More than two thousand missile and drone attacks have been launched against Arab Gulf states since the start of the U.S.–Israeli strikes on Iran on February 28, in an unprecedented military escalation. Why, then, have these countries not responded to Tehran’s attacks in a similar way?
Gulf capitals may not view the issue in such simple terms. In the calculations of Gulf decision-makers, the decision to retaliate is tied to a broader assessment concerning the shape of the next phase of the war, the cost of expanding it, and whether a direct response would curb the threat or instead push it toward a wider level of escalation. This is reflected in official Gulf statements from the first days of the conflict. These statements have combined clear condemnation of the attacks with an emphasis on sovereignty and the right to self-defense, without moving toward the adoption of a direct offensive response.
The United Arab Emirates said it “does not seek to be drawn into conflicts or escalation,” while the Gulf Cooperation Council stressed that the security of its member states is “non-negotiable,” while simultaneously focusing on protecting shipping lanes, vital infrastructure, and the stability of energy markets.
What appears to be a form of restraint, however, is governed by three main factors, according to experts who spoke to Alhurra.
Avoiding a slide into a Broader Regional War
According to the experts, Gulf capitals recognize that a direct response against Iran would go beyond simply delivering a retaliatory strike. It would involve redefining their position in this conflict. Such a shift would alter the nature of the confrontation and expand the list of potential targets.
Even more dangerous is that such a response could provide Tehran with the justification it needs to turn the Gulf region itself into the main battlefield.
Former U.S. ambassador James Jeffrey told Alhurra that most Gulf countries, despite being targeted by Iranian attacks and suffering damage to their oil exports, “do not want to appear” as parties to the fighting, nor do they want to be “associated with an Israeli military operation.” Instead, these states prefer to preserve room for maneuver that would allow them to play the role of mediator in any potential negotiations to end the war.
This margin for maneuver is what pushes Gulf capitals toward de-escalation rather than escalation. Politically and diplomatically, they are treating the war involving Iran, the United States, and Israel as a “single front,” according to Ebtesam Al-Ketbi, president of the Emirates Policy Center. She describes the Gulf position as closer to “a system of political solidarity and collective defensive deterrence” than to a cohesive military alliance ready to take a unified combat decision.
Retired Major General Mohammed Al-Qubaiban agrees, arguing that the current threat “endangers the entire system.” Nevertheless, the Gulf response is focused on “defending its airspace” and strengthening cooperation in command and control as well as intelligence sharing.
The Cost of Military Retaliation
The question here is not whether Gulf states are capable of responding, but whether such a response would be effective. Would it actually alter the balance of power, or would it add costs greater than its impact?
Given the ongoing U.S.–Israeli military involvement, any offensive Gulf role would likely remain limited. As Jeffrey put it, such participation “would add little” compared with the scale of force already being used against Iran, especially since most Gulf countries do not possess significant stockpiles of long-range missiles capable of striking targets inside Iran.
At the same time, these states face direct and repeated threats from missiles and drones, making the use of their air capabilities for defending airspace and vital infrastructure more urgent than employing them in distant offensive operations.
According to political analyst Musaed Al-Maghnam, the Gulf threshold for restraint remains high, but it could fall if attacks move beyond pressure and begin to “paralyze the state” or strike its critical infrastructure.
From another angle, Al-Qubaiban believes the events have revealed shortcomings in the performance of the U.S. security umbrella, particularly since the attack occurred “without coordination with the GCC states,” which he described as a “clear misstep” by the American side. That does not necessarily mean Gulf capitals will move to sever their partnership with Washington, but it reflects a growing need to reassess that role and build a more integrated Gulf defense system.
The Economic Cost of Escalation
The third factor—and the heaviest in Gulf calculations—is the economic cost of escalation itself, and the possibility that it could turn into a “war of attrition against infrastructure and the economy,” according to Al-Ketbi.
The issue is not limited to oil. It involves an interconnected system that includes ports, airports, logistics services, desalination plants, and financial markets—many of which have recently appeared on Iran’s declared list of potential targets.
These costs have already begun to emerge quickly.
The Strait of Hormuz, through which roughly 20 percent of the world’s oil passes, is the source of the Gulf’s strategic importance. Yet at the same time, it is one of the region’s greatest vulnerabilities whenever escalation occurs. As the war entered its third week, oil exports from eight Gulf states dropped by about 61 percent, reaching 9.71 million barrels per day in the week ending March 15, compared with 25.13 million in February.
The International Energy Agency said the war that began on February 28 reduced flows of oil and petroleum products from the Gulf to less than 10% of pre-conflict levels, prompting the agency to release 400 million barrels from emergency reserves, the largest drawdown in its history.
Previous experience also offers a clear indication of the scale of the risks.
In the 2019 attacks on the Abqaiq and Khurais oil facilities in Saudi Arabia, about 5.7 million barrels per day of production were temporarily disrupted—more than 5 percent of global supply at the time.
Some of the clearest economic indicators have come from beyond the oil sector itself, as most Gulf stock markets declined as the war entered its third week. Saudi Arabia fell by 0.1 percent, Qatar by 0.2 percent, Bahrain by 0.5 percent, Kuwait by 0.1 percent, and Oman by 0.4 percent.
The war has also caused widespread disruption to air travel, with more than 40,000 flights canceled since February 28, according to Reuters. Industry estimates suggest that more than six million airline seats had been canceled by mid-March.
This pressure quickly spread to the aviation sector due to airport attacks and the closure of some airspaces. The International Air Transport Association reported rising uncertainty in aviation activity and fuel costs, while Eurocontrol data showed flights between Europe and the Middle East dropping by 66 percent in the first days of the war. More than 21,000 flights have been estimated to have been canceled since the escalation began.
In the background, these developments are also affecting tourism and services, with demand declining and travel and insurance costs rising. This is putting pressure on the hotel, retail, and events sectors, with the Formula One races scheduled for April in Bahrain and Saudi Arabia announced as canceled due to the war.
What Could Change These Calculations?
If attacks shift from the level of military pressure to widespread targeting of infrastructure or civilians, or if defensive breaches occur repeatedly in ways that reveal vulnerabilities in protection systems, experts expect Gulf states to quickly reconsider their calculations.
In such a scenario, the shift may not necessarily be toward a comprehensive war, but rather toward limited and calculated responses aimed at redrawing the lines of deterrence.
For now, however, the balance still appears to favor caution.
The article is a translation of the original Arabic.
Ezat Wagdi Ba Awaidhan
Ezat Wagdi Ba Awaidhan, a Yemeni journalist and documentary filmmaker based in Washington, D.C., holds a master's degree in media studies.
Sakina Abdallah
A Saudi writer, researcher, and TV presenter
