Since Ahmed al-Sharaa assumed the presidency in Syria in January 2025, relations between Egypt and Syria have been marked by coolness and caution.
Cairo has attentively followed developments in Syria, focusing primarily on reaching security understandings to help ensure stability amid rapidly shifting regional dynamics. This engagement, however, largely remained confined to the security sphere.
That posture shifted in recent days with the visit of an Egyptian economic delegation to Syria where it participated in presenting projects for the country’s reconstruction. The visit signaled a qualitative change in bilateral relations.
During his meeting with the Egyptian delegation, al-Sharaa underscored the importance of relations between the two countries, describing them as a must rather than a choice. He called for placing those ties on their “proper course” and stressed that Egyptian companies should have priority in contributing to Syria’s reconstruction.
Amid this rapprochement, the Turkish role cannot be overlooked. Ankara appears to hold a central position in maintaining Syrian security. From the outset, Turkey has sought to narrow differences between Damascus and Gulf states, as well as the United States, and has pushed for easing the economic sanctions imposed on Syria—steps that paved the way for Damascus’ reintegration into the international system.
Dr. Shaher al-Shaher, a Syrian professor of international relations, said recent developments reflect a retreat of ideological considerations in favor of what he called the political and strategic calculations of the “rational state.” Relations between Cairo and Damascus, he said, have reached the level of economic partnerships, with clear Turkish backing that has extended to other regional files, including Sudan, Libya, Syria, and the Gaza Strip, driven by shared concerns over what he described as unrestrained and undisciplined Israeli policies.
Turkish journalist Dr. Yusuf Katipoglu seconds that view, arguing that Syria represents a shared strategic focal point for both Ankara and Cairo, with Turkey playing a pivotal role in ensuring security, opening investment channels, easing sanctions, and supporting reconstruction across sectors such as energy, infrastructure, and textiles. As Katipoglu notes, the Egyptian delegation’s visit to Damascus underscored this convergence, as Cairo and Ankara seek to support the voluntary return of Syrian refugees and promote an economic model centered on private-sector partnerships.
Since 2022, a series of meetings and contacts have taken place on various occasions between Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. Both leaders have emphasized the need to preserve Syria’s territorial integrity and independence and to launch an inclusive political process encompassing all segments of society to ensure a successful national reconciliation.
Egyptian political researcher Bashir Abdel Fattah believes that Cairo and Ankara, following the restoration of their bilateral ties, have entered a new phase of understanding and coordination on regional issues—particularly in confronting threats to Arab territorial unity—by supporting Syria’s stability, preventing foreign interference, and seeking to extricate Damascus from its political and security stalemate.
During his meeting with the Egyptian delegation, the Syrian president affirmed that Syrian-Egyptian integration is key to regional stability—economically, security-wise, and strategically—adding that the success of rapprochement between the two countries “strengthens the entire Arab nation and enhances its ability to confront common challenges.”
On the economic and security fronts, al-Shaher notes that Syria represents a strategic transit zone for oil and gas pipelines, making its stability a shared objective for Egypt and Turkey. Egypt, he said, seeks to position itself as a regional hub for liquefied natural gas and gas trading, while Turkey views Syria as a potential corridor for transporting Qatari gas to Europe. Mediterranean security also constitutes a shared concern among the three countries.
Al-Shaher added that Turkish-Egyptian rapprochement with Saudi Arabia enhances prospects for building a broader regional alignment that could include Egypt and Turkey—and possibly Syria at a later stage—to establish a regional balance that preserves security and stability.
Syria has also joined the international coalition to combat terrorism, which both Egypt and Turkey had previously joined, placing the three countries within a single axis working to confront a common adversary.
The designation of the Muslim Brotherhood as a terrorist organization by the United States was met with relief in both Egypt and Syria, particularly given that Damascus had called on the group to dissolve itself.
Al-Shaher argues that Turkey’s political use of the organization has declined sharply nowadays, paving the way for closer ties among these states.
Still, Abdel Fattah cautions that it is premature to speak of a fully formed Egyptian-Turkish alliance. What exists, he said, is limited understanding and coordination, with each side safeguarding its own interests without undermining those of the other, alongside a shared commitment to supporting Syria’s political and economic recovery and respecting its unity and sovereignty.
Taken together, these shifts in Syria and its neighborhood have opened the door to a new phase of cooperation among Damascus, Cairo, and Ankara. Transforming the current cooperation and understandings among the three capitals into full strategic partnerships—or a political and military alliance, however, remains a distant prospect.
