Discussion has intensified in Israeli political and media circles about classifying Qatar as an “enemy state,” following an announcement by opposition leader and Knesset member Yair Lapid that he intends to submit a bill to formally add Qatar to Israel’s list of enemy states.
The issue itself is not new in Israel. It has surfaced previously during periods of tension between Israel and Qatar but has never been translated into binding legislation.
Lapid justifies his initiative by arguing that although Qatar has not been officially designated an enemy state to date, it has pursued policies that run counter to Israel’s security and political interests, according to his statement.
Lapid said that Qatar supports and finances organizations Israel designates as terrorist groups, foremost among them Hamas, in addition to hosting several of the movement’s leaders.
The classification of an “enemy state” is based on laws related to trade sanctions.
However, Lapid’s proposal does not stop at the legal dimension. It is accompanied by political rhetoric accusing Qatar of standing behind hostile international and media influence networks targeting Israel, including the Al Jazeera network. It also draws on the “Qatar-gate” affair, which involves allegations that figures close to Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu received money from Qatari entities as part of a political and media influence campaign inside Israel.
Qatar has denied these accusations, affirming in official statements that its role is focused on humanitarian and political mediation, and that such claims aim to undermine de-escalation efforts and divert attention from the humanitarian cost of the war.
Dr. Meir Masri, a professor of political science at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, says that Qatar has played a central role in supporting Hamas by financing the organization and hosting its offices and leadership, which, in his view, justifies including it in Israel’s list of hostile states.
He adds that successive Israeli governments have refrained from taking this step for several reasons, including a preference for a policy of containment rather than confrontation with Qatar – especially given the decades-long open channels of communication with Doha – as well as concerns that any direct escalation could strain relations with Gulf Cooperation Council states.
Masri notes that classifying Qatar as an enemy state appears problematic given the cooperation between successive Netanyahu governments and Qatar on several issues, particularly the transfer of funds into the Gaza Strip over nearly fifteen years.
Although this cooperation was framed as humanitarian, he says those funds were exploited by Hamas to enhance its military capabilities. He argues that Lapid’s initiative carries two domestic dimensions: first, appealing to Israeli public opinion with a step that enjoys broad support; and second, embarrassing Prime Minister Netanyahu over years of communication with Qatari leadership, which could be used politically to hold the government responsible for the failures of October 7.
He adds that the Qatari leadership does not play the role of a mediator, but rather supports Hamas through funding and overt backing, adding that this view of Qatar’s role reflects a prevailing mood among a wide segment of Israelis. Accordingly, he characterizes Lapid’s initiative as a politically savvy move that would be difficult to oppose domestically.
In this context, Israel’s Channel 12 revealed in 2025 a legislative initiative in the Knesset aimed at legally classifying Qatar as a state sponsor of terrorism. Such a step would introduce a new legal designation imposing broad restrictions on donations, trade exchanges, and diplomatic relations with Doha.
According to the channel, the initiative was driven by Economy Minister Nir Barkat, but procedural constraints prevented him from submitting it under his own name, prompting several Knesset members from different parties to adopt it.
Barkat escalated his rhetoric against Qatar throughout 2024, questioning its role as a mediator in negotiations with Hamas and directing explicit accusations at Doha of supporting the movement and standing behind the Al Jazeera network, despite Qatar’s efforts to maintain close ties with Western countries.
The growing calls to designate Qatar an enemy state after the latest war raise questions about the motivations behind this escalation.
Dr. Abdullah Baaboud, a specialist in international relations, says the timing reflects rising regional tensions and the sensitivity of international public opinion to developments in Gaza, alongside intensified competition over shaping the narrative of the conflict. He argues that raising the classification issue at this moment is part of a broader battle of narratives, in which lines of alignment are being redrawn and mediation and humanitarian support efforts are reframed within a charged security context.
Why Qatar?
Baaboud explains that several factors make Qatar a logical target in this context, foremost among them its central role as a mediator capable of communicating with conflicting parties simultaneously, as well as its powerful media influence in shaping regional public opinion.
He adds that Qatar’s strategic relationship with the United States gives any pressure on it a dimension that extends beyond Doha itself, sending an indirect message to Washington, in addition to the degree of independence Qatar maintains in its foreign policy.
He concludes that while the relationship with Hamas represents the immediate pretext in this discourse, the broader objective is an attempt to redraw the boundaries of Qatar’s role as a mediator. The timing, he says, is tied to managing the political narrative during a moment of escalation, and the choice of Qatar reflects its real weight in engineering regional communication channels.
Dr. Ali Al-Hail, a Qatari academic and political analyst, offers a reading that places the targeting of Doha within a broader context than temporary disputes, arguing that its roots lie in Qatar’s humanitarian and political support for Palestinians in Gaza and the West Bank.
He believes this stance is connected to Qatar’s regional role in other files, including its support for the Sudanese army in its confrontation with the Rapid Support Forces, which he says are backed by Abu Dhabi and represent, in this context, an extension of Israeli interests in the region.
Al-Hail says that targeting Qatar falls within a broader Israeli vision that has sought for years to fragment the Arab world into weak entities that ultimately enhances Israel’s regional dominance, after attempts to impose direct influence over central states such as Syria, Lebanon, and Iraq faltered.
He recalls previous remarks by the Emir of Qatar, Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani, stating that Benjamin Netanyahu seeks to turn the region into an Israeli sphere of influence – an ambition that, he says, clashes with Qatar’s independent positions.
He adds that unlike countries such as the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain, Qatar chose not to join the track of normalization with Israel, and continued its support for Gaza, including paying public sector salaries and securing electricity and gas supplies despite the Israeli blockade, in coordination with the United States, with the aim of maintaining a minimum level of humanitarian stability in the Strip.
Al-Hail concludes that Doha views this Israeli move as a pressure tactic and a message of political coercion rather than a genuine threat, particularly given Qatar’s coordination with the United States and its network of regional and international partners, which make targeting it a complex path with uncertain outcomes.
Sakina Abdallah
A Saudi writer, researcher, and TV presenter
