Lebanonization of Gaza

Except for the Wadi Gaza – which today is little more than a polluted water basin – no real river runs through the Gaza Strip. Even that Wadi barely reaches the sea. Its flow is choked off by upstream dams that turned it into a stagnant pool of sewage.

This article, however, is not about Gaza’s environment or its scarce water resources. The mention of a “river” in Gaza refers instead to the so-called yellow line (see map) – a boundary Israel has marked across the strip with yellow concrete blocks, dividing the territory into east and west. This “yellow line” now functions like a river. How so?

To understand that, one must look at 1978 Lebanon when the Litani River became the symbolic and military frontier between Israel and Lebanon, regardless of which Lebanese faction was doing the fighting.

In 1978, Israel invaded southern Lebanon in a military campaign called Operation Litani. The goal was to push Palestinian fighters north of the river, away from Israel’s border. Four years later, in the summer of 1982, Israel launched a second invasion to push the Palestinians forty kilometers further north. The Israeli army crossed the Litani River, advanced to Beirut, and eventually expelled the Palestinian fighters from Lebanon by sea. Israel then withdrew but maintained its occupation of most territory south of the river until the year 2000.

In 2006, tensions flared again along the Litani. Hezbollah captured Israeli soldiers, prompting Israel to launch a new military campaign. After 33 days of fighting, the war ended with a ceasefire under UN Resolution 1701, which stipulated “the establishment between the Blue Line and the Litani River of an area free of any armed personnel, assets, and weapons other than those of the Government of Lebanon and UNIFIL.”

This arrangement held until October 8, 2023, when Hezbollah launched rocket attacks on Israel from areas south of the Litani river in support of Hamas in Gaza. By September 2024, Israel announced a new campaign to push Hezbollah fighters north of the river. The operation succeeded after Lebanon signed a ceasefire agreement that required Hezbollah to disarm south of the Litani – an accord still under contentious debate today.

The yellow line in Gaza, then, serves as a kind of Litani River. It functions as a dividing line – a river of sorts – that raises questions about the parallels between Lebanon’s experience and the emerging situation in Gaza. Hence the term “Lebanonization of Gaza”: the adoption of a Lebanese-style model, two years after October 7, 2023.

Ehud Eiran, a professor of international relations at the University of Haifa, explains the logic behind this comparison: “The shock of October 7 pushed Israel from a policy of containment to one of preemptive suppression of any potential threat.”

According to Eiran, Israel has embraced the idea of a “post–October 7 Lebanese model”: an isolated, fire-controlled zone where the Israeli air force enjoys full freedom of movement against Hezbollah targets – a model now applied on both fronts.

Eiran adds that Israel will not allow any form of armament in Gaza, to prevent a repeat of October 7, just as it refuses to tolerate weapon stockpiles threatening its Lebanese border.

However, experts interviewed by Alhurra note important differences between Gaza and Lebanon. Researcher Kobi Michael from the Institute for National Security Studies says that in Gaza, Israel directly controls about 50% of the territory between the yellow line and the Israeli border, with “boots on the ground.” In contrast, in southern Lebanon, the Israeli army has an on-the-ground presence at only five points along the border.

Palestinian affairs journalist Mohammad Daraghmeh points out that Gaza is extremely small – just 365 square kilometers, roughly the size of a small city compared to Lebanon. Unlike Lebanon, Israel and the United States want Gaza’s eastern zone, controlled by the Israeli army, to be repopulated and rehabilitated, with shelters and job opportunities for Palestinians living there. The western zone, west of the yellow line and under Hamas control, would remain besieged, bombed, and deprived of reconstruction to prevent Hamas’s resurgence. In that setup, Israel would maintain freedom of military action against any targets in the west, as it does in Lebanon.

What Palestinians fear, Daraghmeh says, is a “slow displacement scenario.”

“People in the western zone will begin to drift, migrate, and flee eastward in search of food, work, and life – or by sea, since the Egyptian border remains closed.”

Israel’s goal, he adds, is to isolate Hamas by making life where its fighters are synonymous with ruin and hunger. Once civilians leave, Hamas’s numbers shrink, giving Israel an opportunity to eliminate the remaining fighters.

So far, Saudi Arabia and the UAE have refused to fund Gaza’s reconstruction “without a final political solution,” viewing such spending as wasteful. Arab states may, however, agree to fund a  limited rehabilitation of the eastern zone. The western side will remain in ruins until a political deal is made that reassures Israel  October 7 can’t be repeated.

The parallels with Lebanon continue: the proposed U.S.-backed International Stabilization Force (ISF) in Gaza would mirror the “mechanism” that monitors the ceasefire in Lebanon. In the ideal U.S. scenario, says Kobi Michael, Hamas would be dismantled and disarmed, a technocratic government formed, and an international stabilization force and “peace council” established. This would require full Israeli withdrawal from Gaza and coordination with that force to prevent Hamas from rearming. If the force fails – as in Lebanon – the Israeli army would re-enter and strike Hamas, “something we’ve become accustomed to doing in Lebanon,” Michael notes.

As in Lebanon, Michael doubts this plan will succeed, since Hamas is unlikely to comply, despite statements from its officials suggesting willingness to cooperate.

Ehud Eiran argues that the Lebanonization model could at least allow reconstruction in the eastern zone – the area “cleansed” of Hamas – similar to Israel’s security zone in southern Lebanon between 1985 and 2000, where Israel coexisted with local residents and provided social and developmental services.

But such an arrangement comes with challenges; among which are a solid commitment from all parties and acceptance by local residents who may fear Hamas or accusations of collaboration with Israel. The deeper Palestinian dilemma, Eiran says, is that addressing Gaza’s humanitarian suffering might be seen as “depoliticizing the cause,” undermining the broader Palestinian struggle.

For Israel, Kobi Michael concludes, the preferred outcome is a two-zone Gaza, separated by the yellow line: “Since Hamas is unlikely to disarm – just like Hezbollah – Israel should proceed gradually and in parallel: begin implementing the plan in the east, while continuing to fight in the west until Hamas is dismantled.”