On the outskirts of the Syrian city of Palmyra, a moment that was supposed to pass quietly last Saturday turned into a highly complex security incident after a barrage of gunfire ripped through the area, targeting U.S. forces and Syrian security personnel.
The repercussions of the attack—which killed two U.S. soldiers and one U.S. civilian, in addition to wounding several others—did not stop at the human toll. They quickly extended to questions surrounding the identity of the perpetrator and the circumstances of the assault.
Syria’s Ministry of Interior announced that the shooter was a member of the Syrian security forces with links to the Islamic State (ISIS), an admission that reopened critical questions about the nature and limits of infiltration within the newly formed security apparatus and the ability of Syria’s new authorities to control and discipline their military and security structures.
A Jihadist Legacy
As part of the transitional phase plan, Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa called on the leaders of armed factions to dissolve their formations and merge into a single military institution under the umbrella of the Ministry of Defense.
On May 17, Syrian Defense Minister Major General Murhaf Abu Qasra announced the integration of military units into the ministry with the aim of “unifying the military structure within a single institutional framework,” granting remaining factions a deadline to join and warning of legal consequences for those who fail to comply.
However, observers say the rapid integration was not accompanied by a thorough vetting of the ideological and political backgrounds of recruits, allowing individuals with Salafi-jihadist orientations to join the new security forces.
In this context, military and strategic expert Issmat al-Abbasi says that “the Syrian military is undergoing an accelerated process of integrating armed factions under the Ministry of Defense through restructuring divisions, unifying salaries, and imposing discipline—reflecting a real transition from multiple formations to a single centralized structure.”
Despite this progress, Abbasi told Alhurra that significant challenges remain, chief among them “a debate over representation and the influence of former major factions, which raises a question about the nature of the current army: is it a unified army or a federation of militias?” He noted that the balance currently leans toward institutional unification if integration continues at the level of individuals and if parallel funding and decision-making channels are closed.
This reality, according to the director of the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, Rami Abdulrahman, has led to documented “cases of killings, field executions, and serious transgressions against civilians and minorities, including heinous massacres in several areas, particularly along the Syrian coast and in Suwayda, which resulted in hundreds of victims, including women and children.”
The Observatory has also documented, Abdulrahman told Alhurra, “cases of killing, kidnapping, storming of armed checkpoints, and arbitrary arrests in several regions, amid security chaos and the recruitment of fighters into the new forces without effective oversight.”
A Missing Doctrine
Jordanian researcher and writer Dr. Hassan Abu Hanieh, an expert on Islamist movements, believes that reports about jihadist influence within the new Syrian army are linked to the nature of the transitional phase, which is still undergoing formation and restructuring processes within the Ministries of Defense and Interior. He stresses that the current situation remains in its “early stages” and has yet to reach institutional stability.
Abu Hanieh explained to Alhurra that the core human component of the new army is largely made up of factions with diverse jihadist backgrounds. Among them, he noted, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham stands out, having previously fielded around 12,000 fighters in Idlib, in addition to some 3,500 foreign fighters later integrated into the Ministry of Defense, including members of the Turkistan Islamic Party and approximately 3,000 Uyghur fighters, alongside groups of Tajiks and Uzbeks. He added that “a large number of foreign fighters aim to return to their countries of origin.”
According to Abu Hanieh, the new army also includes the former Turkish-backed Syrian National Army, which comprised around 35,000 fighters across roughly 40 factions, primarily focused on preventing the establishment of an independent Kurdish entity. Its political orientation and role after the fall of the previous regime, however, remain unclear.
Leaders With Jihadist Backgrounds
The new Syrian army includes a number of senior military commanders with jihadist backgrounds, most notably—according to Israel’s Alma Research and Education Center, which specializes in security and military affairs:
- Defense Minister Murhaf Abu Qasra, a former commander in Hayat Tahrir al-Sham.
- Deputy Defense Minister Mohammad Khair Hassan Shuaib (“Abu al-Khair Taftanaz”).
- Chief of Staff Ali Nour al-Din al-Naasan (“Abu Hamza”).
- Commander of the Republican Guard Abdulrahman Hussein al-Khatib (“Abu Hussein al-Ordoni”), who is wanted by Jordanian authorities.
- Air Force Commander Assem Rashid al-Hawari (“Abu al-Qassem Beit Jin”).
Figures with similar backgrounds also lead prominent military units, including the 40th Division, formerly linked to Ahrar al-Sham; the 52nd Division affiliated with Hayat Tahrir al-Sham; and the 82nd Division linked to Ansar al-Tawhid. The institute noted that footage documented members of the latter wearing Islamic State insignia during battles in Suwayda.
