Due to geographical proximity, Gulf states are not far removed from the risk of being affected by shrapnel from any military developments involving Iran.
While these countries have moved quickly to distance themselves from any potential U.S. military strike on Iran—and have publicly declared their refusal to allow attacks on Iran to be launched from their territory—questions remain about the extent to which their air defense systems are capable of protecting them from unforeseen escalations.
The Gulf’s current defensive architecture is based on a multi-layered concept. At the upper tier, some countries operate the THAAD system to intercept ballistic missiles at high altitudes. At the next level, the Patriot system—particularly the PAC-3 and PAC-3 MSE variants—constitutes the backbone of terminal defense against short- and medium-range missiles. Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Kuwait, and Bahrain all operate this system to varying degrees of modernization. During 2025 and 2026, announcements were made regarding deals to bolster Saudi Arabia’s stockpile of PAC-3 MSE interceptors, along with upgrade and recertification programs for Patriot missiles in Kuwait, signaling continued investment in enhancing operational readiness.
Some Gulf states have also strengthened their ability to counter low-altitude threats through medium- and short-range air defense systems such as NASAMS, which is designed to engage aircraft, cruise missiles, and unmanned aerial vehicles.
In 2021, the United States redeployed Patriot and THAAD batteries stationed in some Gulf countries as part of a broader review of U.S. force posture, without withdrawing systems owned by the Gulf states themselves.
Despite reliance on layered air defense systems, the question persists as to how resilient this defensive umbrella would be in absorbing the shock of a large-scale or uncalculated confrontation.
Assessing existing capabilities, military analyst Saeed Al-Hajri explains that air defense systems such as Patriot PAC-3, THAAD, and NASAMS in Gulf countries possess high technical efficiency in intercepting short- and medium-range ballistic missiles. He notes that “there have been reports of U.S. reinforcements in 2026 due to tensions with Iran, which enhance operational readiness through advanced radars and joint coordination.”
However, Al-Hajri cautions that effectiveness may be limited against Iran’s multi-range missile arsenal, such as the Fateh-110 and Shahab-3, particularly in scenarios involving saturation attacks, where large numbers of missiles are launched simultaneously to overwhelm air defenses.
Interoperability among Gulf air defense systems is therefore of critical importance, alongside each country’s individual capabilities.
Strategic researcher and military expert Issa Al-Fayea says Gulf states do possess the ability to operate these systems in an interoperable manner, as demonstrated through bilateral and multilateral joint exercises. He adds that “Saudi air defense forces have proven their effectiveness by intercepting more than a thousand projectiles—missiles and drones—since the launch of Operations Decisive Storm and Restoring Hope in support of Yemen’s legitimate government.”
Massed or multi-axis attacks typically pose a greater challenge to air defense systems.
During its 12-day war with Israel, Iran repeatedly launched large numbers of missiles and drones simultaneously, aiming to exhaust Israeli air defenses—a tactic known as saturation.
Low-altitude missiles present an additional challenge for defenders.
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Al-Hajri explains that Iran may employ low-flying cruise missiles to evade radar detection, resulting in incomplete defensive coverage. He adds that air defenses are also insufficient to fully cover the vast territories of some countries, especially when compared with Iran’s arsenal of thousands of missiles.
The possibility that Iran could launch missiles from undisclosed locations further narrows the defensive margin available to Gulf Cooperation Council states.
Al-Hajri argues that “a scenario in which Iran is choked—such as being subjected to a U.S. naval blockade—could push it to adopt complex and unconventional attacks that burden radar systems and rapidly deplete interceptor missiles.”
On technological developments, Al-Hajri points to “laser systems such as the Chinese Silent Hunter used in Saudi Arabia,” noting that they are in testing and deployment phases and are effective against low-altitude drones at relatively low operating cost. However, he stresses that “these systems are not yet ready to offset the high costs of a full-scale war.”
Gulf states maintain close security ties with the United States and host U.S. military bases, placing them directly within the strategic calculations of any potential escalation between Washington and Tehran, despite their refusal to allow their territory to be used for military operations against Iran.
At the same time, differences between Saudi Arabia and the UAE cast a shadow over discussions about the Gulf states’ collective ability to protect their airspace.
Al-Fayea emphasizes that “any external threat to Gulf national security, regardless of its source, obliges member states to adhere to the Gulf Cooperation Council charter and to enhance precise defense and security coordination with Saudi Arabia, irrespective of political differences or bilateral alliances involving some GCC members.”
“I expect—and hope—that Abu Dhabi will recognize the potential collective danger and rise to the level of responsibility required in addressing Gulf national security issues,” Al-Fayea says.
The article is a translation of the original Arabic.
Sakina Abdallah
A Saudi writer, researcher, and TV presenter
