The U.S. National Security Strategy released by the White House on Friday lays out a new map for America’s relationship with the Middle East after decades of Washington’s heavy focus on the region and its conflicts.
The new strategy represents a shift in Washington’s approach. It directs attention toward the Western Hemisphere and seeks to reduce direct involvement in Middle Eastern conflicts, while it continues to safeguard core U.S. interests in energy, security, and regional stability.
The document outlines a new roadmap for U.S. goals in the Middle East and details how Washington will balance, in the coming phase, between containing Iranian influence, supporting traditional allies, and preventing terrorism—while reducing direct military engagement that has cost the U.S. heavily over past decades.
“The new strategy denotes that the U.S. is shifting from its traditional approach of direct military intervention and long-term containment in the Middle East. Instead, the relationship will now be managed on a bilateral, case-by-case basis,”
says Mark Shanahan, a politics professor at the University of Surrey in the U.K.
Still, the Middle East remains important for the U.S. regardless of what the document suggests, argues Tom Warrick, a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council.
“The Middle East is too important to ignore. In fact, I believe any U.S. president will give it significant attention, regardless of what strategic advisers may prefer,”
he says.
The strategy notes that for at least half a century, U.S. foreign policy prioritized the Middle East above all other regions “for obvious reasons”: the region was for decades the world’s most important source of energy; it was a central arena of competition among great powers; and it was full of conflicts that threatened to spill over globally—“even to our own shores.”
Today, at least two of those dynamics are no longer at play: energy supplies have diversified dramatically, and the U.S. has once again become a net exporter of energy.
The second reason, according to the document, is that “great-power competition has given way to rivalry among the powers, in which the United States retains the most enviable position—bolstered by President Trump’s successful revitalization of our alliances in the Gulf, with other Arab partners, and with Israel.”
The new strategy discusses “weakening Iran, the primary destabilizing force in the region,” following the 12-day war with Israel and subsequent U.S. strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities.
It also highlights what it describes as “progress toward a more durable peace” in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict after the Trump-brokered ceasefire between Israel and Hamas in Gaza.
Regarding Syria, the strategy says the country remains “a potential problem,” but with American, Arab, Israeli, and Turkish support, it could stabilize and regain its rightful place as a positive, integral actor in the region.
“President Trump is clearly focused on the long-term threat from Iran—we saw that plainly when he used military force last June. And I think he is fully aware he may need to do so again if Iran refuses to negotiate an end to its nuclear program,”
Warrick tells Alhurra.
He adds that managing Iran “will ultimately depend not on strategy but on a series of individual decisions President Trump will have to make—after consulting leaders in the region such as Israel, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar. Those decisions will determine what is actually done to curb Iranian influence.”
Dania Araissy, a fellow at the New Lines Institute, believes that despite reduced on-the-ground presence, Washington still wields significant influence in the Middle East thanks to its network of partners and allies who effectively shape regional balances.
She notes this influence is clear in areas such as Lebanon, where the U.S. maintains long-term political engagement and is now pushing for talks between Lebanon and Israel with a view to curb Iran and Hezbollah and encourage the expansion of the Abraham Accords.
On Syria, Araissy says Washington is building channels with President Ahmad al-Sharaa and supporting initial talks between Damascus and Tel Aviv, adding that U.S. adversaries such as Hamas, Hezbollah, and Iran have grown weaker which reduces the need for direct intervention.
In her view, the U.S. has now a new approach whereby it manages interests through regional partners—such as Saudi Arabia, the Gulf states, and Lebanon—rather than through direct military involvement. She describes this as a “smart” approach focused on stability and economic gains.
A Decline in Priority
In the energy sector, the strategy says the decades-long reason for America’s focus on the Middle East is fading, after the Trump administration rolled back restrictive energy policies and U.S. production surged.
“Instead, the region will increasingly become a source and a destination for international investments across industries far beyond oil and gas, including nuclear energy, artificial intelligence, and defense technologies.”
The strategy also highlights the commitment of Middle Eastern partners to combating extremism—an “encouraging trend” U.S. policy should continue to support. To do so, the document stresses the need to abandon the “mistaken U.S. practice of reprimanding these countries—especially Gulf monarchies— to make them abandon their traditions and historical forms of governance.” Instead, it calls for encouraging reform only when and where it emerges organically, without imposing it from the outside.
The document also outlines key objectives: preventing U.S. adversaries from controlling Gulf energy supplies and maritime routes; ensuring the region does not become a safe haven for terrorism or a source of terrorism directed against U.S. interests; and keeping Israel secure— “a threat that we can and must confront ideologically and militarily.”
Shanahan notes that Trump in inclined to avoid wars, but that does not mean the U.S. will actually forsake its security commitments in the region. Tens of thousands of American troops remain deployed, and a major drawdown is unlikely.
He expects Trump to continue engaging with Gulf states—especially Saudi Arabia— in advancement of the “America First” principle, whether through economic deals or security cooperation.
He also believes the administration is unlikely to escalate significantly with Iran, as it recognizes the limits of its ability to engineer internal change there. Meanwhile, U.S. interest in Syria’s reconstruction appears minimal, especially given the lack of economic incentives to engage.
Ultimately, he does not expect a dramatic transformation in U.S. Middle East policy, but rather a possible decline in relative importance, driven by growing attention to other arenas such as Venezuela.
This, he argues, may push Israel and the Gulf states to assume greater responsibilities in confronting Iranian threats—while U.S. military support continues, particularly for Israel.
Ghassan Taqi
A journalist specializing in Iraqi affairs, he has worked with the Middle East Broadcasting Networks (MBN) since 2015. He previously spent several years with Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, as well as various Iraqi and Arab media outlets.
