In his first address to the United Nations General Assembly in New York, Indonesian President Prabowo Subianto called for “guaranteeing Israel’s security,” describing it as “a condition for genuine peace.”
Prabowo, who took office in October 2024, greeted the audience with the Hebrew word shalom and openly declared his support for a two-state solution.
The statement was striking for the world’s largest Muslim-majority country.
“Historically, Indonesian diplomacy has always opposed any public rapprochement with Israel, because it is deeply unpopular at home and lacks support within the state bureaucracy,” said Yohanes Sulaiman, professor of international relations at Ahmad Yani University in Yogyakarta, speaking to Alhurra.
Even so, the president sharply criticized Israel for its war in Gaza.
Prabowo also attended the Sharm el-Sheikh summit, where Egypt, Qatar, and Turkey joined the United States in signing President Donald Trump’s cease-fire proposal.
Around the same time, several media outlets reported that Prabowo was planning an unprecedented visit to Israel, which would have been the first of its kind.
The rumors intensified after Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu asked a court to postpone one of his corruption-trial sessions, citing “an urgent and particularly important political visit,” without giving details.
Indonesia’s Foreign Ministry swiftly denied the reports, confirming that the president would return to Jakarta after his visit to Egypt, which he did.
Even so, Israeli newspapers claimed Prabowo had initially agreed to visit Tel Aviv but “backed out after the plan was leaked.” Others suggested Indonesia could become a central player in a “new wave of normalization.”
In fact, Prabowo had already said in May 2024 that “Indonesia is ready to recognize Israel and establish diplomatic relations if Israel first recognizes an independent Palestinian state.”
He made the statement at a press conference in Jakarta alongside French President Emmanuel Macron.
Despite such remarks, Jakarta has maintained its traditional anti-Israel stance. Even after the Sharm el-Sheikh summit, it barred Israeli athletes from competing in the world gymnastics championship, a position that had earlier cost Indonesia the right to host the 2023 FIFA Under-20 World Cup.
Jakarta has also joined South Africa’s genocide case against Israel before the International Court of Justice in The Hague.
“Indonesia does not recognize Israel and will not establish diplomatic relations until a clearly defined, independent Palestinian state is created,” said Dewi Fortuna Anwar, an academic and former adviser to ex-president B. J. Habibie, in comments to Alhurra.
“That position has been official since the Bandung Conference of 1955,” she added.
Still, several policymakers believe rumors that Indonesia is edging toward joining the Abraham Accords, U.S.-brokered normalization agreements between Israel and several Arab states — are more than just speculation.
An informed European source told Alhurra’s Joe Khoury that Indonesia “is pursuing a calculated strategy, publicly maintaining strong pro-Palestinian rhetoric while quietly testing how far it can stretch its foreign-policy flexibility.”
The source added that the government “denies any normalization talks, yet leaves the door slightly open through carefully worded, conditional statements — more a diplomatic performance than a genuine policy shift.”
Public Pressure and Presidential Calculations
Since independence, Indonesia has avoided any open engagement with Israel. For decades, its foreign policy has followed the principle of “Bebas Aktif”, literally ‘Free and Active’ diplomacy, meaning independence from major power blocs combined with active engagement in world affairs.
Researcher Fasih Hamid, writing for the BRICS+ and ASEAN Analysis Center, said President Prabowo aims to redefine that doctrine, not merely as neutrality, as in the days when Indonesia co-founded the Non-Aligned Movement, but by adding a pragmatic dimension that strengthens the country’s political and economic reach.
According to Sulaiman, Prabowo “wants to place Indonesia at the center of global attention by highlighting its role in maintaining peace and mediating the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.”
“The president wants to show that Indonesia is a key player in international politics,” he added, noting that Prabowo must balance his foreign-policy ambitions with domestic constraints, since “support for Palestine enjoys overwhelming popular consensus.”
Sulaiman cautioned that sending peacekeepers to Gaza “could be seen by many Indonesians as endorsing a peace process they view as biased toward Israel.”
Jakarta has already announced its readiness to contribute up to 20,000 troops to any future peacekeeping mission. “Indonesia has a large pool of personnel it can deploy for such operations,” Sulaiman said.