Regarding the effect of jihadist backgrounds of some leaders, Abbasi explains that while such experience “has contributed to higher tactical efficiency in irregular warfare contexts, it is insufficient for building a lasting national doctrine.” He points to “efforts by the Morale Guidance Directorate to unify ideological reference points and formulate a national combat doctrine aimed at reaching a model of a professional national army.”
Abbasi warns of the dangers posed by divergent ideological references and cross-border loyalties, arguing that they “threaten the cohesion of any army, as demonstrated by experiences in Yemen, Libya, and Sudan.” In Syria’s case, he adds, the overlapping influence of factions driven by religious ideologies and foreign-backed self-rule forces further complicates the unification of military decision-making, making any breakdown in the chain of command a direct threat to discipline and effectiveness.
Abdulrahman, for his part, cautions that “the integration of factions with diverse backgrounds—including groups that committed serious violations during the war years, such as some Syrian National Army factions—into the structure of the new army raises real fears that previous patterns of abuse will continue under a new official cover.”
A Ticking Time Bomb?
A study by Israel’s Institute for National Security Studies suggests that the new Syrian army more closely resembles a “federation of militias under a state umbrella” than a unified army that monopolizes the use of force. Despite formal integration, factions still retain their internal chains of command. They still maintain the ability to act independently during crises which exacerbate instability.
Experts believe the current mix within the security forces—comprising former officers, faction leaders, and foreign fighters—constitutes a “ticking time bomb,” especially given ideological divergences among jihadist factions. As Abu Hanieh notes, “some are closer to al-Qaeda, while others hold individual tendencies similar to ISIS.”
Despite talk of change in the conduct of some factions after the integration, Abdulrahman stresses that field data indicate “the integration process has not led to a tangible improvement in the actions of some factions. In some areas, it has even allowed violations to continue or expand, including arbitrary arrests, extortion, and abuse of civilians.” He argues that “formal affiliation with the Ministry of Defense has not been sufficient, apparently, to bring about a fundamental change in fighters’ conduct in the absence of real oversight and accountability mechanisms within the military institution.”
The Presidency and the Dilemma of Change
Since the fall of former Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s regime on December 8, 2024, al-Sharaa has sought to shed his former image as leader of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham.
He abandoned his jihadist nom de guerre (Abu Mohammad al-Jolani) and reverted to his real name, adopted more open positions domestically and internationally—including toward Israel—and undertook visits to several countries, most notably the United States, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar.
However, this shift has not been strongly reflected in the structure, composition, and loyalties of Syria’s new security apparatus.
Nanar Hawach, a researcher on Syria at the International Crisis Group, told Alhurra that there is a risk “that hardline jihadist elements within the state apparatus may reject the pragmatic path pursued by al-Sharaa and view his engagement with the West as a betrayal.” He warned that consequences could range from disobedience of orders and individual defections to ISIS, to more dangerous scenarios such as fractures within the security services, assassination attempts, internal coups, or armed rebellion.
Similarly, Hayan Dukhan, a lecturer in politics and international relations at Teesside University, warns that al-Sharaa faces the risk of a violent backlash from Islamist circles if he moves too quickly or too openly to curtail their influence—especially if restrictions are imposed through coercive measures without alternatives such as structured integration or economic and political inclusion.
Dukhan told Alhurra that the leadership’s room for maneuver is limited, as “external pressure to marginalize actors linked to the jihadist legacy is matched by a high domestic cost for any direct confrontation.”
Multiple Prescriptions for a Solution
Observers propose various “prescriptions” for filtering Syria’s security services of potentially radical elements and ensuring their loyalty to the state alone.
In this context, Abdulrahman calls for “the establishment of independent and transparent judicial mechanisms to hold perpetrators of violations accountable, the imposition of strict civilian and legal oversight over the faction-integration process, the exclusion of those implicated in abuses from leadership positions, the protection of minorities, women, and children, and the application of a fair law on all.”
Abbasi, for his part, proposes “dissolving independent units, conducting a comprehensive inventory of weapons and personnel, and restructuring ground and air forces,” while emphasizing key challenges, including “formulating a non-partisan, non-religious national doctrine; addressing shortages in armament and infrastructure without external dependency; overcoming factional resistance to integration; and ensuring fair representation of all components within a civilian constitutional framework.”
Abu Hanieh concludes that building a unified military doctrine and a new Syrian army “is a long and complex task, tied to the future of the Syrian state and how it manages ethnic and sectarian components, in an environment that remains unstable and without guaranteed pathways.”
