The arrest of Nicolás Maduro in Venezuela was not merely a political turning point in Latin America; it was akin to an “earthquake” whose aftershocks reached Tehran and extended from there to Beirut’s southern suburb.
For Lebanon’s Hezbollah, Caracas had long functioned as a financial and logistical “lung,” allowing the group to breathe beyond the reach of international oversight. According to Ilan Berman, vice president of the American Foreign Policy Council, Venezuela over the past two decades became “Iran’s main gateway to Latin America,” and a platform that enabled Tehran and its proxies to establish what he describes as a “dangerous presence” threatening the continent’s security and U.S. influence.
The historical roots of the Tehran–Caracas relationship date back to the era of the late Venezuelan president Hugo Chávez, particularly with the rise of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to power in Tehran.
Walid Phares, secretary-general of the Transatlantic Parliamentary Group on Counterterrorism, says the relationship effectively began under Chávez, a former special forces officer who seized power in 2002 and transformed the country from a liberal democracy into a radical populist political project aimed at confronting what he called “U.S. imperialism.” According to Phares, the Iranian regime devised a plan to expand into Latin America, with Hezbollah serving as the initial framework that allowed members of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps to enter the region.
Berman explains that the personal friendship that developed between Chávez and Ahmadinejad was the cornerstone of a strategic alliance based on a “shared hostility toward the United States,” under the banner of “global resistance.” During that period, cooperation was not limited to military matters, but extended to evading international sanctions, developing drone technology, and—most importantly—turning Venezuela into a facilitator for the activities of the IRGC’s Quds Force and Hezbollah in that region. Phares notes that this penetration was carried out by exploiting Lebanese communities in Venezuela, particularly those loyal to Hezbollah and originating from southern Lebanon, the Bekaa Valley, and Beirut’s southern suburb. Members of these communities were recruited into the Venezuelan administration, the armed forces, and even the national security committee.
This ideological alliance paved the way for what Berman calls a “solid partnership,” in which Chávez—and later Maduro—opened the doors of the state and its sovereign institutions to serve Hezbollah’s logistical objectives.
Retired Brig. Gen. Wehbe Qatisha, a former Lebanese lawmaker, confirmed to Alhurra that Venezuelan authorities placed “official state-issued passports” at the disposal of Hezbollah operatives, enabling them to travel the world as Venezuelan citizens, evading the scrutiny that is often applied to holders of Lebanese, Iranian, or Syrian nationalities linked to the group. Phares adds that these passports allowed their holders to move freely across Latin America and, during certain periods—such as the Obama and Biden years—facilitated the acquisition of U.S. visas under the guise of commercial activity.
The “passport” issue is considered one of the most dangerous aspects of cooperation between Iran, its militias, and the Maduro regime. According to a 2019 U.S. State Department terrorism report, “systemic corruption” in the issuance of Venezuelan documents made it easy for Hezbollah to obtain legitimate cover. In historic testimony before the U.S. Senate, Marshall Billingslea, a former assistant secretary of the Treasury, revealed that Venezuela issued more than “10,000 passports between 2010 and 2019” to individuals from the Middle East, under the direct supervision of Tareck El Aissami, who served as a key liaison between Caracas, Tehran, and Hezbollah. These passports functioned as “keys” granting visa-free access to more than 130 countries, including members of the European Union, and enabled Hezbollah’s external operations arm, known as Unit 910, to move money and weapons and carry out intelligence activities under legal diplomatic or commercial cover.
This file now represents a top priority for the Trump administration, according to Berman. Secretary of State Marco Rubio has made clear that Venezuela will no longer be allowed to serve as a platform for U.S. adversaries. That means, Berman says, that “the United States will need to dismantle and nullify all the arrangements through which Iran and its proxies exploited the country in the past.”
A financial and economic expert who tracks Hezbollah’s activities, speaking to Alhurra on condition of anonymity, said the group built a “parallel economy” in Venezuela based on key pillars that are now beginning to collapse. Chief among them were the gold trade in the Orinoco Mining Arc, the “Cartel of the Suns” alliance linked to Venezuelan military officers, and money laundering operations on Margarita Island. Phares confirms that this network extended from Venezuela to Chile, Argentina, Brazil, and Colombia, and went as far as establishing ties with drug cartels in Mexico, enabling its operatives to penetrate the United States.
According to U.S. congressional reports, Hezbollah took part in “cross-border drug trafficking” operations, in which cocaine was exchanged for weapons, money was laundered through the group’s financial channels, and large sums were injected into Lebanon’s cash-based economy, helping the group withstand domestic financial crises. The expert told Alhurra that Maduro’s fall would open the “commercial black box” of shell companies on Margarita Island to international investigations, ultimately exposing the true owners and the complex financial networks that feed Hezbollah’s coffers.
Phares believes the greatest source of concern today for Tehran and Beirut’s southern suburb lies in the “vast volume of information” Maduro could provide to U.S. authorities about Iran’s networks, Hezbollah cells, and their security and financial activities in Latin America and the United States.
The loss of this “safe haven” will have consequences in Lebanon. Experts who spoke to Alhurra say Hezbollah is now experiencing a “real financial squeeze,” reflected in a reduced ability to provide social services to its support base and an inability to undertake reconstruction efforts. As pressure mounts in Latin America, reports point to attempts by the group to activate its cells in West Africa, focusing on the “diamond and timber trade.” But according to experts, this shift faces a major obstacle: the absence of official state cover. In Venezuela, Hezbollah operated “as part of the state”; in Africa, it is forced to operate “as a hunted gang,” increasing operational costs and raising the likelihood of security and intelligence strikes.
Asrar Chbaro
