The smoke bellowing from Iran’s vast nuclear complex in the Isfahan desert dissipated quickly, but the wreckage left behind by the “Twelve-Day War” remains visible reminder of a battle that, as it seems, did not fully eradicated Tehran’s atomic ambitions. A new investigation published this week by the Financial Times reveals that Iran’s covert procurement arm, Imen Gostar Raman Kish, is still operating aggressively. It even audaciously claimed to have had access to US and British technologies used by Iran’s nuclear program. Meanwhile, satellite images revealed signs of “clean-up” activities at sites tied to Iran’s weapons development. According to the investigation, Imen Gostar Raman Kish functions as a commercial front for the Organization of Defensive Innovation and Research (SPND). The organization is an affiliate of Iran’s ministry of defense and has for long been identified by western intelligence agencies as overseeing Iran’s “nuclear weapons program” prior to 2003.
The report says SPND claimed to possess radiation-detection technologies sourced from manufacturers in the U.S. and the U.K. Backed by assessments from the Institute for the Study of War (ISW), the investigation highlights the continued activity of Iran’s illicit procurement networks despite damage to the country’s nuclear infrastructure. Meanwhile, the Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS) issued an analysis of recent satellite images from Iran. The analysis indicates that while Iran has made only “small progress” in repairing declared enrichment facilities, it has begun “extensive clean-up” operations at secret sites that are historically associated with nuclear weapons projects.
According to the Financial Times, the Iranian company said it had had access to products containing radiation-detection tubes made by the British firm Centronic, and components from the American company Elijen Technology. The company added these technologies were integrated into its own detection devices. There is no evidence that either Western manufacturer knew its products were being diverted to Iran, a conclusion that underscores the complexities of global supply chains and the sophistication of Iranian intermediaries. “Over the past decade, Tehran has been exceptionally successful in purchasing dual-use technical and commercial components from Western companies—including in the military sphere,” said Behnam Ben Taleblu, senior researcher at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies.
Clean-Up vs. Reconstruction
The U.S. sanctioned the leadership of Imen Gostar in October 2025, citing its role in the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Yet the network’s activities appear to extend beyond equipment procurement. It’s been reported that Iranian delegations traveled to Russia in August and November 2024. Intelligence sources say the visits were aimed at acquiring laser technologies that would allow Iran to “validate the design of a nuclear weapon without having to conduct an explosive nuclear test”— which is a critical threshold for any state seeking deterrence capability without triggering a global crisis. “To obtain nuclear technologies, Iran uses front companies in countries with weak central authority and where vetting procedures are not up to standards,” Ben Taleblu added. He says, “Western companies must strengthen their internal vetting procedures to prevent Tehran from acquiring materials that could be used to advance its nuclear program.”
While procurement networks remain unusually active, the actual landscape of Iran’s nuclear program tells a darker and more ambiguous story. During the exchanges of fire with Israel earlier this year, Iran’s main enrichment facilities in Natanz and Fordow—buried deep underground—sustained significant damage. Satellite images analyzed by ISIS indicate that reconstruction at these flagship sites has been minimal. Nevertheless, activities have been detected elsewhere. At SPND headquarters in Tehran and at the Shahid Meisami Research Center in Alborz Province, teams appear engaged in what analysts describe as “systematic clean-up.” Satellite imagery from late October showed that upper floors in these structures were being demolished, rubble was being removed, and general clean-up activities were being carried out. ISIS assesses that these efforts are “possibly a precursor to reconstruction or might be related to clean-up operations.” ISIS says the latter possibility is particularly concerning as it might indicate attempts to destroy forensic evidence before international inspectors can assess the full scope of Iran’s activities.
Internal Divisions and Regional Threats
The uncertain state of the nuclear program reflects political instability in Tehran. Iranian media this week spread rumors about the resignation of First Vice President Mohammad Reza Aref which would denote deep fissures inside President Masoud Pezeshkian’s administration. Reports indicate that hardline factions are competing for influence amid the power vacuum created by the war, a situation that further complicates any potential diplomatic initiative. Regionally, the situation remains on the brink of explosion. Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant warned Wednesday that Israel would have “no choice” but to expand operations in Lebanon if Hezbollah was not fully disarmed by the end of the year. Israeli reports say that the pace at which Hezbollah is recovering outruns Israel’s countermeasures. With such comments and media coverage, the likelihood of another war remains high.
For the West, the two parallel tracks of Iran’s recovery—stagnation at declared nuclear sites alongside illicit procurement and covert clean-up—poses a complex political challenge. The “Twelve-Day War” may have destroyed much of Iran’s nuclear infrastructure, but the software—the networks, the technical know-how, and the intent—may have survived the flames.
