Any external attack on a member state is considered an attack on all, requiring collective action. This is the principle enshrined in the Joint Defense Agreement signed by the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states in 2000. But a quarter of a century later, experts who spoke to Alhurra are reassessing the agreement to answer a key question: does it amount to a true military alliance, or is it merely a framework for political coordination?
The debate over the Gulf defense system has taken on renewed urgency amid the possibility of a military confrontation between Washington and Tehran, and the likelihood that Iran could carry out its threats to attack countries in the region hosting U.S. military bases—chief among them Gulf states.
The twelve-day war in June 2025 demonstrated that Iran possesses missile capabilities, particularly ballistic missiles, as well as drones that proved effective in overwhelming air-defense systems and reaching their targets in Israel.
Previous attacks on Gulf oil facilities further reinforced the belief that any future escalation could target energy infrastructure, ports, and airports, placing the security of Gulf airspace at the center of GCC strategic calculations.
Since the signing of the Joint Defense Agreement, the institutional framework of Gulf defense has evolved. The Joint Defense Council and the Supreme Military Committee were established, and the Peninsula Shield Forces became a symbol of collective strength. In 2013, the unified military command was approved to enhance operational coordination and link command-and-control systems.
In recent years, GCC states have intensified joint military exercises, expanded the integration of air-defense and early-warning systems, and floated the idea of building a unified missile-defense system—often described in the media as a “Gulf missile shield.”
However, amid mounting signs of military escalation in the region and the resulting need to activate the Gulf defense agreement, disagreements among GCC states have come to the fore—most notably the rift between Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, which began in Yemen in 2025 and later extended to other regional arenas.
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Retired Major General Mohammed Saleh Al-Harbi believes the Joint Defense Agreement establishes a clear legal obligation, but that its activation “remains contingent on the political decision of each state.” The text exists, he says, but implementation depends on each capital’s calculations and specific circumstances.
Security researcher Khaled Ibrahim Al-Sallal goes further, arguing that Gulf defense agreements do not include automatic enforcement mechanisms for military action. In his view, they establish a flexible political commitment rather than arrangements for immediate mobilization. In escalation scenarios, cooperation may focus on intelligence sharing, logistical support, and air defense—without necessarily amounting to the management of a fully integrated joint combat campaign.
Available data on Gulf defense spending in 2025 reflects disparities in capabilities. Saudi Arabia, the region’s largest defense spender, allocated about 259 billion riyals (approximately $69.1 billion) to the military sector, keeping defense among the largest items in its national budget.
As the council’s largest military power, Al-Harbi notes, the kingdom possesses independent capabilities that allow it to act unilaterally if necessary, or with willing partners, even if collective decision-making falters.
In Washington, Danielle Pletka, senior vice president for foreign and defense policy studies at the American Enterprise Institute, says internal disagreements could affect the sharing of early-warning or radar data related to potential Iranian missile launches. However, she argues that any dispute that hampers U.S. operational capacity in the event of a strike against Iran would be a major strategic mistake.
In her assessment, states may act individually in the event of an open conflict, noting that the GCC umbrella is more effective when risk levels remain relatively low.
Beyond internal divisions, Oman stands out as a special case within the Gulf landscape. Muscat’s relationship with Tehran dates back to the 1970s and continued after the establishment of the Islamic Republic in 1979. During the Iran-Iraq War, Oman maintained open channels with all parties. In recent years, it has played a mediating role in multiple crises and was central to talks preceding the 2015 nuclear agreement between Iran and Western powers. It is now mediating between Washington and Tehran in negotiations aimed at reaching a new nuclear deal and avoiding direct conflict.
Regarding Oman’s readiness to join a collective military response if Gulf states were struck by Iran, Pletka says Oman is “not entirely neutral.” Still, she does not expect Muscat to significantly constrain U.S. freedom of action. Al-Sallal, for his part, argues that Omani neutrality does not mean directly obstructing U.S. naval operations or the Gulf defense system, but it does impose political constraints and makes Muscat keen to avoid becoming a platform for offensive operations.
As for the unified military command, Al-Sallal notes that it remains a theoretical framework for coordination rather than an operational command with immediate executive authority. Given internal divisions and divergent national-security priorities, he expects states to act independently or in small groups.
He concludes that collective participation will likely remain selective and coordination-based—such as intelligence support or partial air defense—given the absence of an executable, unified command-and-control structure. This leaves Gulf collective defense closer to a political coordination framework than a system ready to manage a full-scale war.
The article is a translation of the original Arabic.
Alhurra
Sakina Abdallah
A Saudi writer, researcher, and TV presenter
