The path to the Palestinian Authority’s return to war-ravaged Gaza appears lined with difficult international conditions.
Foremost among them is one set by President Donald J. Trump, who has made “reforming the Palestinian Authority” a prerequisite for his administration’s plan to govern Gaza after brokering what it calls a historic cease-fire between Israel and Hamas.
Yet a closer look, through the eyes of officials and analysts familiar with Palestinian politics, suggests that the Authority’s recent arrests and corruption trials may owe less to an internal drive for reform than to outside pressure — pressure that may ultimately fail to produce lasting change.
To illustrate both the scale of corruption within the Palestinian Authority and the growing Gulf frustration toward it, Palestinian researcher Ghaith al-Omari of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy cites a senior Emirati official who once remarked, “It might be better to send the money to a Swiss bank account than risk its misuse by the Authority.” The comment, he explains, referred to the foreign accounts where some Palestinian officials are believed to have transferred funds.
According to al-Omari, that view reflects a broader policy sentiment among several Gulf capitals, particularly the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia. Both governments, which have the financial capacity to bankroll Gaza’s reconstruction, fear that channeling aid through a financially broken Authority would damage their credibility. For them, reforming the Authority is a precondition for granting it the legitimacy to participate in any future Gaza arrangement – and, more strategically, for preventing Hamas from claiming exclusive representation of the Palestinian cause. It is also a way to preserve, at least symbolically, the idea of a unified Palestinian political entity connecting the West Bank and Gaza, and with it, the fading notion of a two-state solution.
In response to mounting pressure, the Palestinian Authority has launched an anti-corruption drive targeting senior officials – some placed under house arrest, others referred to the courts. But analysts see the effort as largely symbolic, “a cosmetic gesture” meant to reassure the United States, Europe and key Gulf donors.
A Palestinian politician interviewed by Alhurra, speaking on condition of anonymity, called the measures “nonessential” and “often entangled with internal political score-settling.” He said the Authority “uses such moves to create the illusion of compliance while avoiding real structural change,” arguing that most Palestinians see the problem as stemming from the very top, from President Mahmoud Abbas himself.
Based in the West Bank, the politician said the arrests are aimed mainly at signaling responsiveness to foreign partners rather than reflecting any genuine reform agenda. In his view, their timing and scope are more coincidental than coordinated – gestures of convenience rather than the outline of a coherent plan.
As for the arrests themselves, the same official described them as “political detentions,” motivated less by reform than by the Authority’s anger at any initiative undertaken without its consent.
According to Ghaith al-Omari, there has been only one genuine model of reform in the Authority’s history: the tenure of Prime Minister Salam Fayyad from 2007 to 2013. During those years, Fayyad introduced sweeping changes in governance, financial transparency, institution-building and the modernization of security services. But his efforts were ultimately dismantled by the current leadership, al-Omari said, “because they threatened the patronage network and demanded serious work on security and reform.”
That obstruction, al-Omari added, became a deliberate strategy under President Mahmoud Abbas, who “destroyed every possible alternative,” sidelining figures such as Mohammad Dahlan, Nasser al-Qudwa and Fayyad himself – anyone who tried to cultivate an independent political or popular base. The result, he said, is a deep leadership vacuum that now hampers the Authority’s capacity to regenerate itself.
The renewed talk of reform coincides with ongoing discussions about Gaza’s reconstruction, which are unfolding along two parallel tracks. One focuses pragmatically on immediate humanitarian relief, treating the territory “as it is.” The other envisions a far more ambitious, long-term real estate–driven rebuilding plan. That approach could involve expropriating damaged properties, requiring residents to register land titles and beginning construction on cleared plots – a process that might delay full restitution and compensation for seven to ten years.
Both reconstruction models would require billions of dollars — and donor countries fear that money could be squandered without a lasting political solution.
Al-Omari argues that reforming the Palestinian Authority is not, in fact, a genuine priority for the current U.S. administration. From Washington’s perspective, he said, the issue is largely “symbolic and ceremonial.” The push for reform, in his view, did not originate in Washington but from Arab capitals — chiefly Gulf partners who have pressed the demand with growing urgency.
What has prevented serious U.S. engagement, al-Omari added, are two factors: the absence of real political will, a pattern already evident during Mr. Trump’s first term, and a lack of operational capacity. No specialized team in Washington, he said, monitors the issue “day in and day out” to ensure Palestinian compliance, especially as the administration juggles a crowded domestic and foreign agenda.
As for Israel, and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s government in particular, al-Omari said it has shown little interest in the Authority’s political or financial reform. What matters most to Israel, he noted, is curbing “incitement” of violence against Israelis in Palestinian school curricula. A weak, financially compromised Authority, he added, conveniently bolsters Israel’s long-standing claim that “there is no Palestinian partner for peace,” pushing the prospect of a two-state solution ever further from reach.
Meanwhile, Egypt is leading efforts to convene a Palestinian dialogue aimed at addressing the core questions of reform.
Cairo, al-Omari noted, sees the talks as an opportunity to tackle two main issues: the formation of a technocratic or expert-led government, and the internal restructuring needed within the Palestinian Authority — or any entity that might govern the next phase in Gaza.
He does not expect President Mahmoud Abbas to attend personally; the Authority typically dispatches a Fatah representative to such meetings, which are viewed as “intra-factional.” Figures from Hamas, including Khalil al-Hayya, as well as a representative of Islamic Jihad, are already in Cairo and expected to participate. The key uncertainty surrounds the role of Mohammad Dahlan.
Al-Omari said Egypt may press the Palestinian leadership to include Dahlan, either as part of the Fatah delegation or as an independent figure. Dahlan’s participation, he argued, is critical to the talks’ success, since he remains the only Fatah-linked leader with a tangible presence “on the ground” in Gaza, unlike the “Abu Mazen wing” of Fatah, which has largely severed its ties with the territory. Without him, al-Omari warned, the dialogue would be “incomplete.” The United Arab Emirates, he added, may even withhold its involvement in reconstruction efforts if Dahlan is excluded.
Whether Cairo can bridge these divisions, or whether the Authority’s crisis of legitimacy will deepen, remains to be seen.
Rami Al Amine
A Lebanese writer and journalist living in the United States. He holds a master’s degree in Islamic-Christian Relations from the Faculty of Religious Sciences at Saint Joseph University in Beirut. He is the author of the poetry collection “I Am a Great Poet” (Dar Al-Nahda Al-Arabiya, 2007); the political pamphlet “Ya Ali, We Are No Longer the People of the South” (Lebanese Plans, 2008); a book on social media titled “The Facebookers” (Dar Al-Jadeed, 2012); and “The Pakistanis: A Statue’s Biography” (Dar Al-Nahda Al-Arabiya, 2024).
