More than 1,086 years ago, the twelfth imam in Twelver Shiite Islam, Muhammad ibn al-Hasan al-Askari, entered what is known in prevailing Shiite belief as the “Major Occultation.” Since then, the community has lived in a prolonged state of abeyance for the Hidden Imam, who is expected to reappear at the end of time to establish justice.
Over the centuries, multiple attempts emerged to grant jurists a broader role in managing people’s affairs—not only in religious matters, but also in political ones. However, none of these attempts resulted in the establishment of an absolute religious-political authority comparable, in its powers, to that of the Hidden Imam.
This transformation materialized with the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979, when Ruhollah Khomeini succeeded in institutionalizing this idea under the concept of “Guardianship of the Jurist” (Wilayat al-Faqih). In Shiite Imami political jurisprudence, this theory holds that a qualified jurist acts as the deputy of the Awaited Imam in administering the affairs of the nation and leading it—making it the foundational pillar of Iran’s current system of governance.
Before the institutionalization of Wilayat al-Faqih, there was “a very broad consensus among Shiite jurists that the jurist holds authority during the Occultation,” explains researcher Zaher Moussa to Alhurra. Moussa conducted an in-depth study on the Najaf religious authority in the post–Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani (95) era, in the event of his death.
In his research, Moussa examined possible scenarios that could unfold in the absence of the current highest religious authority among Shiites. The study was published before the assassination of Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, who was considered the second most-followed figure among Shiites worldwide after Sistani.
With Khamenei’s killing and the selection of his son as his successor, questions about the future of religious authority have intensified, and many assumptions about what lies ahead are shifting.
Looking Back
It is impossible to understand what is happening—and what may happen—without grasping the concept of Wilayat al-Faqih during the Occultation in Shiite thought. After the Minor Occultation of the Mahdi, four deputies, known as “ambassadors,” maintained a secret line of communication between the Hidden Imam and his followers. Following the beginning of the Major Occultation and the death of the fourth deputy, Shiites entered a period of uncertainty, and jurists differed over the question of authority—namely, who leads the nation during the Occultation.
According to Moussa, the historical Shiite disagreement on this issue centers on “the scope of this authority: does the authority of the guardian match that of the infallible Imam—such as declaring offensive jihad, implementing legal punishments, and issuing death sentences—or is it more limited?” This is the core dispute. He adds, “The majority support exercising these powers in their entirety, as argued by major jurists such as al-Muhaqqiq al-Hilli, al-Shaykh al-Mufid, and some Akhbari scholars.”
This concept persisted, Moussa notes, from the Safavid era through figures such as al-Muhaqqiq al-Najafi, Shaykh al-Ansari, and Mulla al-Naraqi, and extended into the political roles played by clerics in the Tobacco Protest, the Constitutional Revolution in Iran, and the support for oil nationalization led by Ayatollah Kashani—continuing through Ayatollah Taleghani and ultimately Ayatollah Khomeini. All of these political interventions were based on the idea that these clerics were “deputies of the Imam” and thus held his authority. After the Iranian Revolution, this doctrine was institutionalized and transformed into a constitutional body (the Assembly of Experts). The disagreement between the traditional seminary in Najaf and the Iranian system, Moussa emphasizes, lies in this institutionalization—not in the underlying idea itself.
Ruhollah Khomeini laid the foundations of Wilayat al-Faqih as an institution and himself assumed absolute authority, wielding powers equivalent to those attributed to the Awaited Imam. He also enshrined this in Iran’s constitution, stipulating that leadership would be transferred through election after his death, and requiring that the leader be the most learned (al-a‘lam). However, after Khomeini’s death, the requirement of scholarly superiority complicated Ali Khamenei’s succession, leading to a constitutional amendment, as Shiite cleric Sheikh Abbas Yazbek explains to Alhurra.
“Khamenei, when he assumed leadership in 1989, was not the most learned, nor was he even teaching advanced ‘bahth al-kharij’ classes, which are a key qualification for jurisprudence. This was not Khomeini’s original plan, but at the last moment the requirement of scholarly superiority was dropped. The political circle surrounding Khamenei, particularly Sheikh Hashemi Rafsanjani, played a decisive role in endorsing him, as he was seen as someone who could be politically guided.”
Yazbek adds that there was a distinctly Lebanese effort, led by Hezbollah, which “helped export Khamenei’s religious authority beyond Iran and consolidate it through written juridical endorsements.”
Although Wilayat al-Faqih has existed as an institution since 1979 and continued under Khamenei from 1989 until his assassination in 2026, its spread as a religious guiding doctrine remained limited compared to the authority of Najaf, represented by Ali al-Sistani. Sistani is considered the most widely followed “marja” (religious guide/referee) within Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, and even among Shiites in Afghanistan, India, and the Gulf states—making him, as Moussa affirms, truly deserving of the title “Supreme Religious Authority.”
Authority Between the Jurist and the Supreme “Marja”
Sistani’s understanding of authority differs from that of Iran’s revolutionary leaders. While he agrees with the Iranian constitution on the requirement of “effective authority” (the capacity to enforce decisions), he differs in the scope and limits of that authority and in the degree of its involvement in politics. Although Sistani exercises powers resembling those of the infallible Imam—such as calling for a constitution, encouraging participation in elections, and issuing the 2014 jihad fatwa—he believes that the authority of the jurist expands or contracts depending on political conditions and public acceptance, rather than being absolute.
When asked to define Wilayat al-Faqih, Sistani said: “Authority, in what jurists describe as ‘hisbi matters,’ is established for every jurist who meets the conditions for emulation. As for broader authority over public matters upon which the order of Islamic society depends, it applies to those jurists who meet additional conditions, including general acceptance among believers.”
