Andres Ilves has overseen Iran coverage for the BBC, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, and now MBN. His newsletter Iran Briefing will launch next week. Subscribe here.
The old playbook for dealing with the Iranian regime has outlived its usefulness. It’s time for a new one.
In the aftermath of the 12-day war with Israel and America, Tehran finds itself in one of its weakest positions since its founding in 1979 – isolated internationally, rocked by a severe economic crisis, and facing widespread internal dissent. A regime less intent on destruction abroad and repression at home might conclude that it’s high time to demonstrate goodwill toward the rest of the world while easing restrictions on its own citizens. This is not that regime, and now is not the time to believe it is.
This memo isn’t getting through to everyone.
Last month, on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly meeting, Iran and three European nations worked flat out to salvage negotiations on Tehran’s nuclear program. Their efforts were to no avail. Iran refused to yield, and UN sanctions were reimposed on it.
That hasn’t stopped the speculation about a possible new deal for Iran.
The question really is: what’s the point? More specifically, what evidence is there that the Iranian regime can be trusted to adhere to the letter, or even the spirit, of an agreement ensuring that they do not develop nuclear weapons? And why even try to negotiate an agreement that the world cannot, ultimately, verify?
History of Duplicity
For the past 55 years, Iran has been a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, under which countries pledge not to develop nuclear weapons and agree to accept international inspectors to verify that their nuclear activities serve only peaceful purposes.
Tehran has repeatedly violated the terms of this treaty. When the multilateral Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) was agreed a decade ago between Iran and six international powers, it tied relief from sanctions for Iran to self-imposed restrictions on the key elements of the development of nuclear weapons and monitoring by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The JCPOA was premised on Iran’s commitment that its “nuclear program will remain exclusively peaceful” and on rigorous international inspections, a necessity driven by the international community’s longstanding suspicions, cited by the IAEA and the UN Security Council, that Iran had previously undertaken activities “relevant to the development of a nuclear explosive device.”
The most important issues covered by the JCPOA concerned uranium – a cap on enrichment levels, a reduction in the stockpiling of enriched uranium, and limitations on centrifuge use.
When, in 2018, the United States withdrew from the JCPOA during President Donald Trump’s first term, Iran began enriching uranium well beyond the threshold set under the agreement. The regime installed thousands of advanced centrifuges. Enrichment was resumed at locations proscribed under JCPOA. Cooperation with IAEA inspection teams was curtailed, and mandated monitoring cameras were removed. Over time, the level of breaches increased dramatically, and the Iranian government openly announced and flouted many of those violations.
As Henry Sokolski, nuclear non-proliferation expert and Executive Director of the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, put it to me recently: “The idea that we have to rely on someone’s truthfulness – we don’t have that luxury. In the phrase of President Reagan, ‘Trust, but verify’ – but I’d add that if you can’t verify, don’t trust.”
The IAEA seems to have gotten the message. This June, for the first time in two decades, the IAEA board of governors formally declared Iran to be in breach of its non-proliferation obligations. The three dissenting votes came from China, Russia, and Burkina Faso.
This breach extended beyond the stipulations of the JCPOA and went to the very core of Iran’s responsibilities under the NPT. Evidence included clear signs of uranium enrichment and restricted access for inspection teams. Iran had accumulated more than 40 times the limit of uranium hexafluoride (UF6) allowed under the JCPOA.
In the words of IAEA director general Rafael Grossi: “Iran has repeatedly either not answered, or not provided technically credible answers to, the Agency’s questions. … It has … sought to sanitize the locations [of man-made uranium particles], which has impeded Agency verification activities,” noting that the regime had stockpiled 400 kilograms of highly enriched uranium.
The day after the vote and referring to the IAEA resolution, Israel launched airstrikes against nuclear and military sites in Iran. Nine days later, the United States entered the conflict by dropping bunker-buster bombs on three Iranian nuclear sites.
Although even the Iranian regime conceded that some facilities had been “badly damaged,” it remains unclear how much of a blow was dealt to Iran’s nuclear program and by how much it has been set back.
Tehran Realities
Iran is led by Grand Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the 86-year-old supreme leader who is fading from public life and increasingly delegating power to others. The emerging leadership vacuum comes as Iran faces some of its greatest challenges ever: high inflation, widespread unemployment, enduring shortages, and general public dissatisfaction with the harsh social and political strictures of the Islamic Republic. Censorship and rigorous controls on media and public expression remain unabated, while the pace of executions is increasing dramatically: according to human rights groups, there have been over 1,000 thus far in 2025.
The blows struck by Israel and the U.S. against Iran’s nuclear program and its military leadership have created a radically different political reality. It’s clear that at the moment, Tehran won’t change its behavior towards its own citizens or the outside world. Yet surely, as the sands inevitably shift at the top, it will have to. New scenarios will emerge, and the world must be ready to take action accordingly, viewing Iran through the lens of change while always matching trust with verification.
The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Middle East Broadcasting Networks.
Andres Ilves
Andres Ilves is Senior Director for Strategic Initiatives at MBN. His career as a journalist and writer includes two decades at the BBC and Radio Free Europe.
