Washington and Syria: Optimism Masks Fragile Realities

In Washington, the mood around Syria has turned unexpectedly hopeful. The fall of Bashar al-Assad has opened what many officials see as a rare political reset: a chance for a new leader, Ahmad al-Sharaa, to steer a country battered by thirteen years of war toward stability. Sanctions are being eased. Diplomatic visits have resumed. Refugees are beginning to return. 

This optimism rests on the assumption that the situation on the ground is finally stable enough to support political and economic reconstruction. But recent events suggest that assumptions may be dangerously premature. 

Last weekend, an attack in Palmyra killed two U.S. soldiers and a Syrian Christian interpreter. Washington and Damascus both attributed the assault to ISIS. The incident briefly punctured the prevailing sense that Syria has entered a calmer phase, then quickly faded from official messaging. 

For Will Todman, the attack underscores a deeper problem. 

Todman is the chief of staff for the Geopolitics Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and recently returned from a visit to Syria. In an episode of The Diplomat, he warned that Washington’s enthusiasm risks outpacing realities on the ground. 

“There is probably over-optimism in Washington, DC,” he said. “I have not seen a true appreciation of the scale of the challenges Syrians are facing.” 

At the center of that disconnect is a critical assumption: that Sharaa can control the coalition of armed groups that helped bring him to power and now form the backbone of Syria’s security apparatus. 

According to Todman, that assumption is far from guaranteed. 

“What keeps getting overlooked is this belief that he can keep all these groups aligned,” he said. “The reality is that some of them feel he has become too moderate.” 

Those groups are not marginal. Syria’s security forces include armed factions formally absorbed into the state, former members of Hayat Tahrir al-Shams, ISIS-adjacent networks, and other Islamist fighters folded into the system during the transition. Many remain armed, autonomous, and ideologically restless. 

Several of these factions, Todman said, view Sharaa’s political choices as a betrayal of the cause that brought them to power. They believe he has gone too far in staying quiet on Israel, too far in courting Gulf investment, and too far in allowing Western advisers access to sensitive security files. 

When such groups feel ignored, they do not issue press statements. They act. 

That is what makes the Palmyra attack so troubling. While ISIS has claimed violence across Syria for years, Todman cautions against rushing to attribution. 

“There’s a gray line here,” he said. “Was this ISIS? Someone inspired by ISIS? Or someone angry at the growing U.S.–Syrian coordination? If it’s the latter, that’s far more worrying.” 

If the attack originated from within Syria’s own security ecosystem, it would point to a far more destabilizing threat: violence not from remnants of the old order, but from factions embedded inside the new one. 

The tension was already visible before Palmyra. 

“There are major factions within the Syrian government that do not want engagement with the West,” Todman said. “They think he’s gone too far.” 

During his visit, Todman said he heard repeated fears that internal opposition could escalate to direct action against the president himself. Assassination attempts were discussed openly. Whether those fears materialize or not, their very existence reflects the fragility of the current arrangement. 

Meanwhile, public expectations inside Syria are rising rapidly. 

For the first time in years, many Syrians believe change is possible. Refugees are returning from Lebanon, Jordan, and Türkiye. Cafés are reopening. Civil society groups and small NGOs are cautiously reemerging. 

But the economic reality has not caught up to the political symbolism. 

Unemployment, inflation, and poverty continue to crush daily life. Sharaa lacks the tools to deliver rapid improvement, yet his political survival depends on it. 

This creates a vicious cycle. Stability is needed to attract investment. Investment is needed to improve living conditions. And improving living conditions is the only durable way to undercut armed factions and preserve stability. 

“This is the misunderstanding around sanctions,” Todman said. “People think lifting them means immediate economic change. It will take a long time for investors to trust the environment.” 

Washington’s strategy appears to assume that Syria’s security situation is stable enough to hold while economic engagement slowly takes root. Palmyra suggests otherwise. 

A small U.S. footprint, roughly 1,000 troops, is tasked with holding together a volatile northeast. The Syrian Democratic Forces do not fully trust Damascus. Damascus does not trust the SDF. Turkey distrusts both. Regional players, Israel, Iran, Russia, and Türkiye, are all hedging for the next phase. 

Against that backdrop, a single attack is not an anomaly. It is a warning. 

“You can’t just wish for new conditions into existence,” Todman said. 

His concern is not that Washington is disengaging too soon, but that it may declare success prematurely. 

“My fear is that the U.S. might say, ‘We’ve done our part,’ and then take a step back,” he said. 

Washington’s optimism is understandable. Assad’s fall removed a brutal constant. Regional actors want calm. Syrians want normalcy. The temptation to believe the hardest part is over is powerful. 

But beneath the hopeful headlines lies a country still defined by fractured authority, armed actors with unresolved grievances, economic collapse, and a political order that remains contested from within. 

The danger is not that Washington is abandoning Syria. 

The danger is that it is misreading the moment.