The Gaza peace plan rests on a deceptively simple chain: an Arab and international force deploys, Hamas disarms, Israel withdraws, a new governing body emerges, and reconstruction begins. Every link in that chain is fragile, and each depends on the others. The two most important links – Hamas disarmament and Israeli withdrawal – now appear unattainable. Without them, the chain is unlikely to hold.
Disarmament: The Missing First Step
Israel cannot compel Hamas to disarm. A year of war has shown the limits of military power against a clandestine movement with deep social roots and adaptive command networks. Even Israeli assessments concede that thousands of armed operatives remain, and skirmishes persist along the new cease-fire line inside the Strip.
Nor is an international stabilization force likely to succeed where Israel has failed. Jordan’s King Abdullah : if the mission involves peace enforcement, he said, “nobody will want to touch that.” Amman has ruled out participation in such a force, and Egypt shares that view. The U.S. draft Security Council resolution envisions enforcement powers, but Arab states reject that mandate. Their vision is limited to supporting and rebuilding Palestinian security institutions – not fighting Hamas. The gap between the two positions is fundamental. Who, exactly, will confront Hamas fighters? Who holds ultimate security authority in Gaza? As Turkey’s foreign minister put it after a recent meeting with regional counterparts, “Palestinians must govern Palestinians, and Palestinians must ensure their own security.”
Palestinian public opinion is equally clear. According to the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research, a large majority opposes any armed Arab force to disarm Hamas. Most, moreover, most reject disarmament itself. In short, the people expected to live under the plan will not legitimize its coercive core.
Hamas, of course, has no incentive to surrender its arms. Its recent attacks and political messaging make clear that it intends to remain a central actor in postwar Gaza. The only conceivable path to disarmament would be through negotiation, perhaps under pressure from Qatar and Turkey – an outcome that is imaginable but highly improbable.
No Disarmament, No Withdrawal
Without disarmament, there can be no effective governance, no reconstruction, and no Israeli withdrawal. This is not a matter of fairness or moral appeal but of political logic. Israel will neither withdraw nor allow reconstruction if Hamas remains armed; Hamas will not sit idly by if Israel doesn’t withdraw. This will make both reconstruction and governance less likely to proceed.
And there are already signs Gaza is heading in that direction. As discussions about disarmament go in circles, Israel is entrenching its control over more than half of Gaza’s strip. New outposts, earth berms, and drones mark a fortified division along the so-called “yellow line,” the boundary between the area still occupied by Israel and the rest of the Strip, under Hamas control.” Since the cease-fire, Hamas fire and Israeli counterstrikes have already killed Israeli soldiers and scores of Palestinian civilians. Israel openly reserves the right to intervene militarily anywhere in Gaza – much as it does in southern Lebanon – ensuring the cycle of attacks and reprisals will continue.
The Mirage of a “New Gaza”
Abandoning disarmament has revived talk of building a “New Gaza.” Jared Kushner recently argued that if Hamas rejects the plan, reconstruction should proceed only in areas under Israeli control – the 53 percent of Gaza now within the yellow line. The idea is to create housing, water, and power infrastructure so that Gazans effectively vote with their feet, leaving Hamas-held ruins for IDF-secured zones. Reports speak of residential districts for up to a million people. But Gulf donors are skeptical, and the assumption that Palestinians will willingly move into territory under the jurisdiction of the same army that killed their families and devastated their homes defies political and human reality.
The more likely outcome is what already exists: a divided Gaza. One side occupied by Israel, with tentative reconstruction and uncertain use; the other a besieged enclave still ruled by Hamas. The “yellow line,” born as a cease-fire device, becomes a political frontier, beyond it a compressed version of the pre–October 7 Gaza, with a weaker Hamas and civilians trapped between two warring parties and a continued humanitarian disaster.
What Could Break the Deadlock?
This deadlock can be broken only if one side blinks. Turkey and Qatar could force Hamas to disarm in a meaningful way – or the U.S. and Arab states could convince Israel to co-exist with Hamas once again. Neither is likely. Each side’s logic feeds the other’s, resulting in a perfect stalemate. And as the regional and international players are determined to avoid a return to war, the result will likely be a series of half-measures designed to look like progress. These will satisfy no one, change little, and leave Gaza trapped in the scenario that already exists, divided in two, half under Israeli control and half under Hamas rule, with civilians squeezed in between.
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The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Middle East Broadcasting Networks.
Ezzedine Fishere
Ezzedine Fishere is an Egyptian novelist and journalist and a Senior Lecturer at Dartmouth College.
