The Missing Leader

Rami Al-Amin is a Lebanese writer and journalist based in the United States. He holds a master’s in Islamic-Christian Relations from Saint Joseph University in Beirut and is the author of  O Ali, We Are No Longer the People of the South (2008), and The Pakitan: A Statue’s Biography (2024).

Anyone seeking to understand the convictions of Marwan Barghouti, the imprisoned Palestinian Fatah leader serving five life sentences in Israel, need only look at the names he gave his children.

His eldest son, Qassam, bears the name of Izz al-Din al-Qassam, the Syrian preacher and anti-colonial fighter whose name Hamas later adopted for its military wing. His second son is called Sharaf, meaning “honor,” after a friend and fellow student killed by Israeli forces. His third, Arab, reflects his pride in Arab identity. His daughter, Ruba, whose name evokes the Arabic word for “hilltops,” symbolizes his attachment to the land itself.

In his 2011 prison memoir, A Thousand Days in Solitary Confinement, written in a voice that is angry and unflinching, Barghouti explains to the Israeli officer interrogating him why he chose those names: “Qassam, because I love Izz al-Din al-Qassam, a timeless symbol who must live in our hearts – and Qassam was born long before Hamas or its Brigades ever existed. Sharaf, after my friend Sharaf al-Tibi from Khan Younis, a fellow student at Birzeit University killed by your cowardly bullets. Arab, because I am Arab, and proud of it despite all the bitterness of the Arab condition. And Ruba, because I love the land – the word means the high hills that rise above it.”

Born in 1958, Barghouti embodies one of the defining paradoxes of Palestinian politics: a man serving multiple life sentences who nonetheless remains the most popular and potentially unifying figure in Palestinian public life after Mahmoud Abbas, head of the Palestinian Authority. A member of the Palestinian Legislative Council since 1996, Barghouti has retained symbolic political influence from behind bars. His name returned to prominence recently after former U.S. President Donald Trump reportedly discussed the possibility of his release, describing him as one of the few figures capable of uniting and leading the Palestinians in the next phase. The final decision, however, remains in Israel’s hands.

Polls consistently show Barghouti as the leading choice among Palestinians to succeed Abbas. The latest survey by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research, released on Oct. 25, 2025, shows him comfortably ahead of all competitors. Analysts say Barghouti’s immense popularity stems less from what he has done recently than from what he has not: he has been absent from the corruption, stagnation, and factionalism that have crippled the Palestinian Authority. “By being in prison for more than two decades, Barghouti has remained insulated from the systemic political and economic corruption that has plagued Fatah’s leadership,” says Jonathan Schanzer, senior vice president at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, speaking to Alhurra.

Israeli scholar Kobi Michael, a senior researcher at the Institute for National Security Studies, agrees. “His legal isolation gives him political legitimacy,” he says. “Public frustration with the current leadership has been invested directly into Barghouti’s image, turning his imprisonment into political capital.”

Barghouti’s status was forged during two defining moments in Palestinian history – the first and second intifadas – when he emerged as one of the leading organizers of Fatah’s armed wing, known as the Tanzim. He also held a senior position within the Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades, designated by Israel and the United States as a terrorist organization, which formally broke from Fatah in 2007.

Arrested in 2002 during Israel’s military operations in the West Bank, Barghouti was convicted in 2004 of involvement in attacks that killed five Israelis. He denied the charges and refused to recognize the legitimacy of the Israeli court.

In recent years, Barghouti’s health has become a subject of growing concern. Footage released by far-right Israeli National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir showed the 66-year-old prisoner appearing frail and gaunt, having lost considerable weight during his confinement. The image of suffering has only strengthened his mythic aura. Among his admirers, Barghouti has come to embody a Palestinian version of Nelson Mandela, the prisoner-turned-president who liberated South Africa from apartheid.

