The past few days were anything but ordinary in Beirut’s southern suburb. Within minutes on Sunday, the scene flipped upside down when Israeli missiles struck a residential building in Haret Hreik, killing senior Hezbollah commander Haitham al-Tabtabai. In first images, the strike site looked like it had just emerged from a lightning war: thick columns of smoke, charred cars, shrapnel scattered across narrow alleyways, and ambulance sirens shattering the terrified silence of residents. The strike killed al-Tabtabai and four Hezbollah members and wounded 28 others.
Striking such a high-value target stoked fears of a potential large-scale confrontation between Hezbollah and Israel and flared up significantly the controversy inside Lebanon about disarming Hezbollah and the need for the state to hold an exclusive monopoly of the decision of war and peace. Meanwhile, the Israeli army said on X that it will “continue to act against the terrorist group’s attempts to rebuild and rearm and will work to remove any threat to the citizens of the Israeli state.”
A Deep Political Divide
Lebanon is standing at a sharp crossroads, torn between two capms with completely opposing views. The first camp calls for Hezbollah’s disarmament. It groups political forces and public figures who argue that keeping the decision of war outside state institutions poses an existential danger. They say recent Israeli strikes demonstrate that weapons outside the possession of legitimate authorities put any region in Lebanon at risk of destruction, leave the country at the mercy of decisions it doesn’t control, deepen its Arab and international isolation, and paralyze state-building.
The second camp is made up of Hezbollah and its allies. The affirm that the recent Israeli escalation adds weight to the importance of preserving the weapons as the most important element in the equation of “deterrence.” They say regional circumstances are not conducive to engaging in such a debate, and that calling for disarmament now serves “Israel’s strategy.” Following al-Tabtabai’s assassination, Hezbollah ratcheted up its rhetoric. The head of the party’s Executive Council, Ali Da’moush, said Israelis “should now feel worried because they committed a major mistake.”
On the other camp, there have been more comments criticizing Hezbollah for refusing to disarm. MP Nadim Gemayel asked on X: “How many more times must the southern suburb be bombed and livelihoods be destroyed before they understand that there is no international protection for Lebanon without handing over the weapons and dismantling Hezbollah’s military structure?” Samir Geagea, leader of the Lebanese Forces, called on the president and prime minister to convene an emergency cabinet session to implement the August 5 and 7 decisions related to Hezbollah’s disarmament. Charles Jabbour, head of media for the Lebanese Forces, told Alhurra that his party has for 35 years been consistently demanding that Hezbollah must disarm. “Their possession of weapons is illegitimate. It contravenes the Taif Accord, drags Lebanon into wars, and undermines the state.” Political analyst George al-Aqouri told Alhurra that linking al-Tabtabai’s assassination to renewed calls for Hezbollah to disarm is inaccurate. He says these calls “have been continuously made ever since the Taif Accord was reneged and undermined in the early 1990s.”
The Response Dilemma
The strike on the southern suburb has created a very complex situation for Hezbollah. While a retaliation may unleash an expansive war, withholding a response undermines the group’s image among its populace and invites more domestic pressures. Strategy expert Brig. Gen. (ret.) Naji Malaab told Alhurra that Hezbollah is unlikely to carry out a military response against Israel, even if it has the capabilities to do so. He says the cost domestically would be enormous. It would cause internal security disruptions, stoke tension with the Lebanese army, create friction with other political forces, and add fuel to growing discontent among its own community, which no longer tolerates bearing the brunt of new wars.
Jabbour argued that recent developments have revealed that all of Hezbollah’s narrative has collapsed. Axioms such as “the balance of deterrence”, “strength,” and “ weaker than a spider’s web” have all gone down the drain. He says “Hezbollah in no longer capable of initiating a response. And as it sustains more losses, it perpetuates Lebanon’s exposure to chaos, death, and destruction. It inflicts on its own community more tragedies by clinging to weapons which Iran itself does not consider useful anymore.” Aqouri agrees with the view that realities on the ground show how limited Hezbollah’s ability to respond is. “If it had such a capability, it would have used it. Hezbollah may have weapons that annoy Israel, but it does not possess weapons enable it to launch a direct and effective offensive operation.” The Israeli army recently announced on X that Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Eyal Zamir inspected the 210th Division’s operating theater on the northern border. He “reviewed stand-by measures and ordered troops to be on high operational alert” in the wake of eliminating Al-Tabtabai.
Domestic fears
As regards to concerns that a “civil war” may erupt due to political pressure on Hezbollah to disarm and the party’s refusal, Jabbour says this framing is misplaced. He says, “a civil war erupts as a result of a sectarian conflict. What we have today is an attempted coup against the state.” He argues that if the state decides to impose its authority and disarm Hezbollah, “the confrontation becomes between the state and the party — not between sectarian groups.” Aqouri notes that a civil war could only occur only if Hezbollah chooses to confront the Lebanese state and its army, “the latter being the only actor with real military capability”. Other forces clearly support the state and its institutions but cannot engage Hezbollah.” He stresses that the issue is not internal division but rather a choice between a real state that holds exclusive monopoly over weapons and war decisions and a quasi-state that remains weak and constrained.
Possible Scenarios
Observers outline three possible trajectories for Lebanon: an internal–international settlement that resolves the weapons issue, continued Israeli escalation without a response from Hezbollah, or an all-out war if Hezbollah decides to retaliate to Israeli strikes. Malaab notes that recent comments by Hezbollah officials — particularly those by Political Bureau deputy chief Mahmoud Qomati, who said the party “stands behind the Lebanese state” while insisting that “all options are on the table ” and “handing over weapons is off limits”— reflect a gradual shift in Hezbollah’s tone toward positioning itself behind the state, at least on face value. Malaab added that the Lebanese army has until the end of the year to completely clear all weapons south of the Litani river. Subsequently, it is supposed to take custody of weapons all over Lebanon and to prevent their use and movement.
Integrating Hezbollah’s weapons into state institutions, he said, would be “the least confrontational and most feasible solution.” Aqouri emphasized that what Hezbollah is facing today are not theoretical scenarios but limited and real choices: they can either hand over weapons to the Lebanese state, a step that invalidates Israel’s justification for further strikes, or they continue with their defiance. The latter will allow Israel to keep targeting the group’s cadres and military infrastructure, which would heighten the risk of a war that is potentially more devastating than the September 2024 conflict. Jabbour said the only path to stopping Israeli strikes is Hezbollah’s disarmament. “This issue belongs first and foremost to the Lebanese state — before being an Israeli, American, or anybody else’s matter.”
