Houthis May Be Losing Their Hold

The Houthi movement in Yemen announced on Oct. 16 the death of its chief of staff, Muhammad Abd al-Karim al-Ghamari — a development that has stirred doubts about the group’s cohesion and raised questions over whether its long-insulated leadership is starting to fracture.

Al-Ghamari, regarded as the most powerful figure in the movement after its leader, Abdul-Malik al-Houthi, was killed along with his son and several aides in Israeli airstrikes on Sanaa during what the Houthis called the “Gaza support battles.”

The group moved swiftly to project stability, naming Maj. Gen. Yusuf al-Madani as al-Ghamari’s successor. But analysts say the appointment has done little to mask growing signs of strain. The strike that killed al-Ghamari was not an isolated episode: in September, Israel also targeted a cabinet meeting in Sanaa, killing Prime Minister Ahmed al-Rahwi and several ministers in what many observers now view as a turning point for the movement.

Still, few experts foresee a swift collapse of the Houthi movement — nothing resembling the sudden disintegration that befell Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria last December. The Houthis, analysts note, are more likely to erode gradually under the weight of internal strain than to implode overnight.

This article explores five potential trajectories for that erosion, based on reporting from field sources and interviews with experts and military commanders. It unpacks the intricate system that sustains Houthi rule — a web of tribal, security, and economic loyalties — and draws on testimony from people familiar with the preparations now underway inside the movement.

Scenario One: Leadership Vacuum

Abdul-Malik al-Houthi remains the keystone of the movement — its supreme reference and unifying figure. He assumed leadership at a young age, combining religious symbolism with battlefield charisma, and consolidated his authority through defining moments: the six Saada wars (2004–2010), the capture of Sanaa in 2014, the regional war against the coalition (2015–2022), and, most recently, the “Gaza support battles.” In each phase, he has appeared as “the master” around whom threads are woven — a leadership style often compared to Hezbollah’s.

The movement’s identity is rooted in both family and geography. It descends from its founder Hussein al-Houthi and his father Badr al-Din, and the family’s home area of Houth in ‘Amran province north of Sanaa. Since 2011, it has used the name “Ansar Allah” to broaden acceptance beyond its narrow geographic and familial base.

“The movement could collapse by 60–70% in the event of a sudden absence of Abdul-Malik al-Houthi,” says researcher Adnan al-Jabarni of the Sana’a Center for Studies. “Abdul-Malik al-Houthi is a very central figure in the movement; He personifies the movement’s core identity and is the key factor in its cohesion… there is no obvious alternative to him.” If the head is absent, he added, “three levels of conflict will appear: within the Badr al-Din al-Houthi family, among the shadow men in the jihadi organization, and among the public leadership,” meaning the absence of Abdul-Malik could accelerate splits or clashes between rival wings long suppressed by the “prestige of the master” and absolute obedience.

Organizationally, the Houthis concentrate leadership within the family to avoid power struggles. Al-Jabarni says the Badr al-Din family sees itself as most entitled to lead the project, even though Zaydi tradition historically allowed the imamate to pass among different Hashemite families. The movement, however, has enshrined a family-succession approach — from Hussein Badr al-Din to his brother Abdul-Malik, and possibly later to one of his sons or brothers — to ensure loyalty and prevent the rise of a rival head.

If Abdul-Malik is absent, competition is likely to intensify between the family wing and the “shadow men” in security and the military. Within the family, the most prominent figures are Muhammad Ali al-Houthi, who oversees provincial supervisors and once led the Supreme Revolutionary Committee, and Abd al-Karim al-Houthi, the interior minister and head of the movement’s executive office. Opposing them are commanders like Yusuf al-Madani, recently appointed to succeed Muhammad al-Ghamari, deepening rivalries over the levers of power. Yet any successor would lack the appeal of the “master leader,” even if drawn from the Hashemite household.

