The regional rivalry between Turkey and Iran is nothing new. But it entered a new phase at the end of 2024, when the government of Bashar al-Assad collapsed at the hands of Turkish-backed opposition forces.
Iran’s influence in Syria, however, has not disappeared.
According to Syrian sources who spoke to Alhurra, Tehran continues to rely on clandestine networks linked to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and Hezbollah, as well as weapons-smuggling routes into Lebanon, to preserve what remains of its influence after losing its closest Arab ally.
As Turkey works to consolidate Syria’s new government and Iran seeks to protect its remaining assets, the country is emerging as a new testing ground for whether the two regional powers can manage their competition without sliding into direct confrontation.
Mudhar Hammad al-Assad, head of the Syrian Supreme Council of Tribes and Clans, said Syrian authorities are conducting near-daily security operations targeting cells affiliated with the IRGC and Hezbollah.
“The Syrian General Security forces are operating aggressively both inside Syria and along the Lebanese border,” he told Alhurra. “Over the past several months, they have carried out raids that resulted in the arrest of dozens of operatives linked to the IRGC and Hezbollah, while also seizing large stockpiles of weapons and explosives.”
On Sept. 11, Syrian authorities announced that internal security forces and the country’s intelligence service had arrested members of what they described as an Iran-backed Hezbollah cell operating near Damascus.
Authorities had previously said Syrian forces intercepted multiple shipments of rockets and other weapons allegedly destined for Hezbollah in Lebanon.
Last month, Syria’s Interior Ministry said it had foiled a new series of assassination plots that it blamed on Hezbollah. The ministry said the alleged plans targeted senior officials, members of minority communities and civilian sites, while also involving weapons-smuggling operations. It accused Hezbollah and Iran-backed groups of attempting to destabilize security across the country—allegations the Lebanese group denies.
Despite those accusations, Damascus has so far refrained from taking any direct military action against Hezbollah inside Lebanon. Analysts attribute that restraint to a desire shared by both Syria’s new government and Turkey to avoid opening another regional front that could undermine efforts to stabilize the country.
That position was reinforced by Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa during a meeting with tribal leaders from the Damascus countryside in mid-June. He said Syria had no intention of intervening militarily in Lebanon and that its priority was to support Lebanese state institutions and help preserve stability.
Ankara’s Calculations
Turkey also appears reluctant to see tensions escalate.
Muhammad Raqiboglu, a Turkish expert on international relations, said Syria’s new leadership lacks the capacity to engage in military operations beyond its borders while its armed forces are still being rebuilt and the country continues to grapple with severe economic challenges.
He told Alhurra that Ankara is equally cautious because it hopes to entrench its influence in Syria through economic engagement and diplomacy rather than through an expansion of military conflicts.
Still, Raqiboglu said any Syrian move against Hezbollah carried out with Turkish backing—or even Turkish acquiescence—could push relations between Ankara and Tehran into a new period of tension.
He stopped short of predicting a direct confrontation, arguing that the two countries have spent decades managing their differences through political and security channels.
Iraq Could Become Part of the Equation
Whether Turkey and Iran could ultimately find themselves in direct conflict remains uncertain. But any Iranian response to mounting pressure on its longtime ally Hezbollah is unlikely to be confined to Syria.
“Tehran could turn to its regional partners, particularly the Iran-aligned armed factions in Iraq, to counterbalance Turkey’s growing influence,” said Iran analyst Masoud al-Fak.
He said Iran could use those groups either to shape developments inside Syria or to pressure Turkish interests in Iraq in an effort to prevent the emergence of a new regional order stretching from Damascus to Beirut beyond Tehran’s influence.
In that scenario, he said, the contest would extend well beyond Syria itself and encompass the broader network of influence linking Iraq, Syria and Lebanon.
For nearly four centuries, Turkey and Iran have avoided direct war despite their long-standing competition for regional influence.
The Ottoman and Safavid empires fought a series of wars that ended with the Treaty of Qasr-e Shirin in 1639, which established much of the modern border between them. Since then, the two states have avoided direct military conflict.
In recent decades, their rivalry has played out across Iraq, Syria and the South Caucasus, even as expanding trade and economic ties have helped preserve a degree of stability in bilateral relations.
Wael Alwan, a researcher at the Syrian Center for Studies in Damascus, said a broader Syrian campaign against Hezbollah could provoke Iran and the Iraqi factions aligned with it, but he does not expect the tensions to escalate into direct conflict between Ankara and Tehran.
“Iran will seek to preserve a measure of influence inside Syria through its traditional networks, while Turkey will continue supporting the Syrian government within the limits of its security and economic role,” he told Alhurra. “The pressure will continue to play out across regional arenas rather than develop into military confrontation between the two states.”
For now, Turkey appears determined to prevent Syria from becoming the site of a direct confrontation with Iran, recognizing that stability is essential to consolidating its political and economic influence in Damascus.
But the future of relations between Ankara and Tehran will depend not only on developments inside Syria. It will also hinge on how Damascus chooses to deal with Hezbollah—and on how far Iran is prepared to go to defend one of its most important remaining strategic assets in the Middle East.
Adapted and translated from the original Arabic.
