The United States has made a dramatic shift in how it handles the war in Sudan: President Donald Trump is now following the file personally. He is “not delegating it,” but overseeing it himself, according to U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio. He added, during a meeting at the White House, that Trump is “the only leader in the world capable of resolving Sudan’s crisis.”
Last month, Trump announced he would work to end the war in Sudan after a request from Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman. The announcement was welcomed by all sides of Sudan’s conflict. But major obstacles stand in the way of any U.S.-brokered settlement. Sudan’s army has put forward a deal plan that diverges from the “Quartet’s” approach and has refused to sit at a table that includes the United Arab Emirates which he accuses of supporting the Rapid Support Forces (RSF). That leaves Washington with the challenge of finding a formula that satisfies Sudan’s government without alienating regional allies — especially the UAE.
Another complication is how satisfied Washington is with the Sudanese army’s assertions that it has no ties to the Muslim Brotherhood at a time when the U.S. is moving to designate the group as a terrorist organization.
There is also the reported Sudanese offer to Russia to build a naval base in Port Sudan — a proposal that has raised international concerns as it relates to one of the world’s most strategic waterways and could impact the balance of power in the Red Sea.
Competing Visions
Efforts to end Sudan’s war — now in its 30th month — revolve around a cluster of international and regional initiatives aimed at halting the fighting.
U.S. envoy Massad Boulos is leading Washington’s push to implement a “road map” rooted in the Quartet statement (the United States, Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Egypt). It is based on five principles. The most prominent of which are a cease-fire and the exclusion of both the military and “remnants of the former regime” from the political process.
The latter in particular — keeping the military out of politics — is one of the core contentions. Wagdy Saleh, rapporteur of the committee that dismantled Sudan’s former regime, said the army leadership “rejects explicit language that bars both sides of the war — the army and the RSF — from any political role in the next phase.”
In a counter proposal to the Quartet’s plan, the Sudanese government has submitted its own road map to the U.N. secretary-general. It envisions a cease-fire, the withdrawal of RSF forces from cities, followed by an inclusive Sudanese-Sudanese dialogue.
Ali Youssef al-Sharif, Sudan’s former foreign minister, told Alhurra that this plan is largely built on the outcomes of the Jeddah process, particularly in regard to the RSF withdrawal from civilian areas.
Suleiman Baldo, director of the Sudan Transparency and Policy Observatory, believes army chief Abdel Fattah al-Burhan rejected the Quartet road map because he thought the Saudi crown prince had presented an alternative proposal during his Washington visit.
“That is not what happened,” Baldo said, explaining that Saudi Arabia was simply trying to encourage Trump to intervene directly so there would be “greater momentum behind the road map.” “There is no alternative plan,” Baldo said. “The army and the Sovereignty Council will ultimately have to accept the road map.”
Justin Lynch, director of the Washington-based Conflict Insights Group, considers the Quartet plan the most viable foundation for a settlement, but one that requires far greater attention from Trump. “So far, we’ve seen a tweet from President Trump, but beyond that, not much action,” Lynch said.
Al-Sharif, the former foreign minister, also argues that Washington should appoint a new special envoy. “In my view, Massad Boulos is no longer the right person to continue the mediation,” he said.
The Islamist Question
Political Islamists is another complication facing the roadmap. Lieutenant General Abdul Fattah al-Burhan insists the Sudanese has no links at all to the Muslim Brotherhood, but not many believe that claim.
Baldo says al-Burhan’s statements are “unconvincing to the local public opinion and the international community,” given the overwhelming “evidence dating back to the 1989 coup.” He notes that the Islamic Movement has provided military personnel to lead the Sudanese army’s campaigns on the ground alongside media and propaganda support for the war effort.
Lynch argues that any future peace agreement hinges on resolving the Islamists’ influence within the army. Their presence, he says, blocks any deal. “Even if al-Burhan wanted to sign an agreement, it’s not clear he would be able to because he faces internal pressure from Islamists,” Lynch said. He added that U.S. pressure on Sudan’s Islamists aligns with the UAE’s broader campaign against political Islam.
The UAE is accused of providing support to the RSF, but Abu Dhabi and Emirati analysts reject the claims. Emirati political analyst Ismail al-Mansouri told Alhurra journalist Sukaina Ali that despite the Sudanese army’s profuse political and media rhetorics, it “has not presented any coherent evidentiary file to any international judicial body that would amount to a legal case against the UAE.”
Mohammed Baharoon, director of the Dubai Public Policy Research Center, said similar allegations were made about UAE actions in Yemen and Libya, but were “nothing more than disinformation campaigns unsubstantiated by evidence.”
However, U.N. experts and U.S. lawmakers say the Sudanese army’s claims that the UAE is supplying weapons to the RSF are “credible,” according to Reuters.
When asked about Abu Dhabi’s role, Secretary of State Rubio did not name the UAE explicitly, saying only: “We know who the actors are… which is why they are part of the Quartet, alongside other engaged countries.”
With Washington moving to designate the Muslim Brotherhood as a Foreign Terrorist Organization, pressure on the Sudanese army is expected to intensify. “Including the Sudanese branch of the Islamic Movement under this designation would create a major challenge for the existing alliance between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Islamic Movement,” Baldo said.
A Russian Naval Base?
A portrait of Sudan’s complex political landscape would fall short if it did not include a look at the Russian naval base. Media reports — including The Wall Street Journal — say Sudan offered Russia permission to build what would be Moscow’s first naval base in Africa.
The idea dates back to former ruler Omar al-Bashir’s 2017 visit to Moscow, when the two sides signed a preliminary agreement allowing Russia to establish a base in Port Sudan in exchange for political and military support.
But the agreement stalled after the government of Abdalla Hamdok refused to approve it, citing “sovereignty concerns”. One sticking point, Baldo said, was a clause that would allow Russia to deploy 300 troops to protect the base and surrounding area, use Sudanese airfields freely, and move shipments without inspection.
Lynch is also skeptical of the Russian base reports. “Russia has long sought a base, and Sudan’s armed forces have long toyed Russia with the idea of the base,” he said. “This is nothing new… The army has for long been floating the proposal of a base to Russia, Iran, Turkey, and the United States without any commitments.”
Wagdy Saleh, the rapporteur of the committee for dismantling the former regime, called the base proposal a “recycled maneuver” dating back to Bashir’s era. “All of this talk is just for maneuvering in a highly intricate political situation,” he said. “Any base on the Red Sea is an issue of concern to the littoral states and, above all, to the Sudanese people and the sovereignty of their country,” he added.
Caught between the Islamist issue, Saudi and Emirati calculations, and Western fears of expanding Russian influence, Washington faces an extraordinarily delicate diplomatic test. It is a test that helps explain why Trump has chosen to be personally involved — not as a distant mediator, but as a direct player trying to manage deeply fraught equations of balance.
