The United States and Iran are moving closer to a political understanding that could ease military tensions in the Middle East. But it remains unclear whether such an arrangement would address one of the region’s most sensitive issues: armed groups linked to Tehran.
In Iraq, where Shiite armed factions operate both within state institutions and alongside them, politicians, analysts and officials are closely watching the negotiations between Washington and Tehran. Even if the groups are not mentioned explicitly in any agreement, the outcome could shape their future.
Since the war began in February, Iraqi factions supported by Iran have used drones and rockets to attack sites linked to American forces in Iraq and the broader region. Those attacks offered fresh evidence of the groups’ place within what Tehran calls the “axis of resistance” and underscored how difficult it is to separate their future from any shift in relations between Washington and Tehran.
So far, there are no indications that the expected agreement includes detailed provisions on Iran’s proxies, which include not only Iraqi armed factions but also Lebanon’s Hezbollah and the Houthis in Yemen. Still, the mere existence of a new negotiating track between Washington and Tehran has opened a wider debate over groups that have long served as instruments of Iranian influence in the region.
That debate has coincided with direct American pressure on Baghdad to exert control over the weapons Iran-backed groups possess. An Iraqi government source told Alhurra that Washington had asked Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi’s government to set a clear timetable for bringing all weapons under state control and dismantling armed groups operating outside state authority. The request came during a visit to Baghdad by the U.S. envoy Tom Barrack, who met with al-Zaidi.
Despite the many leaks and reports surrounding the expected U.S.-Iran understanding, the actual details remain limited.
“It’s completely unclear how much this MOU is actually going to include proxies,” said Matthew Levitt, director of the Reinhard Program on Counterterrorism and Intelligence at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy.
“Let’s take as a premise of the question that, you know, there really is a serious intent for the MOU to include deliverables and the proxies, you know, with the understanding that that’s an assumption,” Levitt told Alhurra, “there’s no way to know if it’s going to be more focused on or more enforceable in one venue or another.”
Most of Iraq’s current armed factions emerged after 2003, then expanded significantly after the Islamic State swept across large areas of the country in 2014.
Many of these factions have political, military and ideological ties to Iran, especially to the Quds Force of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, which has played a central role in training, arming and supporting a number of them over the years.
The groups include prominent factions such as Asaib Ahl al-Haq, Kataib Hezbollah, Harakat al-Nujaba and Kataib al-Imam Ali, along with other formations that operate within or in coordination with the Popular Mobilization Forces.
During the war against Islamic State, these groups gained broad legitimacy inside Iraq because of their role fighting alongside government forces. But their activities later expanded beyond Iraq. Some factions fought in Syria in support of the government of former President Bashar al-Assad, and in recent years they have become involved in operations tied to the regional conflict between Iran and Israel.
Several experts doubt that there is any genuine U.S.-Iranian consensus over the future of armed groups linked to Tehran, or that Iran is prepared to abandon its proxies.
Joshua Yaphe, a senior fellow at the Center for the National Interest in Washington, said “Iran has no intention of withdrawing support for its regional proxies. That leaves the United States with more of the same options: sanctions, interdictions, arrests, and covert action.”
“The White House will undoubtedly insist on concessions from Iran regarding its proxy groups,” Yaphe told Alhurra. “However, only the governments in, Beirut, Baghdad. Each will also be constrained by its own domestic political limitations.”
In Iraq’s case, Yaphe said “newly appointed Prime Minister al-Zaidi is trying to strike a delicate balance by welcoming PMF groups into his government while avoiding a fight among them over access to resources.”
Hezbollah: A Different Priority
Iran accords its regional allies varying degrees of importance and strategic value, depending on the nature of the relationship and the role each group plays in Tehran’s calculations.
Many analysts describe Lebanon’s Hezbollah as Iran’s most important ally, given the depth of its ties with the group’s past and current leadership, and Lebanon’s position as a direct line of confrontation with Israel — unlike the Iraqi factions or the Houthis in Yemen.
Levitt said comparing Hezbollah with the Iraqi factions is difficult because the Lebanese group occupies a special place within the regional network Iran has built over several decades.
“Hezbollah has always been the crown jewel in the axis of resistance crown, as it were. It goes back the farthest in time. It is the most intimate ideologically and otherwise,” he said. “It includes significant interpersonal relationships and familial relationships with people from Iran and Lebanon, marrying into each other’s families. Ultimately, Yemen is not a frontline state to Israel. Iraq is not a frontline state to Israel. So Hezbollah at many levels is unique from the Iranian perspective.”
Jason Brodsky, policy director at United Against Nuclear Iran, said he believes Tehran is trying to link Hezbollah’s file to any future understanding with the United States.
“Iran wants to create linkage in the MOU with Hezbollah. This is because it wants to preserve its capabilities and space to rebuild and rearm,” he said.
Iraq’s factions, by contrast, could be affected by any agreement even if they are not directly mentioned in its text. Lower tensions between the United States and Iran could give these groups room to reorganize, while a breakdown in that broader relationship could push them back to the forefront of confrontation.
“The Iran-backed militias will use any ceasefire to rehabilitate their capabilities,” Brodsky said.
Ultimately, the future of Iraq’s armed factions will not depend solely on the provisions of any possible memorandum of understanding between Washington and Tehran. It will remain tied to the balance of power inside Iraq, the relationship between the state and the factions, and the direction of the broader regional conflict in the Middle East.
Adapted and translated from the original Arabic.
