Ain al-Hilwe, Lebanon’s largest Palestinian refugee camp, is not simply a tightly packed cluster of buildings: it’s a city within a city, or, as some have called it, “a state outside the state.” On this narrow patch of land in southern Lebanon, lack of space causes houses to be piled on top of one another, while alleyways block both air and light. The damp on the walls clings as oppressively as the lingering smell of gunpowder, bearing silent witness to never-ending conflicts.
In these enclaves, armed factions impose internal systems that dictate daily life, leaving the Lebanese state observing from the margins, with actual sovereignty pushed aside.
Over time, Palestinian camps in Lebanon have become quasi-closed “security islands,” hubs for weapons and influence as well as the scenes of repeated outbreaks of deadly clashes. These changes have run parallel to Lebanon’s shifting attitudes toward Palestinians since 1948.
From welcome to humanitarian crisis
Historian and researcher Eliana Badr tells MBN that Palestinians were initially welcomed, finding jobs and a degree of openness during the country’s boom years. Yet by the late 1950s, repression and marginalization set in. The “Second Bureau,” led by Fouad Chehab, brought a new phase: tight security surveillance and bans on political activity within the camps.
At the heart of this story is a humanitarian crisis. According to official UNRWA figures, around 480,000 Palestinians are registered in Lebanon, but other sources suggest only 200,000 to 250,000 actually reside in and outside the camps – a decline fueled by constant emigration as younger generations seek better lives abroad. Their unstable legal status, work restrictions, and extreme poverty combine to foment frustration and hopelessness, making the camps fertile ground for discontent and unrest. These refugees live in thirteen official camps as well as many informal clusters spread across Lebanon.
Unemployment exceeds fifty percent in some camps, with poverty rates surpassing seventy percent. The majority subsist below the extreme poverty line, almost entirely dependent on relief organizations such as UNRWA. Legal restrictions prevent Palestinian refugees from owning property or working in more than 39 professions, exacerbating their lack of opportunity. These conditions have made the camps a generator of growing despair and instability.
War and fragmentation
The organizational and military autonomy in the camps, made official with the 1969 Cairo Accord, once allowed economic and cultural institutions to flourish, but this ended with the Lebanese Civil War that broke out in 1975. According to Badr, the fedayeen were viewed as allies by Muslims and the political left during the conflict, and the PLO temporarily became a “state within a state.” After Israel’s 1982 invasion of Beirut and the PLO’s departure, Palestinians faced institutional collapse and neglect. Sporadic dialogue with the Lebanese government produced few results, as laws restricting rights and property ownership were issued.
Inside the camps, the “front lines” dividing neighborhoods aren’t marked by signs or fences but by invisible boundaries controlled by distinct factions, each imposing its own rules and demanding loyalty. Moving from one street to another often requires permission or a “guarantee” from the faction in charge, turning basic movement into a risky undertaking. This fragmentation translates into restrictions on daily life, with poverty and despair pushing unemployed youth into the arms of armed groups that offer purpose and financial stability in an environment stripped of hope.
Camp dynamics: factions and arms
The map of influence in camps is complex. Control might be divided among traditional Palestinian factions like Fatah and Hamas, hardline Islamist groups, and local leaders. Fatah dominates some sectors; its absence in others is due to the rise of more hardline groups. Influences overlap—no single power might be dominant, and this fragmentation is the product of interventions that sustain a state of “organized chaos.”
Palestinian researcher Hisham Debsi describes to MBN how some camp factions serve as “a gun for hire” for regional players, especially Iran, with loyalties manipulated as tools for broader agendas. Regional powers exploit Lebanon’s internal weaknesses, and the armed Palestinian presence has long been entwined with external factors.
The issue of disarming Palestinian factions inside the camps is a complex and sensitive matter. In May, Lebanese and Palestinian leaders declared “the era of weapons outside the authority of the Lebanese state” over, yet no concrete progress has been made since then. This stalemate is not a mere security issue but a deeper crisis of Lebanese sovereignty, tied to wider regional developments.
Citizenship and naturalization: the stumbling blocks
The general narrative describes refugees as being denied citizenship and integration. Badr explains that this denial was not due to the “Palestinian presence” in itself, but to a “Palestinian presence that threatens the sectarian and demographic balance” in the country.
As she notes, the denial of citizenship elsewhere wasn’t about Palestinian identity per se but about “a Palestinian presence that threatens the sectarian and demographic balance” of Lebanon. Where such a threat was absent, integration was possible.
The specter of “naturalization” – Palestinians being granted Lebanese citizenship –periodically resurfaces, used as both a pressure card and a pretext for keeping weapons.
The danger, warns Debsi, lies in how it is politicized. The size of the Palestinian population is often exaggerated, stoking sectarian fears. Badr explains that the denial of rights is deeply rooted in concern over “changing the demographic balance” in the country. Since most Palestinians in Lebanon are Sunni, granting citizenship could upset Lebanon’s sectarian equilibrium, an outcome resisted by political leaders.
Analysts agree that the crisis of Lebanon’s Palestinian camps cannot be solved by security measures alone. It requires comprehensive solutions that address the issues of rights, living conditions, and the restoration of hope. The fate of these camps is closely tied to the question of the Lebanese state’s sovereignty and its ability to extend its authority and decision-making across all its territory.