Anwar noted that Indonesia “has long been a major contributor to U.N. peacekeeping operations but does not take part in combat or enforcement missions, in line with its domestic laws.”
She added that the idea of deploying troops to Gaza “is not new for Prabowo, he proposed it during his election campaign.”
Normalization for an OECD Seat
Behind Prabowo’s diplomacy lie clear economic motives. Indonesia is eager to join the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), a group of mostly advanced economies.
In April 2024, Yedioth Ahronoth quoted an Israeli official saying that Indonesia was ready to normalize relations with Israel as part of its bid to join the organization.
The official said secret talks between the two countries had continued for months under the mediation of OECD Secretary-General Mathias Cormann.
According to The Times of Israel, the OECD had already begun the process of admitting Jakarta, but Israel objected because the two nations lack diplomatic ties. Foreign Minister Yisrael Katz reportedly refused to withdraw the objection unless normalization came first.
Because OECD membership requires unanimous approval, Israel effectively holds a veto over Indonesia’s application.
Less than a year later, Indonesia joined the BRICS group, the economic bloc of Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa, in January 2025.
Despite the absence of formal relations, direct and indirect trade between Israel and Indonesia is estimated at about $500 million a year, according to Rebecca Zeifert, executive director of the Israel-Asia Center, quoted by Yedioth Ahronoth in 2022.
Secret Negotiations
Indonesia, the world’s largest Muslim-majority nation, is known for its mass pro-Palestinian demonstrations, especially in Jakarta.
“The Palestinian issue is not merely a religious matter, it is a cornerstone of Indonesia’s political identity,” Anwar said.
“Whenever rumors of rapprochement with Israel surface, the president faces waves of public and parliamentary opposition,” she added.
While “many Indonesians visit Israel through Jordan on regular passports,” Anwar noted, “officials never go, since relations are formally banned.”
Despite strong domestic opposition, media reports suggest that secret contacts between Indonesia and Israel began even before Prabowo took office in October 2024. Discussions at the time focused on Jakarta possibly joining the Abraham Accords, talks that were halted by the Oct. 7 Hamas attacks and the ensuing war in Gaza.
Then-president Joko Widodo quickly denied any plans to normalize ties with Israel.
Waiting for Saudi Arabia
In October 1993, former Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin visited Jakarta and met President Suharto, but after Benjamin Netanyahu took office in 1996 and peace talks stalled, Jakarta once again cut off contacts with Tel Aviv.
Indonesia’s official position remains that recognition of a Palestinian state must precede any normalization, the same stance that guided its brief diplomatic openness in the 1990s.
Jakarta also fears domestic backlash. For that reason, a Saudi-led regional normalization could provide the political and religious backing Indonesia needs to move closer to Israel.
Israeli officials, cited by Yedioth Ahronoth and other outlets, believe Indonesia may wait for Saudi Arabia, whose role as custodian of Islam’s two holiest sites in Mecca and Medina would give Jakarta the religious legitimacy to follow suit.
Sulaiman agrees that Indonesia might eventually join the Abraham Accords “especially after Saudi Arabia does, because of the kingdom’s symbolic influence in the Muslim world.”
Saudi Arabia, for its part, insists that any normalization must follow the creation of an independent Palestinian state, in line with the 2002 Arab Peace Initiative it introduced at the Beirut summit.
Scenarios Ahead
President Prabowo understands that domestic stability is a red line. Any normalization, analysts say, would likely be gradual and carefully timed, tied to developments in the Palestinian issue, Indonesia’s OECD bid, or a Saudi-led regional framework that offers wider Islamic legitimacy.
In practice, Jakarta may continue or even expand unofficial ties with Israel, possibly by opening non-diplomatic liaison offices, to meet OECD criteria without provoking public anger.
If a Saudi-led regional deal with Israel emerges alongside concrete progress toward a two-state solution, Indonesia could join the Abraham Accords under far more favorable conditions. That would give Prabowo the political and religious cover he needs both domestically and regionally.
Otherwise, Jakarta’s current course is likely to persist: reinforcing solidarity with Muslim nations and supporting Gaza through humanitarian aid and peacekeeping initiatives.
