At Port Sudan airport, some arriving planes are carrying more than passengers and luggage. Reports speak of drone and missile shipments, hinting at a quiet alliance taking shape on the Red Sea.
This is not just another scene in Sudan’s civil war, now entering its third year. It reaches far beyond the battlefield.
On September 12, the U.S. State Department sanctioned Sudanese Finance Minister Gibril Ibrahim and the Sudanese Islamist militia “Al-Baraa bin Malik Battalion,” reviving scrutiny of Sudan’s ruling Sovereign Council, led by Gen. Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, and Khartoum’s growing ties with Tehran.
After eight years of ruptured ties, Tehran and Khartoum restored diplomatic relations in October 2023. Sudan was – and still is — mired in a brutal power struggle between the army and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), while Iran was searching for a new foothold on the Red Sea after the collapse of its nuclear talks with Washington.
Soon after, reports indicated that Iranian weapons were arriving through Port Sudan airport, helping the army repel RSF advances on the capital.
For Burhan, the renewed relationship offered a political and military lifeline. For Iran, it opened a corridor to one of the world’s most critical maritime routes as well as a gateway into Africa.
From Khartoum to the Houthis
Iran’s growing presence in Sudan is increasingly intertwined with the Houthis.
LAst month, Houthi forces struck two ships near Saudi Arabia’s Yanbu port, nearly 600 miles from Yemen’s coast. The attacks revealed new capabilities, and analysts warned that Sudan’s Red Sea coastline could become a launch point for drones and small boats, easing pressure on Houthi positions in Hodeida and Sanaa.
Fahd al-Sharafi, adviser to Yemen’s Minister of Information, says Tehran deepened its role after Burhan’s government accused some Arab states of backing the RSF. “Iran began sending batches of weapons, especially drones and military experts,” he told Alhurra.
“We have information on squadrons of Hajer-type drones and anti-tank missiles [being] transferred to Sudan through Port Sudan in October 2024,” al-Sharafi said.
Experts now describe Sudan as a logistical hub for the Houthis, a place to store munitions and spare parts far from Yemen’s frontlines and to open new smuggling routes across the Horn of Africa. For Iran, Sudan offers a new lever over international shipping and the Bab al-Mandab Strait, heightening tensions along an already volatile corridor.
Old Roots, New Return
Sudan’s place in Iran’s strategic map is not new. Since the 1990s, its Red Sea location has drawn Tehran’s attention as well as regional concern.
In 1993, Egypt’s then-president Hosni Mubarak issued a stark warning to Khartoum, essentially warning that if it built an Iranian base in Port Sudan, he would strike.
Sudan’s then-leader Omar al-Bashir ignored him. He opened Sudan’s doors to Iran’s Revolutionary Guards, ultimately welcomed Iranian warships in 2011, and allowed weapons to move through Sudanese territory to Hamas. The result was Arab and international isolation, and U.S. accusations that Khartoum was sponsoring terrorism.
Under mounting pressure, Sudan pivoted in 2014, abandoning Tehran for Riyadh and Abu Dhabi. It joined the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen and cut ties with Iran in 2016, following Saudi Arabia’s lead.
After Bashir’s fall and the 2023 Saudi-Iran rapprochement brokered by China, Khartoum reopened the door to Tehran. The ongoing war between the army and RSF provided the pretext. Iran moved quickly, supplying weapons and advisors to Burhan’s forces, exploiting Sudan’s internal fractures and regional reluctance to take sides.
Limits of Influence
Despite its apparent gains, Iran’s reach in Sudan faces clear limits.
Yemeni Brig. Gen. Thabet Hussein Saleh says the Houthis are acting under Tehran’s direction to establish a new outpost in the region. “But I doubt Sudan will become a permanent base,” he adds, citing internal resistance and international opposition.
Saudi analyst Faisal al-Shammari warns that Houthi and Iranian expansion could further destabilize Sudan. “This intervention weakens state authority and strengthens smuggling networks,” he says. “The Houthis’ presence gives them logistical reach along the Red Sea’s western shore, but it’s fragile and can be stopped if regional powers act decisively.”
Iran’s reliance on local militias and ad hoc arrangements in a divided country leaves its presence vulnerable. The U.S. and Israel have a long record of striking weapons-smuggling networks in Sudan — including a 2009 air raid that targeted facilities linked to Iran’s Revolutionary Guards.
The Red Sea: The Most Dangerous Front
The Red Sea has become one of the region’s most volatile fronts. Since 2023, the Houthis have escalated attacks on commercial and military vessels, later declaring an end to their truce with Washington and threatening companies such as ExxonMobil and Chevron.
“2024 was the most escalatory year since October 7,” says al-Sharafi. “After an Omani-brokered truce, their activity subsided briefly, but the renewed attacks, including on a U.S. warship, suggest American strikes may resume.”
The assaults have prompted Washington to tighten its naval alliances, while Israel continues to hit Houthi logistical sites in Hodeida and Sanaa. Together, these moves have turned the Red Sea into an open front, one that could soon extend to Sudan if its role in Iran’s support network is confirmed.
Between Gain and Burden
Sudan today is more than a domestic battleground. It has become a node in Iran’s regional network stretching from Yemen to Lebanon. For the Houthis, it is a logistical haven and a launchpad for expansion. For Tehran, it offers leverage, a pressure card against Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Israel, and a means to deepen its reach into Africa.
Yet this influence is fragile. Sudan’s internal divisions, the Red Sea’s volatility, and regional suspicion all threaten to undercut Tehran’s ambitions. As al-Shammari notes, “Sudan’s instability could become a burden for the Houthis rather than a gain.”
Ultimately, the question is not just whether Iran can cement its presence in Sudan, but whether regional and global powers will allow it. Sudan may yet become a new hub in Iran’s regional arc, or remain a fleeting stop in the broader struggle for dominance along the Red Sea.
Sukina Ali
A Saudi writer, researcher, and TV presenter
