The visit of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan to Saudi Arabia and Egypt was much more significant and substantive than a mere traditional visit. It rather signaled Ankara’s return to Arab heartland.
In addition to closing the chapter on years of strained relations, the visit, according to observers, laid the foundations for a partnership based on coordination over major shared interests.
Ankara knocked on Riyadh’s door with economic ambitions, aiming to raise bilateral trade to the threshold of $50 billion annually. Despite the magnitude of that figure, the “most prominent strategic gain” lies in military-technical cooperation, which has moved from a procurement phase to one of joint manufacturing, according to official statements.
A former Turkish ambassador, who requested anonymity, told Alhurra in a special interview that “what Ankara is offering is capacity-building within a Turkey-designed system. Partnerships are built on mutual benefit and interdependence, not on subordination or political influence over Turkey’s regional choices.”
Arab-Turkish coordination extends to several regional flashpoints. In Sudan, intelligence reports and satellite imagery have revealed a role for “Turkish drones” launched from Egyptian bases in shifting the balance of power in battles between the Sudanese army and the Rapid Support Forces.
Ümit Çağrı Sarı, political analyst specialized in the affairs of the Horn of Africa, says “during the first two years of the war, Egypt largely adhered to a neutral position. However, the UAE’s growing support for the Rapid Support Forces pushed Cairo toward a more active role—one that has now become clearer on both the diplomatic and military fronts.”
In this context, Ben Fishman, an expert on African affairs at the Washington Institute, argues that Egypt has long supported the Sudanese government led by General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, and that Turkish-Egyptian relations are a key component of that support.
Fishman points to international reports about what he calls “the drone race in southern Egypt, including Turkish aircraft,” noting that these reports have added little beyond what was already widely known about Turkish-Egyptian cooperation on Sudan.
Turkey likewise relies on these relationships to expand its strategic interests in the eastern Mediterranean. However, despite the diplomatic rapprochement between Cairo and Ankara, maritime boundary demarcation remains a point of contention.
A Turkish diplomat explains that “Cairo deals cautiously with maritime boundary agreements and will not easily relinquish its gains with Greece. But if Egypt finds that an agreement with Turkey offers longer-term strategic and economic benefits, it might show limited but meaningful flexibility.”
Fishman, for his part, stresses that cooperation on specific issues does not necessarily mean resolving others. “The maritime dispute between Turkey and Egypt does not appear close to resolution. The 40-point memorandum to which both sides committed did not address the maritime issue. This suggests that countries can now cooperate on several regional matters while maintaining differing priorities and preserving their disagreements on others.
Turkey today appears to be succeeding in what might be called a “smart balancing policy.” It seeks to strengthen its relationship with the BRICS group without severing its ties with European partners, while simultaneously importing gas from both the United States and Russia.
Turkey’s pivot toward the Arab sphere stems from its conviction that the path to joining the European Union in Brussels remains riddled with obstacles it has been unable to overcome over the past two decades. Despite the confidence these parties express in their mutual relations, the question remains: can this rapprochement withstand longstanding geopolitical rivalries and the anxieties associated with what is often termed “neo-Ottomanism”?
