“If they don’t disarm, we will disarm them. And it will happen quickly and perhaps violently,” said President Donald Trump when asked about the future of Hamas’s weapons in Gaza.
The remarks came days after a cease-fire agreement was signed Monday between Israel and Hamas, brokered by Trump and containing 20 provisions. Several key parts of the deal have already been carried out, including the release of all living hostages and the return of some bodies, in exchange for the release of Palestinian prisoners from Israeli jails and a halt to military operations.
“These achievements, important as they are, are the low-hanging fruit. The harder task is forcing Hamas to disarm,” said Max Abrahams, a senior fellow at a U.S. foreign-policy think tank, in an interview with Alhurra.
Talk of Hamas’s arsenal goes far beyond a list of scattered weapons. It refers to an entire logistical infrastructure: rockets, arms depots, local manufacturing workshops, smuggling networks, and a complex tunnel system stretching for kilometers underground.
Disarmament, therefore, means more than collecting visible weapons. It must include the systematic dismantling of missile and drone workshops, closing smuggling tunnels, cutting off financing channels, and disrupting the command, control and communications networks that allowed Hamas to manage long and complex operations for years.
“Disarmament is possible in theory, but it is extremely difficult, if not impossible,” said Reuven Berko, a reserve colonel in the Israeli army, in an interview with Alhurra.
Berko linked the difficulties to the lack of political will and the capacity to enforce the law in Gaza. He drew a practical distinction between types of weapons: removing heavy capabilities, such as launchers, rocket platforms, and mortar systems, “seems more feasible than seizing thousands of small arms stored in homes.”
He warned that the continued spread of small arms would make rearming easier. Berko also emphasized the need to stop outside supply lines, saying success would depend on effective control of crossings and borders, especially with Egypt.
He added that any realistic path forward would require a transitional authority with real powers to enforce rules, whether Arab, international, or a mix of both. But he cautioned that past experiences have shown the limits of international forces without political backing and real monitoring powers, as seen with Hezbollah after the 2006 war.
Given current conditions in Gaza and the pressure on Hamas, three main scenarios for disarming the group have emerged, said Palestinian governance researcher Jihad Harb.
The first scenario is Israeli military control of the Gaza Strip, followed by disarmament operations and tunnel destruction. “This scenario is difficult to implement since Israel has not succeeded over two years in eliminating Hamas. It could take a long time and result in heavy casualties, especially among Palestinians,” Harb said.
A second scenario is disarmament under a U.N. peacekeeping mission authorized by the Security Council, involving weapon collection, fighter demobilization, and social reintegration, similar to missions the U.N. has carried out in Latin America and Africa. “Implementation is unlikely,” Harb said, “because of Israeli and U.S. reservations about placing the effort under an international mandate.”
“The most likely scenario,” he added, “hinges on the Palestinian Authority’s return to Gaza and a deal with Hamas to surrender weapons in exchange for guarantees that fighters will not be prosecuted or pursued by Israel in the future, similar to aspects of the Northern Ireland process.”
“If the goal is to disarm Hamas, and Israel has not been able to achieve that militarily, I don’t believe anyone can do it without a political path forward,” Harb said.
That scenario, he explained, depends on the Palestinian Authority’s gradual return to Gaza and reaching understandings with Hamas for weapon handovers in exchange for security and legal guarantees and phased reintegration.
But the central problem remains incentives: for Hamas, weapons are not just combat tools but part of its power structure and identity. “That’s why any security steps must be paired with fighter-reintegration programs, sustainable economic measures, and political guarantees that address the lack of local legitimacy and offer civilians tangible alternatives,” Berko said.
Disarming Hamas, he added, can only be achieved gradually and realistically, within a clear political and security framework backed by serious international and regional will, and with effective monitoring and accountability measures. Success, he said, requires linking security efforts to tangible civilian incentives such as reconstruction, job creation, and improved services to help restore public trust in civil institutions.
In Gaza, the narrow coastal strip that stretches 41 kilometers along the Mediterranean, the calm after the cease-fire felt like a lull that could be temporary.
For two years since Oct. 7, 2023, when the war erupted after a Hamas attack that killed 1,200 Israelis and captured 251 hostages, Gaza was devastated. More than 66,000 Palestinians, mostly civilians, have been killed, according to the Gaza Ministry of Health, and about three-quarters of buildings were destroyed.
Today Gaza is enjoying a brief respite, but the specter of renewed war remains.
On Thursday, Trump posted on social media that if Hamas continues killing people in Gaza, “we will have no choice but to go in there and kill them.” The comment followed reports that Hamas had executed seven men in Gaza City it accused of collaborating with Israel.
Hours earlier, Trump said he would consider allowing Israeli forces to resume fighting in Gaza if Hamas did not abide by the cease-fire and refused to disarm.
Those remarks coincided with statements by Israeli Defense Minister Yisrael Katz directing the military to prepare a comprehensive plan “to defeat Hamas” in Gaza if the war resumes.
Abrahams said Israel may resume its campaign because there are few viable alternatives. “Hamas will not disarm willingly because remaining a cohesive armed organization is its core objective,” he said.
He added that Turkey and Qatar are unlikely to play that role effectively, given their historical ties to and long-standing support for Hamas. “Nor do I see a Palestinian leadership emerging soon that could confront Hamas. Such leadership may appear one day, but I don’t think Israel will wait patiently while Hamas remains armed,” Abrahams said.
Yehia Qasim
