From the moment information leaked about the existence of a training camp in the Benishangul region inside Ethiopian territory—allegedly used to train fighters linked to Sudan’s Rapid Support Forces (RSF)—relations between Sudan and Ethiopia entered a new phase of tension.
Reports spoke of the training of individuals believed to be preparing to join the RSF on the Blue Nile front, a sensitive theater given its proximity to Sudan’s Roseires Dam and to the Ethiopian border. This lent the issue dimensions that went beyond the military sphere, touching on the balance of power across the entire Horn of Africa.
Addis Ababa was quick to deny the allegations. An Ethiopian government official told Alhurra that his country does not side with any party, stressing that Ethiopia “reaffirms the constancy of its position in support of Sudan’s unity and the necessity of ending the conflict through political dialogue among the warring parties. It also denies all allegations claiming that it has taken sides with any party on the ground, considering them entirely baseless.”
This official stance sought to entrench Ethiopia’s image as a potential mediator rather than a party to the conflict—particularly given that it hosts the African Union, a status that gives it additional political weight in any diplomatic initiative.
By contrast, Rafaella Lippshitz, a researcher at the New Lines Institute, told Alhurra that “the RSF training camp in Benishangul is the first direct evidence of Ethiopia’s involvement in Sudan’s war. This represents a dangerous development that could supply the RSF with new fighters at a time when the Blue Nile region is witnessing escalating conflict.”
She added that “sources say the United Arab Emirates funded the construction of the camp and provided military trainers and logistical support to the site.” She went further, saying that “Ethiopia is intervening in Sudan’s war, siding with the Rapid Support Forces and accepting money from the United Arab Emirates to protect its interests related to the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam.”
The UAE denies intervening in the Sudanese war and has said in official statements that it does not provide “weapons or military support to any of the warring parties in Sudan.”
Lippshitz warned that “Ethiopia’s involvement in Sudan’s war is fraught with risk and could lead to a conflict with Eritrea. Ethiopia may view it as strategic to keep the Sudanese Armed Forces—aligned with Cairo—weak, because they strengthen the camp opposed to the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam.”
Amid this controversy, Sudanese Foreign Minister Muhyiddin Salim paid a visit to Ethiopia, a move some interpreted as an attempt to contain the escalation and prevent it from shifting from media accusations to an open political confrontation.
The visit coincided with a significant development: ongoing calls to lift the suspension of Sudan’s membership in the African Union after its suspension in the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) was ended. This brought Khartoum back to the regional table after a period of isolation, raising questions about whether Ethiopia’s stance on reinstating Sudan’s membership was merely a diplomatic gesture or part of broader trade-offs.
Lippshitz believes that Ethiopia, “as the host country of the African Union, enjoys informal influence over summit dynamics. Ethiopia may choose not to directly oppose Sudan’s return to the African Union while continuing to support the Rapid Support Forces on the ground.”
She adds that “it is better to understand Ethiopia’s potential lack of opposition to reinstatement as a diplomatic gesture that does not cost Addis Ababa much.” She also notes that any potential understanding “is not only between Ethiopia and Khartoum, but part of broader regional negotiations involving the United States, Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, and Saudi Arabia.”
On the other hand, Ethiopian journalist Nour al-Din Abda, editor-in-chief of Nilotic Post, offers a different reading that focuses on geography and the pressures of reality. He argues that border areas have turned into a confrontation zone because of the Sudanese army’s efforts to secure airports and bases in Damazin, Sennar, and Kurmuk in southeastern Sudan along the Ethiopian border within Blue Nile State. This, he says, “has put Ethiopia under pressure from both sides of the war and their regional backers to push it toward taking sides—something Ethiopia rejects, instead trying to maintain equal distance from everyone.”
Nour al-Din also says he does not believe there has been a fundamental shift in Addis Ababa’s position. Rather, Ethiopia’s problem is that it does not oppose the Sudanese state as much as the RSF would like, nor does it oppose the RSF as much as Sudan’s official government would like—leaving it exposed to accusations from both sides.
Parallel to this regional track, a revised draft plan presented by the U.S. envoy to Sudan, Massad Boulos, emerged under the leadership of the international “Quad.” The plan focuses on an urgent humanitarian truce that would open the way for the flow of aid, while postponing military and political issues to later stages.
Lippshitz explains that “previous plans that were somewhat similar to this one were strongly rejected by the leaders of the Sudanese Armed Forces. What distinguishes this plan is its context and the current state of the conflict.” However, she warns that its implementation “requires, to some extent, legitimizing the Rapid Support Forces… Even if these forces withdraw, RSF-affiliated governance structures are likely to remain in place.”
She adds that the plan “is unlikely to produce a solid political settlement or to dismantle the Rapid Support Forces and is more likely to manage the war rather than end it.”
In this sense, three tracks intersect: the on-the-ground track in Benishangul and the Blue Nile; the diplomatic track tied to the African Union and IGAD; and the Boulos draft, which seeks to freeze the conflict by prioritizing humanitarian concerns.
Ethiopia officially affirms its support for Sudan’s unity and political dialogue, while some analyses and satellite imagery accuse it of backing the Rapid Support Forces to safeguard its interests linked to the Renaissance Dam.
Between official denials and mounting accusations, one constant remains: any movement in Benishangul or the Blue Nile cannot be separated from the broader calculations in Addis Ababa, Khartoum, Cairo, Abu Dhabi, and Riyadh. The trajectory of war and peace in Sudan has become closely tied to wider regional balances that extend beyond its geographic borders.
The article is a translation of the original Arabic.
