Iranian Repression, with a Chinese Flavor

The protests that have swept through Iran’s streets since late last December recall the wave of anger that erupted after the death of the Kurdish woman Mahsa Amini in 2022—albeit with a clear difference in momentum and, more notably, in the methods used to suppress protesters.

Following the 2022 protests, authorities announced that they would rely on “smart” cameras in public spaces to identify women deemed “noncompliant with head cover regulations” and issue warnings and penalties with minimal human intervention. The announcement was an explicit signal of a shift in tools: from foot patrols to algorithms, and from street-level policing to digital infrastructure.

In the current wave of protests, that shift has taken on a harsher dimension with the shutdown of the internet—since January 8, 2026—in an attempt to isolate street protests from each other from the outside world, and to reduce the political cost of repression by limiting documentation and dissemination.

Behind this transformation stands a well-known technical partner: China.

For more than a decade, Beijing has woven a security partnership with Tehran built on three pillars: police training, export of a crowd control “methods” and the supply of advanced surveillance technology.

Internet shutdown in Iran since January 8, 2026, following protests (Reuters)

Police Training

Security cooperation at the institutional level between Beijing and Tehran began to take tangible shape in 2015, most notably through programs that trained Iranian police officers under the supervision of their Chinese counterparts. These programs included advanced crowd-control tactics and Chinese surveillance techniques designed to suppress internal unrest.

Among the most prominent initiatives were those hosted by the People’s Public Security University of China beginning in 2015. The university—one of China’s leading police academies—hosted an advanced workshop for senior Iranian law-enforcement officers.

In May 2016, an official Iranian delegation headed by the deputy interior minister visited the university’s headquarters in Beijing to review training methods and equipment.

In 2017, Iranian police officers again visited the university to explore avenues of cooperation, while China sent its senior instructors to conduct an advanced course for 19 Iranian officers from mid- and upper-level leadership ranks.

These regular exchanges continued, including a visit by a delegation from Iran’s Interior Ministry in April 2018, followed by a visit by a university delegation to both Iran and Turkey in July of the same year.

These exchanges culminated on December 28, 2025—just days after the protests erupted—when Iran’s ambassador to Beijing paid a visit to the university.

Parallel to hands-on training, Beijing worked to export its control and policing thought models to Tehran.

Exporting the Model

This model is based on a Chinese doctrine known as “stability maintenance,” which places the highest priority on preserving order and protecting the security of the ruling regime above all other considerations.

Analyses by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace indicate that in Chinese discourse, “stability maintenance” effectively means suppressing any signs of instability, collective action, or popular protest through police and security apparatuses.

China itself has applied this doctrine rigorously within its borders, particularly in the Xinjiang region, where authorities established a comprehensive surveillance system that subjects millions of individuals to constant monitoring.

Beijing attributes its success in controlling restive regions such as Xinjiang and Tibet to the combination of advanced technologies and this “security model”—a model it has begun exporting abroad, including to Iran.

At the same time, China has become the world’s leading supplier of surveillance technology to other countries and has consequently faced accusations of helping governments such as Iran and Pakistan suppress opposition.

The transfer of the Chinese model to Iran has also included the adoption of concepts such as the “Safe City.” This concept—according to media reports—is developed by the Chinese company Huawei. It relies heavily on the widespread deployment of smart cameras and facial-recognition technologies in public spaces, with the aim of deterring violations and achieving automated security control.

Iranian officials have openly acknowledged Huawei’s “Safe City” concept, to the extent that major cities such as Tehran and Kashan hosted conferences in 2017 to discuss its implementation.

While Iran does not replicate China’s measures verbatim, it imports the Chinese conception of the relationship between security and technology—namely, that controlling society in the information age requires an integrated surveillance infrastructure and real-time data analytics. This leads to the third pillar.

Tiandy’s booth at the “Security China 2018” exhibition in Beijing (Reuters)

Surveillance Technology

The flow of Chinese surveillance technologies into Iran represents the most prominent pillar of this partnership, contributing to the construction of Iran’s “surveillance state” infrastructure over the past two decades.

Since 2003, at least eight Chinese companies specializing in surveillance technologies have entered the Iranian market—some of which were later subjected to U.S. and international sanctions.

Among these companies, Tiandy, which specializes in video surveillance systems, stands out as a major player in Iran since 2007. The company markets cameras with advanced night-imaging capabilities, such as Starlight technology, which captures clear, color images in low-light conditions—a feature that enhances the effectiveness of tracking individuals on the streets during protests.

According to its marketing materials, Tiandy also offers video-analysis algorithms capable of detecting gatherings and “abnormal” patterns and issuing instant alerts to security agencies.

The company previously listed Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps among its clients, reflecting direct integration with Iran’s security architecture.

Despite Tiandy’s inclusion on the U.S. blacklist in 2022, reports and shipment tracking indicate that its commercial presence in Iran has not ceased.

Next is Hikvision, another video-surveillance specialist. Hikvision began operating in Iran in 2008 and continued until 2021.

Hikvision’s role was not limited to selling cameras in Tehran; it also played a documented role in establishing a large-scale surveillance system in China’s Xinjiang region. This record has raised significant international concern over the use of the company’s technologies in mass repression.

Major Chinese telecommunications companies have played similar roles, disregarding Western sanctions. These include:

• Huawei: Began operations in Iran in 2006 and installed surveillance equipment used by Iranian security agencies to arrest dissidents. Its presence continued until 2022.
• ZTE: Entered the Iranian market early in 2003, supplying the state telecommunications company with a massive wiretapping system. Its technologies also played a central role in suppressing the 2010 protests. As a result, the company was later sanctioned for sanctions evasion.
• Dahua: A specialist in smart surveillance cameras, Dahua began operations in 2013 and continues to supply advanced facial-recognition and tracking cameras, despite being under sanctions since 2019.

In addition to these prominent names, other Chinese companies are also active, including Tencent, which has provided digital communication and monitoring applications since 2008; Uniview, China’s third-largest camera manufacturer, known for ethnic-tracking technologies used against Uyghurs; and FiberHome, which has supplied optical communication systems and network-monitoring solutions since 2008.

Surveillance cameras by Tiandy (Reuters)

An Unprofitable—Yet Persistent—Market?

China’s presence in Iran, despite U.S. sanctions, cannot be explained by market logic alone. Chinese exports of surveillance equipment to Iran between 2013 and 2025 were consistent, yet Iran’s global market share does not exceed 0.1 percent—confirming that the Iranian market is commercially unprofitable. This suggests that continued supply is driven primarily by strategic and security considerations.

Digital evidence also reveals striking qualitative indicators. In some years, the average value per unit of equipment shipped to Iran surged to levels far outside the normal range (globally, $10–25 per unit).

In 2023, a single shipment recorded an average price of nearly $100,000 per unit—a figure incompatible with consumer-grade surveillance cameras, instead pointing to the delivery of integrated systems tailored for highly sensitive government use.

These shipments likely included comprehensive solutions such as central command platforms, data storage servers, facial-analysis software, and possibly even after-sales services and training.

This pattern does not reflect mere trade, but rather digital contracts of a sovereign nature. In this context, digital surveillance becomes both a tool and a commodity exported as part of a broader “security partnership package” that extends beyond equipment to encompass concepts and expertise.

Through this threefold intertwining of training, “model,” and technology, China offers Iran a fully integrated blueprint for digital control.

The article is a translation of the original Arabic.