Yet this glorification of violence gives Barghouti a unique political advantage. His record as a resistance figure grants him credibility among Palestinians, even those who support Hamas, while his affiliation with Fatah allows him to remain within the framework of the Palestinian Authority. “His biography of resistance gives him the credibility to make painful compromises with Israel in the future – something less radical figures, often seen as corrupt or collaborating with Israel, could never survive politically,” says one analyst interviewed by Alhurra. Professor Eyal Zisser, a historian at Tel Aviv University, believes Barghouti’s release “would be hugely significant,” with the potential to alter “the balance of power within the Palestinian Authority and between the PLO and Hamas, since he enjoys broad popularity and hails from the West Bank. His release could even revive the two-state solution – something the current Israeli government strongly opposes.”

The idea of reviving the two-state framework also revives the paradox at the heart of Barghouti’s politics. He has long described himself as a supporter of two states solution, a position he helped codify in the influential 2006 Prisoners’ Document, which he co-authored and which even Hamas endorsed. But in his statements and writings, Barghouti continues to insist that “armed resistance” remains the means to resolve the conflict. Most tellingly, he has maintained strategic ambiguity about his future intentions toward Israel. In one passage of his memoir, he writes that the United States and Israel “wasted an extraordinary opportunity for peace in Yasser Arafat.”

John Hannah, a senior fellow at the Jewish Institute for National Security of America, argues that Barghouti “has failed to clarify his intentions on the core issues essential to peace – renouncing armed struggle, accepting disarmament, and recognizing Israel’s right to exist.”

Hannah, who followed Barghouti closely in the early 2000s, acknowledges the prisoner’s powerful appeal among ordinary Palestinians but insists that “Barghouti was deeply involved in violence and terrorism during the Second Intifada as a Fatah commander overseeing armed groups such as the Al-Aqsa Brigades and the Tanzim. The truth is that Barghouti was neck-deep in organizations and operations responsible for horrific deaths of dozens of Israelis, including civilians. Even if his direct responsibility for each killing wasn’t proven in court, there’s no doubt he was at the center of one of the most violent and traumatic chapters in Israeli-Palestinian history before October 7.”

Barghouti’s path to leadership is blocked by the entrenched “old guard” of the Palestinian Authority. Schanzer describes the corruption within Fatah and Mahmoud Abbas’s circle as “deep and systemic,” with both political and economic dimensions. Recently, Abbas appointed his deputy, Hussein al-Sheikh, as his designated successor in the event of death or incapacity. Michael notes that although this appointment is temporary – lasting 90 days with the option of extension – everyone understands that free elections are unlikely anytime soon. “Once Hussein al-Sheikh stays beyond the 90 days, he will remain there for a long time,” he says. “So, I’m not sure Barghouti’s release would ultimately change much on the Palestinian scene.”

Michael also believes that Israel itself has contributed to the Barghouti myth. “After so many years of glorifying his image, it would be politically difficult for any Israeli government to justify releasing him,” he says. The debate over Barghouti’s possible release has intensified amid broader regional discussions about Gaza’s postwar governance following the U.S.-brokered ceasefire. Trump’s comments about Barghouti’s potential freedom may reflect Washington’s search for a credible Palestinian leader capable of bringing stability to the region.

Zisser doubts Trump’s personal involvement, suggesting instead that “one of the Gulf states may have urged him to pursue Barghouti’s release, or someone may have hinted that Barghouti could strike a deal with Israel.” Hannah offers a different theory, pointing to influential American Jewish businessman Ronald Lauder, who has advocated in Israel for Barghouti’s release as part of recent prisoner exchanges. “Did Lauder, who knows Trump well, make a similar appeal to the former president? We don’t know,” Hannah says.

Michael believes that Barghouti could play a broader role in regional normalization efforts if his release were part of a defined political agreement. But in the end, the decision rests with Israel, whose domestic calculations differ sharply from regional and international expectations. Most experts interviewed by Alhurra doubt Israel would approve Barghouti’s release unless there were major progress on expanding the Abraham Accords and achieving a verifiable demilitarization of Gaza – two deeply contentious issues. A less likely scenario, they say, is that Israel might agree to free Barghouti on the condition that he go into exile abroad. Schanzer warns that such an outcome could be risky: if Barghouti were to rule from exile – say, from Tehran – “he would no longer be accountable to his people and would likely come under the influence of Iranian leaders and their agenda. That would serve no one’s interest,” he says.