In Washington’s view, Lebanon’s crisis is no longer just about Hezbollah. It is about the political gatekeepers who make reform impossible, and Nabih Berri sits at the top of that list.
That assessment crystallized last week in Congress, when Rep. Darrell Issa dismantled Berri’s long-crafted image as an institutional stabilizer. “Mr. Berri has been in office for 34 years,” Issa said. “Everyone has left him alone for generations, while his vast wealth sits with relatives in Dearborn, Michigan.” The remark was not rhetorical. It marked the beginning of a legislative push to shift U.S. Lebanon policy away from armed actors alone and toward the civilian power brokers who shield them.
Issa made the comments as he and Rep. Darin LaHood introduced the Lebanon Election Integrity and Diaspora Voting Protection Act of 2026, a bill that would place Lebanon’s parliamentary leadership within the potential U.S. sanctions authority. The legislation classifies interference with diaspora voting as a national security concern and authorizes penalties against any foreign individual who obstructs or manipulates overseas ballots.
A senior State Department official told MBN the shift is being framed bluntly. “This is not about personalities but about chokepoints. From Washington’s perspective, the 2026 elections are a hinge moment. Anyone who blocks them becomes a policy problem.” The official added that Berri, who controls the legislative gate through which electoral reform must pass, is no longer viewed as a mediator but as an obstacle.
That logic was reinforced during a House Foreign Affairs Committee hearing titled “U.S. Policy Toward Lebanon: Obstacles to Dismantling Hezbollah’s Grip on Power.” Three experts from the Washington Institute for Near East Policy testified, in rare full alignment, that Berri is the primary institutional barrier to reform. Former Assistant Secretary of State David Schenker described him as a systematic obstructionist who has hollowed out constitutional processes. Analyst Hanin Ghaddar called him the gatekeeper of a political system built to shield Hezbollah from accountability.
This framing matters. State Department officials increasingly view Berri not as a standalone actor but as part of the political architecture that protects Hezbollah from within the state. That is why the sanctions language are structural, not personal. It also explains why diaspora voting now sits at the center of U.S. strategy. In Washington’s calculus, the Lebanese diaspora represents one of the few pressure points Hezbollah cannot easily suppress. Interference with that vote is no longer treated as a domestic Lebanese issue but as a strategic threat.
Behind the scenes, the financial track is already in motion. A senior staffer on the House Foreign Affairs Committee said Treasury agencies, including the Office of Foreign Assets Control and the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, are reviewing U.S.-exposed assets and financial flows linked to Lebanese political elites. Issa’s reference to family-held wealth in Michigan was intentional, signaling jurisdiction and vulnerability.
Committee staff say the process has been methodical. The hearing records, witnesses, and legislative text were curated to build an evidentiary trail strong enough to withstand legal scrutiny if sanctions follow. Letters sent to two administrations in 2024 and 2025 warning of electoral obstruction were part of that buildup. From Capitol Hill’s perspective, this is not escalation by impulse but by design.
There is a political dimension as well. Issa and LaHood’s Lebanese heritage gives the effort rare bipartisan and cultural insulation. It blunts accusations of sectarian targeting and reframes the issue as one of democratic rights, not communal politics. A senior House staffer put it simply: “You cannot weaken Hezbollah’s grip if you keep the same doorman to the political system.”
For decades, Berri mastered the dual language of institutionalism abroad while protecting Hezbollah’s dominance at home. The new legislation threatens that balance. If passed, it would require the administration to identify within 60 days any foreign individual involved in obstructing diaspora voting and to assess the role of Iran-backed entities in Lebanon’s 2026 elections.
In Washington’s evolving view, Berri is no longer a problem-solver. He is the problem. And unlike previous cycles of frustration, this one is being translated into legal and financial leverage. The question now is not whether Washington is worried about Lebanon’s paralysis, but whether it is finally prepared to impose consequences on those who sustain it.
The article is a translation of the original Arabic.
Rami Al Amine
A Lebanese writer and journalist living in the United States. He holds a master’s degree in Islamic-Christian Relations from the Faculty of Religious Sciences at Saint Joseph University in Beirut. He is the author of the poetry collection “I Am a Great Poet” (Dar Al-Nahda Al-Arabiya, 2007); the political pamphlet “Ya Ali, We Are No Longer the People of the South” (Lebanese Plans, 2008); a book on social media titled “The Facebookers” (Dar Al-Jadeed, 2012); and “The Pakistanis: A Statue’s Biography” (Dar Al-Nahda Al-Arabiya, 2024).
