For nearly four decades, Egyptian-Iranian relations have existed in a gray zone. At various points, contacts between Cairo and Tehran have taken place, but they never rose to a level of “normal” and sustained cooperation. At other times, relations appeared to go frosty and cautious, though they stopped short of a complete rupture.
Today, several pressing files have compelled both countries to temporarily set aside their heavy legacy of disputes and engage with one another to defend their interests and avert worse outcomes for Middle East security and stability.
As part of this engagement, Egyptian Foreign Minister Badr Abdelatty held a phone call last Tuesday with his Iranian counterpart, Abbas Araghchi. According to a statement from Egypt’s Foreign Ministry, the two discussed “ways to enhance bilateral relations and exchanged views on regional issues of mutual concern, foremost among them developments related to Iran’s nuclear file.”
Cairo had announced on Sept. 9 that Iran and the International Atomic Energy Agency had reached an agreement to resume cooperation that had been suspended in June 2025, following Egyptian mediation.
However, Iran’s foreign minister announced last November that the “Cairo Agreement” had formally ended after the IAEA’s Board of Governors adopted a resolution calling on Tehran to immediately cooperate regarding its nuclear facilities and stockpile of enriched uranium.
Egypt fears that stagnation in negotiations over Iran’s nuclear program could lead to military escalation that would disrupt regional security, particularly after U.S. and Israeli strikes targeted Iranian nuclear facilities last June.
All of these developments underscore the growing importance of Egypt’s role in the Iranian nuclear file and raise questions about whether they could push both countries out of the longstanding gray zone.
Possible Secret Negotiations
Ahmed Lashin, a professor of Iranian studies at Ain Shams University, told Alhurra that Egyptian-Iranian relations are going through a phase that can be described as “cautious openness.”
He stressed that the current landscape does not mean full normalization but represents a clear departure from the prolonged stagnation that has characterized relations between the two countries.
“These contacts are not protocol-driven, but function-based,” Lashin said. “Egypt is acting from a crisis-management perspective, while Iran is seeking to break out of the regional isolation imposed on it.”
Regional crises are not the only arena for engagement. Economic considerations have also played a role, including concerns about the economic consequences of any military escalation in the region.
Lashin explained that the Suez Canal, Red Sea security and the stability of international shipping lines are strategic pillars of Egypt’s economy, and that any regional escalation — whether through the Houthis or direct confrontations — has immediate and significant economic costs.
“Egypt is therefore being highly pragmatic in attempting to reduce tensions and protect its vital economic interests,” he said.
Ibrahim Shir, a writer and expert on Iranian affairs, told Alhurra that Tehran views Cairo as a gateway through which it can convey messages to the outside world.
Shir said Egypt is seeking to sponsor future negotiations — possibly beginning behind closed doors — between Tehran and Washington. He argued that Iran sees the Egyptian role as central and politically credible, and views Egypt as a neutral arena for dialogue between Iran and the United States.
Historical Legacy and Present-Day Challenges
Last August, Iran’s foreign minister said he had met Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sissi several times and had held 10 meetings with his Egyptian counterpart. Araghchi pointed to regular consultations between the two countries on Gaza, the West Bank, Lebanon, Syria and Iran’s nuclear file.
Addressing the long absence of relations between the two countries, Araghchi said there had been good progress in bilateral relations despite the persistence of some old obstacles. He said relations had exceeded expectations, though both sides were not rushing to formally announce normalization.
Despite progress in resolving some disputes — including changing the name of Khalid al-Islambuli Street in Tehran — several other issues continue to cast long shadows over relations. These include Iran’s policies in the Gulf, Lebanon, Syria and Yemen, among others.
Lashin said ongoing contacts between Cairo and Tehran reflect an ability to move past historical crises in response to present-day demands. He noted that Egypt is not rushing toward normalization, but at the same time is not closing the door.
The most recent meeting between the Egyptian and Iranian presidents took place on the sidelines of the emergency Arab-Islamic summit held in Doha last September. In a joint statement, the two leaders stressed the need to continue deeper consultations in the future in light of rapid regional developments, and discussed ways to enhance bilateral relations across various fields.
Curbing Regional Escalation
Cairo has played a key role in negotiations on several regional files, including the Gaza cease-fire agreement. Egyptian officials say Egypt’s refusal to enter into regional polarization gives it greater room for maneuver and makes it more acceptable to conflicting parties across multiple arenas.
Lashin warned that any direct confrontation between Iran and Israel would ignite the entire region, and Egypt will be among the first to suffer the consequences.
“Cairo has the ability to play a strong and effective regional mediation role in reducing tensions between Iran and Israel,” he said, “given both sides’ recognition of the effectiveness of the Egyptian role — especially for Iran, which relies on Cairo to break out of regional isolation.”
Shir agreed, saying recent years have seen a high level of coordination between Egypt and Iran on several regional issues, contributing to reduced escalation and a measure of relative stability.
Regarding Egypt’s concerns about Iran-backed armed factions in the Middle East, Lashin said Cairo views cross-border militias — whether in Yemen, Lebanon or Iraq — as a threat to the concept of the nation-state, a red line in Egypt’s political doctrine.
“Any rapprochement with Tehran remains conditional on not threatening Arab national security,” he said, noting that such armed groups sometimes trigger crises that are difficult to contain regionally and could harm Egypt’s interests, whether with Gulf states or with Israel.
Lashin concluded that if the current trajectory continues without major regional shocks, Egyptian-Iranian relations could reach a “quasi-normal” state by 2026, including full diplomatic representation, high-level official visits and possibly a presidential visit — but under clear conditions.
For now, current regional challenges continue to draw Egypt and Iran closer to each other. But that improvement is expected to remain contingent on two factors: shedding the burdens of the past and reaching agreement on many of the challenges of the present.
