil from Kazakhstan, with bilateral trade reaching nearly $236 million in 2024.

But the ties extend beyond oil and arms, reaching into social and cultural spaces.

In Baku, the presence of a longstanding Jewish community has made relations with Israel more familiar to society, easing potential resistance.

Albania, by contrast, has pursued normalization through education and cultural initiatives, weaving engagement with Israel into its broader state-building process. For many Albanians, this is reinforced by a powerful humanitarian legacy: the rescue of hundreds of Jews during the Holocaust.

That history, argues Arolda Elbasani of the European University of Tirana, created an emotionally positive foundation for deeper people-to-people ties. “One reason for Albania’s strong support for Israel is its history and unique relationship with Jews during the darkest days of World War II. Albanian Muslims protected their Jewish neighbors, and Albania was the only country where the Jewish population grew after the war compared to before it,” she told Alhurra.

She added that Albania’s support for Israel reflects its broader foreign policy orientation and its efforts to reshape its image as “a model state of religious tolerance and moderate Islam, a bridge between East and West, and a player in religious peace.”

Kosovo’s ties with Israel are more recent, dating back to 2021, when the two signed an agreement brokered by the United States. That same year, Kosovo went further than any other Muslim-majority state by opening an embassy in Jerusalem, a sensitive first.

Even before official recognition, history had laid the groundwork for a positive relationship. During the 1998–1999 war with Serbia, Israel provided humanitarian aid to Kosovar refugees. Since establishing diplomatic ties, the two countries have moved quickly, including a 2024 visa-free travel agreement that boosted tourism.

The importance of this kind of “popular normalization,” analysts note, lies in ensuring the durability of relations and protecting them from collapse during political crises. “When governments are truly pragmatic and see relations with Israel as strategically valuable, popular normalization becomes especially effective as a complementary factor, ensuring that ties are not only based on formal dealings but are also socially rooted,” said Fuad Shahbazov.