Iran on the Brink

Welcome back to the MBN Agenda, our lookahead at the events driving the news in the Middle East this week. 

First up, a must-read on the story that matters most from the region, just up from MBN Magazine: “If I were Khamenei,” by Joumana Haddad. “Once power becomes funny,” she writes, “it is already bleeding out.” 

Today we bring you the latest on what’s going on in Iran, and how Washington and the Middle East are reacting. This story is changing by the minute. Follow our flagship Alhurra news sites (in Arabic or English) for the latest updates.

Also this week, we asked our resident great-power competition experts to look beyond the streets of Tehran and into a couple other capitals that matter: Beijing and Moscow. Plus, a sudden political realignment in Yemen following Saudi Arabia’s forceful move against the Emirates shows how the region is being remade, even while Tehran burns. 

If you prefer to read this in Arabic, click here. Share your thoughts anytime at mbnagenda@mbn-news.com. And if the Agenda was forwarded to you, please subscribe.

– Andres, Rami, Youssef and Ezat

 

 

 The Situation

Since the current wave of unrest began last Dec. 28, Iran has experienced its most widespread protests since 2022, with demonstrations reported in all 31 provinces. What started as anger over currency collapse and soaring inflation has rapidly evolved into an openly anti-regime uprising, triggering a sweeping security crackdown.

Field reporting and open-source monitoring document approximately 600 protests nationwide. Thousands of people have been detained, though the true figure remains difficult to verify amid prolonged internet blackouts and restricted access. Hundreds of people are estimated to have been killed — hardly surprising, given the reports of live ammunition being used against demonstrators. Security forces, including police and IRGC units, have also suffered casualties, with estimates ranging from 37 to 121 fatalities.

Iran has imposed an internet shutdown that has now lasted more than 60 hours, as hospitals report being overwhelmed and shootings are documented in multiple cities. Major clashes have been reported in Tehran, Shiraz, Isfahan province (Najafabad), Hamedan, Qeshm, and other urban centers. Security forces have employed live fire, shotguns, mass arrests, and beatings across at least 13 cities.

What to Look Out for Next

It’s Tuesday morning, and we’re now in week three of the massive nationwide demonstrations in Iran. Any way you look at it, this is a key moment in the history of the Islamic Republic.

There are three key things to follow now:

• Numbers: The respected, Norway-based Iran Human Rights (IHRNGO) organization said yesterday that at least 648 protesters have been killed during the current unrest. Credible videos show shrouds and body bags. The real death toll will likely be far higher. The question is how high.
• Crackdown: The government crackdown has taken a particularly vicious turn. Live ammunition is being fired into unarmed crowds. It’s estimated that some 10,000 people have been detained. Among the charges: “Enmity against God,” for which the penalties include amputation and the death penalty.
• America’s response: President Donald Trump posted on Monday on Truth Social that countries doing business with Iran will pay a tariff of 25 percent on their business with the United States. This comes after he told reporters on Sunday night that Tehran called him and “they want to negotiate.” Key point to note: the president also said that “we may have to act because of what’s happening before the meeting.” Earlier Trump declared that if “Iran shoots and violently kills peaceful protesters … [the U.S.] will come to their rescue” – yet the Iranian government massacred demonstrators anyway. So the question isn’t if the U.S. will act but how.

Read Andres Ilves’ Iran Briefing every Thursday. Subscribe here

 

  Regional Spillover

Iran Quake Reverberates

What happens in Iran affects Iraq and vice versa. “We all remember the October 2019 protests in Iraq,” Iraqi journalist Muntadhar Nasser recently told our Rani Al Amine, “and how large-scale protests erupted in Iran just weeks later, only to be swiftly suppressed”

Based on his monitoring of the internal Iraqi situation, he says that everything that is happening in Iran has a direct influence on events in Iraq. There is constant movement between the two peoples. Iran is the country most visited by Iraqis, and Iraq is the country most visited by Iranians. Geographic proximity, holy shrines, and ideological factors all connect the two nations.

According to Nasser, current events in Iran affect not only the pro-Iranian armed groups but also the Iraqi public. There is widespread frustration with the Iraqi political class, which is aligned with Iran and governs through a system of sectarian quotas.

Iran-aligned armed groups have become financially and economically independent from Tehran by exploiting the Iraqi state and utilizing government projects for funding. Consequently, these groups no longer rely on Iranian money to sustain themselves.

In Lebanon, the situation appears more complex, according to writer and political activist Mustafa Fahs. For Hezbollah, the fall of the Iranian regime would mean not just the loss of a political sponsor, but the collapse of their religious authority. To the party, the fall of Khamenei would be like “the death of a god.” The problem, as Fahs sees it, is the state of denial within the party and among its supporters, who treat the possibility of the regime’s collapse with disdain and arrogance. Fahs reinforces Nasser’s point about Iraq: while groups linked to Iran there can become financially and ideologically independent, this is impossible for Hezbollah. If the Iranian regime falls, the consequences for the Lebanese Shia community would be catastrophic.

 

 

In Conversation

 

Demonstrators attend a protest in support of the Iranian people outside Downing Street. Reuters

Moscow and Beijing Watch Nervously

As Iran’s crisis deepens, another question is whether Tehran’s two most important external partners are starting to adjust their bets. We asked MBN’s great-power competition experts Min Mitchell, who tracks China, and Andres Ilves, a veteran Iran and Russia watcher, to look beyond the streets of Tehran and into Beijing and Moscow. An excerpt of their text exchange is below.

Supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei reportedly has an “escape plan” that involves fleeing to Russia if current nationwide intensify, according to The Times of London. Is there evidence the Russians are actually close to abandoning the Iranian regime?

Andres: Such reports are congruent with a broader narrative of elite panic, but evidence remains thin. What is clear is that Moscow and Tehran have deepened cooperation since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, with Iran supplying drones and munitions and Russia expanding economic and military ties. This has created mutual dependence.

For the Kremlin, however, Iran is a useful partner that helps blunt Western influence but not an ally worth risking direct confrontation with the United States.

U.S. forces raided a cargo ship traveling with weapons from China to Iran last month. Two weeks ago, Iran criticized China publicly for Beijing’s backing of the UAE over three strategically located islands in the Persian Gulf. How do you assess the current state of relations between Beijing and Tehran?

Min: The last thirty days have delivered a brutal reality check to the “comprehensive strategic partnership” between Beijing and Tehran. The current dynamic between Beijing and Tehran is a rather fragile, highly asymmetrical partnership of necessity that is undergoing a significant stress test.

These two events highlight that Iran is locked into a dependency where it must rely on China for economic survival (oil sales) and military technology, even as China demonstrates it will not offer security guarantees. Beijing effectively balances the region by keeping Iran as a useful anti-American hedge while conducting its serious, high-value business with the stable Arab monarchies.

Expect relations in 2026 to remain transactional and tense. The relationship is durable not because of trust, but because Iran has nowhere else to go.

There’s a great deal of interest in Washington in the shape of a post-Mullah Iran. To what extent do Russia and China believe they can influence events in Iran in the case of regime collapse?

A & M: In Moscow and Beijing, talk about a post-Islamic Republic remains cautious, but planners cannot ignore the possibility of abrupt change. Both powers have invested in state-to-state relations. At the same time, neither wants to be locked into a single political outcome.

Russian strategists view Iran primarily through the lens of regional balance and confrontation with the West. China’s priority is uninterrupted energy flows and protection of its nationals and investments.

Both powers understand that overt interference could provoke nationalist backlash in Iran. Their preferred method is quiet engagement with whoever emerges on top, combined with diplomatic language about noninterference and regional dialogue.

Read the entire conversation with Andres and Min here

 

 Close Look

Southern Yemen Undergoes a Reset

In just five days, the situation in southern Yemen has been utterly transformed. Saudi Arabia has acted to quash a UAE-backed political project aimed at southern independence from the north, testing the limits of what can — and cannot — be imposed from outside.

Since the war began, Saudi Arabia has backed Yemen’s internationally recognized government, while the UAE built influence in the south through local partners, most notably the Southern Transitional Council (STC), which advocates restoring the former state of South Yemen. In December, the STC expanded its footprint in key eastern provinces — a move Riyadh viewed as upsetting the coalition’s internal balance.

Aden, which has been under the de facto administration of Southern Transitional Council (STC)–affiliated authorities since 2018 while formally serving as the interim capital of Yemen’s internationally recognized government, sits at the heart of the Saudi-UAE power balance in the south. On January 7, STC leader Aidarous al-Zubaidi was expected in Riyadh for political talks. He never arrived. His absence triggered an immediate escalation: emergency security measures in Aden and a Saudi-backed government announcement removing al-Zubaidi from the Presidential Leadership Council, accusing him of treason.

The crisis deepened on Jan. 8, when Saudi Arabia announced that al-Zubaidi had left Yemen with Emirati assistance — a blunt accusation that publicly exposed the strain between the two coalition partners after years of managing differences behind closed doors.

On the ground, Saudi-backed forces regained control of Aden and Mukalla, while STC units withdrew from recently seized positions. Militarily, Riyadh appeared to have contained the challenge quickly. Politically, the fallout proved more complex.

On Jan. 9, an STC delegation in Riyadh announced the dissolution of the council and its governing bodies. The move was immediately rejected in the south. A day later, large demonstrations erupted in Aden, rejecting the decision and calling for independence — a clear signal that the issue could not be settled by decree alone.

It soon became clear that the STC push for dissolution reflected a decision to align with the Saudi-led initiative and avoid further confrontation. At the same time, a broad faction of STC leaders based in Aden and Abu Dhabi rejected the move outright, describing the Riyadh statements as the product of political pressure rather than a genuine internal decision.

Behind the scenes, Saudi Arabia has framed its approach as a strategic reset: consolidating anti-Houthi forces, stabilizing the southern front, and redirecting focus back toward the northern conflict. From Riyadh’s perspective, reducing internal fragmentation is a prerequisite for confronting the Houthis more effectively.

 

  MBN Camera

After days of heavy headlines, MBN Camera takes you somewhere quieter — a place where time slows down and memory takes the lead.

Lara Ajami didn’t expect an antiques market to pull her in this much. But the moment she stepped inside, it became clear this wasn’t about buying or selling. It was about holding on. In the United States, just as in the Middle East, people come to flea markets searching not for rarity, but for recognition — objects that echo a life once lived.

This is our pause from the region’s intensity, and a reminder that nostalgia, preservation, and the need to protect memory are universal.

Click here to watch Lara Ajami’s Touching the Past: A Walk Through Nostalgia