GCC Countries and Yemen Face a New Stage

In March 2015, the Arab coalition intervened in Yemen under the banner of restoring hope for the Yemeni people, reinstating legitimate rule and facing up to the Houthis. However, the long course of the war gradually revealed an erosion within the coalition’s structure, as divergences in objectives and tools among its members intensified, and coordination shifted from an overt partnership to an undeclared competition for influence.

This regression reached a break point with the developments of December 26, when Saudi airstrikes targeting forces aligned with the “Emirati partner” put the concept of joint forces against an unprecedented reality. Striking units that had been trained and armed within the same framework reflects a practical breakdown in military coordination mechanisms and points to fractures in the joint command structure.

In this context, Hadramawt and Al-Mahra have emerged as a new testing ground. These two governorates, which had remained relatively distant from direct confrontation with the Houthis, have turned into an arena where competing influence projects with the same camp intersect.

Southern Transitional Council (STC) forces have recently consolidated control over the south of the country and expanded their areas of influence in both governorates.

All these developments place the Arab coalition before fundamental questions that go beyond a transient military incident and touch the very core of the idea of GCC countries’ collective security and its ability to endure amid clashing interests and declining trust among partners.

Testing De-escalation in the East

Recent statements by Saudi Defense Minister Khalid bin Salman have outlined the framework through which Riyadh approaches the security developments in Hadramawt and Al-Mahra.

He called on the Southern Transitional Council to respond to de-escalation efforts led by Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates by vacating military positions and handing them over to the relevant official authorities.

The Saudi defense minister linked this stance to the legal and political context of the coalition’s intervention in Yemen, which was launched at the request of the internationally recognized government. He also tied it to the stated objective of the intervention: rebuilding state authority.

For its part, the Southern Transitional Council, in a statement issued after a meeting of its leadership chaired by Aidarous al-Zubaidi, said it was ready to discuss any arrangements that ensured the security and stability of the south and the integrity of its territory “in line with the aspirations of its population.” The statement reaffirmed continued cooperation with the coalition countries.

The toning down of rhetorics by both sides raises questions about whether these positions mark the beginning of a genuine containment of the crisis in Hadramawt and Al-Mahra or merely reflect a temporary alignment in language without a clear translation on the ground.

Diverging Objectives

Since early 2018, practical fissures within the Arab coalition in Yemen have begun to surface openly.

In late January 2018, Aden witnessed armed clashes between government forces and the UAE-backed “Security Belt” formations, which ended with those formations taking control of most of the city before direct Saudi intervention halted the fighting.

These confrontations marked the first real test of unity in the military decision-making body within the coalition.

The rift became more pronounced in 2019, particularly in June, when the UAE announced a reduction of its direct military presence in Yemen and withdrew a large portion of its forces, while maintaining extensive influence through local armed formations.

A series of clashes and confrontations then erupted in 2019 between parties backed by coalition states, before the Riyadh Agreement was signed in November of that year to contain the conflict.

Implementation of the agreement, however, faltered throughout 2020 and 2021, amid the continued proliferation of armed formations and the absence of genuine force integration.

In April 2022, the Presidential Leadership Council was announced with Saudi-Emirati backing, in an attempt to close the ranks of the anti-Houthi camp without fundamentally addressing divergent agendas.

During 2023 and 2024, competition gradually shifted to the eastern governorates—particularly Hadramawt and Al-Mahra—with the redeployment of local forces backed by both sides. This trajectory reached its peak in December 2025 with STC forces’ consolidation of control over the south, leaving the coalition facing a functional meltdown that observers say is difficult to contain through conventional arrangements.

GCC Collective Security

The recent Saudi airstrikes targeting STC positions in Hadramawt mark a notable turning point in how Riyadh manages the southern file.

Rashad al-Alimi, chairman of the Presidential Leadership Council, had requested that the Saudi-led coalition support the Yemeni armed forces in enforcing de-escalation and protecting mediation efforts.

Yemeni Foreign Minister Riyad Yassin also announced that his country had asked the Gulf Cooperation Council states to deploy “Peninsula Shield” forces to protect vital interests and borders, before Iran-backed Ansar Allah militants “overrun all of Yemen.”

Saudi political analyst Dr. Ahmed al-Shahri says that Al-Alimi’s call for coalition intervention—following a meeting of the National Defense Council—provided Riyadh with clear political cover to act, which was reflected in the Saudi defense minister’s statements demanding the withdrawal of STC forces from Hadramawt and Al-Mahra.

What is unfolding in Yemen raises broader questions about the future of GCC collective security, particularly in light of the Saudi-Emirati disagreement over the trajectory of southern Yemen, which has weakened the consensus necessary for any collective security response.

Strategic and security expert Khaled Ibrahim al-Sallal argues that “Peninsula Shield is not a self-activating military intervention tool outside GCC states, and any potential use of it in the event of a conflict between Saudi Arabia and the Southern Transitional Council would remain conditional on a formal request from Riyadh and clear political approval from GCC countries. It would not be a spontaneous response under security agreements.”

Why Hadramawt and Al-Mahra?

The growing competition over Hadramawt and Al-Mahra cannot be understood as a mere peripheral extension of the Yemeni conflict. It is rather a reflection of a newly acquired appreciation by regional actors of the importance of eastern Yemen’s geography in regional security, energy, and economic equations.

Hadramawt constitutes Yemen’s most important economic backbone in terms of natural resources, containing the largest share of investable oil and gas reserves, in addition to a long coastline along the Arabian Sea and potential ports that could be developed into independent export gateways.

Al-Mahra, meanwhile, lies in direct contact with Oman and stretches along an open coast on the Arabian Sea, making it a candidate to play a pivotal role in cross-border transport and energy projects. For Saudi Arabia, Al-Mahra holds particular importance as part of the search for alternative energy export routes away from the Strait of Hormuz and Bab al-Mandab.

By contrast, the UAE views Hadramawt and the coasts of Al-Mahra as part of a broader network of ports and maritime corridors it seeks to integrate into its commercial and logistical influence extending from the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden and the Horn of Africa.

Accordingly, the competition over Hadramawt and Al-Mahra reflects not a temporary tactical dispute, but a struggle over the future shape of influence in Yemen—and over who will possess the ability to shape energy, trade, and security pathways in one of the world’s most sensitive and geopolitically significant regions.