Dr. Andrea Carboni, head of analysis at the Armed Conflict Data Project, told Al-Hurra that the movement’s cohesion rests on “an interlocking network that protects the leader and regulates influence. Its components remain loyal as long as he is strong, but they could turn against him if they sense weakness.” Al-Jabarni goes further: “The killing of Abdul-Malik would harm the entire project.” His absence, he said, would not only create a leadership vacuum but also expose the web of security and tribal loyalties, lower the threshold of internal cohesion, and open opportunities to local and regional adversaries. “The initial military objective would then be obvious,” Al-Jabarni added: “Saada — symbolic, logistical, and intelligence key that connects the leadership to centers of influence.”

According to Carboni, “intelligence branches themselves might turn on the leader if his weakness becomes apparent; thus, the leadership vacuum should be read, not as an end, but as a key which — if exploited quickly and with proper coordination — would trigger what we call in Scenario Two ‘the military shock.’”

Scenario Two: Military Shock

A rapid collapse remains unlikely, but a coordinated military shock is plausible if three conditions align: a leadership vacuum or a weakened head that unravels the loyalty network; a swift, focused operation that seizes the movement’s symbolic and logistical hub in Saada; and timely intelligence coordination among Yemeni, regional and international actors to open simultaneous fronts.

Why Saada?

Brig. Gen. Nasser Basimah, a commander in the Yemeni army who fought in the six Saada wars and in the liberation of Aden, argues that any decisive campaign must begin there. “A fast, intensive military operation to seize Saada could lead to a rapid collapse in control lines across northern provinces,” he says. That assessment echoes Adnan al-Jabarni’s view that Houthi cohesion depends on “a strong head” capable of pressuring local centers to enforce discipline; without it, the movement is far less able to absorb a concentrated shock.

Saada is not just a historic stronghold. It functions as a command center, a meeting point for intelligence networks and tribal patrons, and a launch base for rockets and tactical drones. But the field reality is broader: Dr. Andrea Carboni, who has studied the Yemeni war for years, says the decisive rupture may come nearer Sanaa. “The most decisive battlefield event would be a breach of the Marib front, especially the Nihm area — the ring around Sanaa… if it falls, access to the capital becomes easier,” he told Al-Hurra.

Analysts who spoke to Al-Hurra map the battlefield into three simultaneous axes: a northern thrust from Marib toward Nihm to break the mountains encircling Sanaa; a southeastern–southern push from Shabwa and Al-Bayda toward Dhamar to isolate the center from the south; and a western axis along the coast and through Hudaydah to sever the economic lifelines and smuggling routes that sustain the movement.

Al-Jabarni stresses that the shock phase must be followed by careful dismantling of command, control and communications nodes, paired with safe corridors for tribes that choose to defect. Success, he says, depends on “striking centers of gravity” — not staging theatrical fronts — because the Houthi movement “is not defeated by numbers, but by breaking rings of command.”

Scenario Three: Factional Coup

While Scenario Two imagines an external military shock, experts warn that the Houthis face an equally potent threat from within — a rupture of their security apparatus or revolt by allied tribes.

Since taking Sanaa in 2014, the movement has ruled through a network binding tribal loyalties and economic interests under strict security control. A 2023 U.S. State Department report estimates that the Houthis govern areas home to 70–80 percent of Yemen’s population, despite holding only a third of its land. This model has preserved cohesion but also fueled resentment between Saada-based supervisors and local field commanders.
“Partnerships are pragmatic and unequal alliances under the threat of force,” says Andrea Carboni.

That tension has surfaced repeatedly since 2017 — in Ibb, where local leaders clashed with Houthi supervisors; in Al-Jawf and Al-Bayda, where tribal factions fought among themselves; and in Hudaydah, where disputes erupted over revenue collection. Most incidents remained isolated thanks to the group’s security grip and the absence of a unifying opposition. Yet Ibb, a Shafi‘i-majority region of about four million, has become a bellwether for unrest, recording nearly 50 anti-Houthi incidents between 2019 and March 2025, according to ACLED.

“There is a double suppression experienced by tribes of northern-north Yemen,” says Al-Jabarni. “They resent the Houthis but fear their repression.” Sporadic refusals to send fighters, skirmishes with conscription patrols, and revenge killings — such as the 2019 assassination of Sheikh Ahmed Salem al-Sukni after his revolt — reveal simmering anger. The 2017 killing of former president Ali Abdullah Saleh delivered another clear warning against defection.