“Hisbi matters” refers to public issues requiring direct intervention by the jurist to preserve social order, life, property, and honor. These include managing the wealth of orphans and minors, public endowments, and the affairs of absent individuals.
With Khamenei’s assassination, the disappearance of his son from public view amid reports of injury and possible assassination, and even the possibility of regime collapse due to war, numerous questions arise about the future of Wilayat al-Faqih—and extend to the future of Shiite religious authority as a whole in the post-Sistani era.
From Moussa’s perspective, Mojtaba Khamenei “possesses an excellent scholarly religious record, arguably better than that of his father when he assumed the position of Wilayat al-Faqih in the late 1980s.” The precedent of his father’s succession following constitutional amendments allows him to assume authority without major obstacles. Full physical presence is not required, and Moussa argues that Mojtaba could exercise the role of supreme jurist even from the shadows. His absence does not necessarily place the Qom seminary in crisis, as there are senior jurists capable of serving as marja‘ for Shiites at large, including Vahid Khorasani, Makarem Shirazi, and Shobeiri Zanjani—figures who have pledged allegiance to Mojtaba despite being his teachers.
For Sheikh Abbas Yazbek, however, the crisis runs deeper. He argues that Wilayat al-Faqih has been in crisis since the first constitutional amendment that enabled Khamenei’s leadership, and that norms were further broken with the selection of his son Mojtaba. Politics, he says, has come to clearly dominate the institution, which aspires to represent all Shiites globally and extend its influence wherever they are found. Yet, according to Iran’s constitution, only an Iranian national can assume this role—raising a fundamental question, as Yazbek puts it: “How can the jurist claim authority over non-Iranians when they themselves are barred from holding this position?”
Yazbek notes that Lebanese cleric Mohammad Hussein Fadlallah had intended to assume both religious authority and leadership, “but this collided with the requirement that the supreme jurist must be Iranian.”
Thus, Iran’s Wilayat al-Faqih appears closer to a political center than a purely religious authority. Even within Hezbollah, Yazbek argues, “there was a distinction between political loyalty and religious emulation—some followers emulated al-Khoei religiously while politically following Khomeini.” The same dynamic exists in Iran, where some view Mojtaba Khamenei as a political leader while emulating Sistani religiously.
Moussa does not expect followers of Ali Khamenei to shift their emulation to Sistani after his death, for a key reason: “Those who followed Khamenei did so as a ‘guardian jurist’ and political leader, not necessarily for his scholarly superiority. They believe in the political project of Wilayat al-Faqih and are unlikely to shift to Najaf’s Guardianship, which practices limited ‘hisbi authority.’ Instead, they will follow his son Mojtaba.” Yazbek adds that “Iranians who follow Wilayat al-Faqih religiously are, in fact, following it politically—their religious choices are shaped rather than freely chosen.”
The Door to Dynastic Succession Now Open
The question remains open regarding the future of religious authority in the event of Sistani’s death in Najaf, or the possible assassination of the new supreme leader Mojtaba Khamenei.
If Sistani dies and the Iranian system remains intact, Mojtaba Khamenei could emerge as a strong contender for Sistani’s position, Moussa suggests, “especially given Shiite preference for unified authority to avoid internal strife.” However, this remains speculative. Other scenarios exist in Najaf, where Mohammad Ridha Sistani, the son of Ali al-Sistani, is a prominent figure. He is “a senior jurist trained in both the Khoei and Sistani schools, who has managed his father’s authority with competence for 30 years and achieved significant institutional successes.”
Although hereditary succession is theoretically absent in Shiite religious thought, Mojtaba Khamenei’s succession in Iran may open the door for Sistani’s son to assume leadership in Najaf—“especially given public trust in his judgment, which reflects that of his father.”
Shiite thought, across its historical stages, inherently intertwines religion and authority. Imam Ali ibn Abi Talib combined spiritual leadership with political rule as the fourth caliph after the Prophet Muhammad. In the age of Occultation, as both Moussa and Yazbek explain, the jurist remains the deputy of the Hidden Imam in both religious and political spheres. Accordingly, Moussa does not expect a fundamental shift in Shiite reality worldwide: “They will continue to believe that the jurist is the Imam in both religion and worldly affairs, and if he acquires power and influence, he will declare himself guardian and rule in the name of Imam al-Mahdi.”
For Yazbek, however, there is today “a real crisis in the structure of religious authority and Wilayat al-Faqih, and an urgent need to reconsider the very concept of marja‘iyya (guardianship) and redefine its role.”
In both cases, two models of religious authority emerge: one in which politics takes precedence, as in Iran’s Wilayat al-Faqih; and another in which the public interest is prioritized, leaving politics largely to politicians except in exceptional circumstances requiring intervention, as in Najaf. In both models, the jurist has a political role—the difference is that in Iran his authority is absolute, whereas in Iraq it remains limited and flexible, shaped by political conditions and the requirements of the public good.
The article is a translation of the original Arabic.
Rami Al Amine
A Lebanese writer and journalist living in the United States. He holds a master’s degree in Islamic-Christian Relations from the Faculty of Religious Sciences at Saint Joseph University in Beirut. He is the author of the poetry collection “I Am a Great Poet” (Dar Al-Nahda Al-Arabiya, 2007); the political pamphlet “Ya Ali, We Are No Longer the People of the South” (Lebanese Plans, 2008); a book on social media titled “The Facebookers” (Dar Al-Jadeed, 2012); and “The Pakistanis: A Statue’s Biography” (Dar Al-Nahda Al-Arabiya, 2024).
