Hezbollah was never merely a political party in Lebanon, nor an ordinary militia. It has long been an actor that transcended the logic of conventional electoral competition.
Its organized military strength, extensive social and economic networks, and cross-sectarian political alliances enabled it to entrench itself at the heart of Lebanon’s political system, despite that system’s inherent fragility.
Yet that image—cemented after the 2006 war with Israel—now appears profoundly altered.
The transformations Lebanon has experienced since the financial collapse of 2019, through prolonged political paralysis, and culminating in the most recent war between Hezbollah and Israel and its repercussions, have weakened the party’s power and placed its popular base and alliances under scrutiny: who still supports Hezbollah today, and why? And who has abandoned it?
Data from Arab Barometer, an independent research project that employs advanced scientific methodologies, indicate that trust in Hezbollah at the national level has become limited. Fewer than one-third of Lebanese express confidence in the party, while more than half explicitly say they do not trust it.
When the results are broken down along sectarian lines, the gap becomes even clearer. Within the Shiite constituency, Hezbollah still enjoys a relatively high level of support, but it no longer reflects the near-total consensus it once did.
By contrast, trust in Hezbollah among Christian, Sunni, and Druze communities has not changed significantly and generally remains below the 10 percent threshold.
These figures were confirmed to us by Rabih El-Habr, director of Lebanon Statistics, in an interview conducted last November. They continue to reflect the views of broad segments of Lebanese society regarding the party’s role—particularly with respect to decisions of war and peace and their direct impact on daily life—since conditions on the ground have not changed substantially since then.
The Mar Mikhael Agreement, signed in 2006 between Hezbollah and the Free Patriotic Movement (FPM), marked a pivotal moment in the party’s history. It was the first time Hezbollah’s weapons received explicit and organized Christian political cover, enabling the party to present itself as a national rather than a sectarian force.
That cover, however, did not endure. Last week, FPM leader Gebran Bassil announced the dissolution of the agreement between the two parties. In an interview with Alhurra, Martine Najm, a senior figure in the Free Patriotic Movement, told us that the decision to end the agreement was “the result of a long trajectory of disagreements that worsened over time.”
Najm explained that the FPM had clung to the agreement for years because, in theory, it rested on broad principles such as state-building, partnership, and reform. In practice, however, she added, developments moved in the opposite direction: weapons shifted from being a source of protection to a source of anxiety, especially after the most recent war with Israel.
Najm further noted that the central turning point in the relationship with Hezbollah was its involvement in wars that went beyond the framework of defending Lebanon. What was referred to as the “support war,” she argued, constituted a clear departure from the foundations of the Mar Mikhael Agreement. Hezbollah, she said, made the decision to go to war without consulting the Lebanese people, the state, or its institutions—placing the country at the heart of a regional conflict in which it had no interest. This, she added, led to a deep distortion of the concepts of national partnership and power-sharing.
Najm stressed that the Free Patriotic Movement had been clear in rejecting this trajectory, particularly as it tied Lebanon to external regional axes. Dragging the country into new confrontations, she argued, does not serve its stability or the future of its people—especially at a time when Lebanese citizens are seeking to keep Lebanon neutral from regional conflicts and restore a minimum level of stability.
“The war and the destruction, fear, and absence of any horizon that followed it have profoundly affected the Christian public mood. People no longer see this path as a guarantee for their future.”
Najm emphasized that Christian opposition does not mean rejecting coexistence or severing ties with the Shiite partner but rather rejecting the continuation of an equation in which existential national decisions are made outside state institutions.
Politically, the collapse of the agreement represents a direct blow to Hezbollah, as it entails the loss of the last organized Christian ally that had provided national cover in contentious political files.
Journalist and writer Ali Al-Amin goes even further in describing the nature of the relationship that bound the two sides. In a lengthy interview with Alhurra, he describes the 2006 agreement as an alignment of mutual interests rather than a genuine political partnership built around a comprehensive national project.
Al-Amin argues that the Free Patriotic Movement benefited from the “dominance of weapons” to reach positions of power, while Hezbollah benefited from Christian cover to entrench the legitimacy of its arms. But that equation, he says, changed fundamentally after the most recent war: “The dominance of weapons has receded politically, and proximity to Hezbollah no longer yields gains—it has become a source of loss.”
He adds that Hezbollah is now facing unprecedented political isolation, as it no longer has any Lebanese allies outside the Shiite framework. “What we are witnessing today is an almost complete dispersal of allies. No one openly declares an alliance with Hezbollah anymore, because the cost of such an alliance has become higher than its return.”
For Sunnis and Druze, the decline in Hezbollah’s popularity did not begin with recent developments. The events of May 7, 2008, followed by the party’s military intervention in Syria and the subsequent political obstruction, entrenched a widespread conviction that Hezbollah acts as a force above the state.
According to international research centers, the majority of Lebanese Sunnis and Druze believe that Hezbollah drags Lebanon into regional conflicts, deepens its international isolation, and limits the state’s ability to make independent sovereign decisions. This conviction has not remained confined to public opinion—it has been reflected in electoral behavior and in the absence of any genuine political alliances with the party.
Despite Hezbollah’s continued status as the most organized force within the Shiite community, field interviews and social indicators point to ongoing shifts within the sect itself. Ali Al-Amin notes that for years the party was able to attract support by providing a sense of security and financial and social protection.
That factor, however, has eroded. Today there are no sufficient compensations, no sense of security, and no tangible gains. Proximity to Hezbollah no longer offers what it once did.
Al-Amin believes this transformation will eventually be reflected at the ballot box. Even if it does not lead to a complete collapse of Hezbollah’s monopoly over Shiite representation, it will nonetheless break that monopoly.
The party is already facing early signs of internal fractures within its environment, linked to the security and economic losses it has recently incurred. The resignation of Wafiq Safa, head of the Liaison and Coordination Unit and one of the party’s most influential figures, is widely seen as a strong indicator of deeper transformations within the Shiite community that go beyond mere organizational considerations.
The article is a translation of the original Arabic.
Randa Jebai
Randa Jebai is an award-winning journalist with more than 20 years of experience. She joined Alhurra TV’s investigative team in 2020, earning honors from the AIBs, New York Festivals, and the Telly Awards. She previously worked with major Lebanese outlets and holds master’s degrees in law and journalism.
