In Lebanon, words can be as combustible as rockets. Six of them: “ideology is more dangerous than weapons,” were enough to ignite a political firestorm. They came from Member of Parliament Paula Yacoubian, one of the country’s most outspoken reformist voices, and within hours she was accused of attacking the entire community.
She insists her target was never sectarian. What she meant, she explains, is that “the ideology that justifies weapons is more dangerous than the weapons themselves.” Criticizing Hezbollah’s worldview, she argues, is not an attack on Shiites any more than criticizing the Muslim Brotherhood means attacking all Sunnis. “The real threat is the corrupt leader who sells empty slogans,” she tells Alhurra.
For Yacoubian, the backlash revealed a deeper malaise. In Lebanon, political factions try to fuse themselves with their sects, convincing people that any critique is an existential threat. “Leaders needed to rally their base by saying, ‘you are under attack.’ What is under attack is Hezbollah’s policies. Those policies destroyed homes in the very community it claims to protect. Shiites have paid the highest price in this war.” She describes Hezbollah as fundamentally different from other Lebanese parties, requiring its members to be Shiite, Twelver, and believers in velayat-e faqih. “That is not a normal Lebanese political party. Criticizing it is not attacking a religion. It is about politics, about dragging Lebanon into endless adventures. We have the right to say this ideology is incompatible with a country that wants institutions and citizenship.”
She rejects the argument that Hezbollah’s weapons are what kept Lebanon safe. “Weapons did not protect or deter. The state is what offers protection. If the army holds the weapons, they become a source of national consensus.” To her, the Lebanese army is stronger than any faction because it carries the legitimacy of all Lebanese, though she warns that forcing it into direct confrontation with Hezbollah’s base would be disastrous. The solution, she argues, is to abandon “militia logic” in favor of “state logic.” That also means pushing Hezbollah to transition from armed movement to political party as other militias once did. “The sooner the better,” she says. “Every day of delay multiplies the risks.”
When asked why Hezbollah’s supporters still hold on despite the movement’s setbacks and Iran’s distractions, Yacoubian is blunt. “Iran will not give up this card in Lebanon. It invested in this weapon from the beginning. It trained generations in a specific worldview. Weapons are part of a larger system. Official Lebanon is asking for disarmament. Iran sees weapons as a bargaining chip, something to trade for concessions on its regime or nuclear program. But the price should not be Iranian interests. It should be Lebanon’s.”
Her critique of Hezbollah extends to Lebanon’s broader collapse. Reconstruction of the south and Beirut’s suburbs, she says, is impossible without external support, but the international community will not provide it so long as weapons remain outside state control and reforms are absent. “In the past, the world tolerated this. Not anymore. Today, disarmament and reform are non-negotiable.” That judgment is tied to what she calls Lebanon’s “deep state”: a network of parties embedded inside institutions, filling sensitive posts with loyalists and blocking any attempt at neutral governance.
For Yacoubian, the arrival of Prime Minister Nawaf Salam marked the first real attempt at reform, a leader and a team not tainted by the past. “That never existed under Syrian tutelage or after,” she says, which is why entrenched cartels are fighting so hard to bring him down.
She singles out the banking lobby as the most powerful of these entrenched interests, describing how it funds media hostile to reformists and manipulates political currents. “Add to it the weapons lobby, though weaker now,” she says, “but money controls media and power.”
For her, the success of reforms is almost entirely tied to external aid. In Paris conferences and elsewhere, conditions were set but never met because the old political class was deceiving donors. Now, with reformists inside government, external and internal pressure are finally aligned.
This alignment, she warns, is fragile, especially when international actors narrow their focus. “Washington sometimes focuses only on weapons, ignoring reforms. That is a mistake. Without reforms, the power of weapons and the parallel economy grows. The two must go hand in hand.” If reform fails, Yacoubian says, it will be because Lebanon has hit the wall of regional politics. “Remember, this is Iranian weaponry on Lebanese soil. And Israel wants the Lebanese front to remain open for Netanyahu’s political survival. The world must pressure Iran and Israel simultaneously.”
Her conclusion is that Lebanon is at an inflection point, with Iran weakened, Syria no longer under Tehran’s full influence, and Hezbollah under pressure after years of war. A reformist government is trying, against the odds, to break the cycle of paralysis. Whether Lebanon seizes the chance, Yacoubian believes, depends on whether the country can shed the ideology that has for decades justified the weapons and power of militias. Only then, she insists, can Lebanon become a state of institutions and citizenship.
Joe Kawly
Joe Kawly is a veteran global affairs journalist with over two decades of frontline reporting across Washington, D.C. and the Middle East. A CNN Journalism Fellow and Georgetown University graduate, his work focuses on U.S. foreign policy, Arab world politics, and diplomacy. With deep regional insight and narrative clarity, Joe focuses on making complex global dynamics clear, human, and relevant.