These events stop short of an organized uprising, but they expose the fragility of the internal balance — one that could unravel if tribal discontent converges with a leadership vacuum or major military blow.
Carboni cautions that “elite infighting or tribal tensions can accelerate under economic collapse,” potentially turning quiet resentment into full-scale fragmentation.

Scenario Four: Economic Exhaustion

Yemen is enduring one of the world’s worst humanitarian crises. In 2025, about 19.5 million people need assistance — up 1.3 million from the previous year. The World Food Programme estimates that 14.5 million lack sufficient food, and nearly half of all children under five suffer from chronic malnutrition.

In Houthi-controlled areas — home to roughly 70 percent of Yemen’s population — the crisis is even starker. Public-sector salaries have been suspended since 2016, and only about 3 percent of employees still receive government pay. The disruption of oil exports cut national revenues by 43 percent in 2024, according to Yemen’s internationally recognized government, accelerating the currency’s collapse, fueling inflation, and eroding the state’s ability to pay salaries or provide services.

Amid this contraction, the Houthis have built a parallel war economy to sustain their military effort and reward loyalists. Taxation under labels such as khums and zakat, along with fuel fees and “organizational” levies, have burdened traders and farmers alike. Multiple testimonies report that humanitarian aid is distributed as a tool of social control — directed to fighters’ families and withheld from households that refuse to send sons to the front.

Cracks in the movement’s social base began to appear in 2023, when teachers and public employees staged rare protests in Sanaa and other cities demanding unpaid wages. The Houthis responded with arrests, beatings of journalists, and threats against critical parliamentarians — including MP Ahmed Hashid, according to the Joint Forces website. These incidents expose the shrinking space for dissent even within Houthi strongholds, and the fragility of their governing structure under economic strain.

Recruitment has also faltered. In 2022–2023, the movement struggled to fill frontlines in Marib and Taiz, resorting to judicial orders compelling tribal sheikhs to supply fighters under threat of punishment.

Economic exhaustion alone may not topple a force that still wields coercive power, but it is transforming the Houthis, in the words of Brig. Gen. Nasser Basimah, into “a system besieged by its people.”

Scenario Five: Managed Transition

Unlike the previous scenarios, this one envisions the war ending through a negotiated political transition — a settlement that would gradually absorb the Houthi movement into state institutions in exchange for an organized disarmament and integration of its fighters into the national army. Despite its complexity, this scenario enjoys growing regional and international support, as it offers a path to stability without risking a power vacuum or renewed chaos.

Early signs emerged with Saudi-Houthi negotiations in Oman in late 2022, followed by reciprocal visits between Sanaa and Riyadh in 2023 as the parties drafted a roadmap for peace. The transitional formula centers on a permanent ceasefire, a national unity government, payment of public-sector salaries through a U.N.-supervised oil-revenue mechanism, and a phased disarmament under regional and international monitoring.

On the surface, it is the least costly and most appealing option for war-weary Yemenis. Yet trust remains the central obstacle. The Houthis — who see themselves as battlefield victors — view their weapons as an “existential guarantee.” The internationally recognized government insists that any deal must include complete disarmament and the restoration of state institutions.

Regional dynamics since the Gaza war have injected new momentum. Saudi Arabia, eager to calm regional flashpoints after its 2023 Beijing agreement with Iran, now sees ending the Yemen war as essential to securing its borders. Tehran, drained by the Gaza confrontation, appears willing to freeze the Yemeni front to avoid antagonizing Riyadh.

Still, Brig. Gen. Nasser Basimah cautions that the Houthis “do not treat a truce as a final peace option but rather as preparation for a larger battle they believe is near.” During the lull, he said, they have expanded recruitment and upgraded missile capabilities. Researcher Adnan al-Jabarni echoed the warning: “Peace with the Houthis might be a fighter’s rest,” he said, adding that without credible international mechanisms to verify disarmament, any agreement would merely give the movement “a chance to catch its breath and then reignite the war from a stronger position.”