The UAE and Russia’s Shadow Fleet

In January 2026, Russian fighter jets painted the colors of the Emirati flag across the skies of Moscow in a ceremonial welcome for UAE President Mohammed bin Zayed, who visited the city and met President Vladimir Putin.

At the same time, the waters off the UAE’s Fujairah coast were alive with the quiet movements of Russia’s so-called “shadow fleet,” which includes, in particular, numerous oil tankers.

The birth and role of this fleet has been closely linked to the profound shifts that have reshaped global oil trade since the outbreak of the war in Ukraine. It has become one of Moscow’s primary tools for continuing to export oil, gas, and gold outside the traditional channels that are subject to Western sanctions.

According to the British newspaper Financial Times, the fleet expanded markedly in 2024—by nearly 70 percent—reflecting Russia’s growing reliance on these alternative mechanisms in the energy trade.

As the United States and Western countries monitor these developments, Russia continues its efforts to evade sanctions through this fleet, while the UAE seeks to benefit from its activity and to safeguard its leadership role in regional trading operations.

Between Russia and the UAE

While commercial cooperation between countries is nothing unusual, what lies behind the activity of Russia’s “shadow fleet” raises serious questions.

These questions fall along two lines. The first is Russia’s attempt to evade Western sanctions in order to secure much-needed financial resources. The second is its effort—along with other international powers—to establish an “alternative pathway” to the global financial system, according to observers.

Anna Borshchevskaya, a senior fellow at The Washington Institute, argues that the overall picture has not fundamentally changed since the beginning of this year. She notes that “the U.S. Treasury Department continues to classify Dubai as a key hub for Russia’s circumvention of Western sanctions and export controls. Dubai has gained particular importance as a trade transit center facilitating so-called dual-use technology, gold, and financial flows—factors that have effectively helped Russia finance its war” in Ukraine.

All of this has created a flexible environment for Russian companies seeking a safe haven away from the traditional SWIFT system. However, observers say it has not helped the UAE in its efforts to be removed from the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) “grey list.”

The Role of Fujairah

Competition with Saudi Arabia on the regional stage does not appear far removed from the UAE’s calculations when it comes to the activity of Russia’s shadow fleet along its shores.

In this context, Simon Henderson, director of the Gulf and Energy Policy Program at The Washington Institute, says the UAE’s role has gone beyond merely providing berths. “Fujairah has become a rear base for Russian oil trade. The UAE provides financial and legal cover for selling oil outside Western price caps. This cooperation helps Abu Dhabi reinforce its position vis-à-vis Riyadh, which constrains its production quota—but it remains cooperation, not an alliance.”

By contrast, Nasser Al-Sheikh, former director general of Dubai’s Department of Finance, stresses that Fujairah is a global hub for bunkering (7.5 million tons in 2024), storage, and handling, and that the port cannot be held responsible for the operation of these vessels.

Regarding the concept of a “shadow fleet,” Al-Sheikh explains that it is an operational description for ships and entities that use complex ownership structures and often operate outside Western insurance and shipping systems. He adds that “the presence of vessels linked to Russian trade near Fujairah does not mean the port operates them or provides them with sovereign cover—especially since Europe itself still imports around 13 percent of its gas needs and some Russian oil.”

The BRICS Bet

Official figures show that economic cooperation between Abu Dhabi and Moscow is enjoying an unprecedented boom. Total non-oil trade between the two countries rose to around $11.5 billion in 2024, an increase of 5 percent compared with 2023. The first quarter of 2025 also recorded exceptional growth, with non-oil trade jumping by 76.3 percent compared with the same period a year earlier.

Dmitry Brijev, a researcher at the Russian International Affairs Council, says that “talk of Dubai and Fujairah providing financial cover remains a media story rather than an official designation. From Moscow’s perspective, the UAE represents a logistical platform for redirecting energy toward BRICS markets and Africa.” He notes that Russian companies rely on establishing legal fronts in friendly countries—something that is legally permissible—and that the use of cryptocurrencies and the BRICS Pay system is part of adapting to restrictions.

While Russia has benefited from the UAE in operating its “shadow fleet” and securing a significant portion of the financial resources it needs, the continuation of this activity may pose a test for the UAE’s relations with its partners and with the wider world.

The article is a translation of the original Arabic.