From Muscat to Doha, from Tehran to Washington, and through coordination with the International Atomic Energy Agency, Egyptian Foreign Minister Badr Abdelatty has been conducting intensive diplomatic outreach in a preemptive effort to contain a potential explosion stemming from the Iranian nuclear program crisis.
The pace of Egypt’s communications reveals a phased trajectory that began on February 5 with preliminary consultations involving regional and international parties, before intensifying again on February 22 as tensions escalated – an attempt to keep dialogue channels open at a particularly sensitive moment.
Engagement with Oman and Qatar aims to cooperate with intermediary capitals capable of conveying difficult messages, while direct contact with Iran and U.S. envoy Steve Witkoff reflects Cairo’s determination not to remain on the margins of the influence equation, but rather to position itself within it.
The stance taken by Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi during a phone call with his Iranian counterpart Masoud Pezeshkian on January 31 encapsulates Egypt’s broader diplomatic effort in this regard. During the call, Sisi stressed the need to avoid escalation and rejected military solutions, reaffirming Egypt’s continued efforts to bring Washington and Tehran back to the negotiating table – a position he also reiterated in his meeting with U.S. President Donald Trump on the sidelines of the recent Davos Forum.
Pushing for De-escalation
Ambassador Moataz Ahmadein, Egypt’s former permanent representative to the United Nations, told Alhurra that these Egyptian contacts build on diplomatic moves made before and after the June 2025 strike, when the United States asked Egypt to urge Iran to show flexibility toward U.S. demands, push for de-escalation, refrain from responding to the U.S.–Israeli strike, and accept the resumption of inspections of Iranian nuclear facilities by the International Atomic Energy Agency.
According to Ahmadein, Iran agreed in August to resume inspections, but Western countries – by his account – failed to uphold their commitment not to reimpose sanctions.
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In September 2025, Cairo hosted the signing of an agreement between Iran and the IAEA to resume technical cooperation and prepare the practical steps for the return of inspections, in the presence of Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi and IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi.
The agreement followed a suspension of cooperation after Iranian nuclear facilities were bombed in June, an attack that froze inspectors’ access. Iran’s parliament subsequently passed a law restricting inspections and making them subject to approval by the Supreme National Security Council. Yet this track, despite its political symbolism, remained fragile in the absence of long-term, reciprocal guarantees.
Preventive Diplomacy
Dr. Mohammed Al-Araimi, writer, researcher, and head of the Omani Journalists Association, argues that Egypt’s move reflects an active form of preventive diplomacy aimed at preventing the region from sliding into an open confrontation between the United States and Iran.
The contacts, Al-Araimi told Alhurra, are not merely protocol-driven, but stem from an understanding that any escalation would have direct repercussions for Egypt’s national security – whether through the Red Sea, the Suez Canal, or the dynamics of the Palestinian file.
He points to a clear convergence of views between Cairo and Muscat, centered on prioritizing the prevention of war as the costliest option for all parties, alongside Egypt’s desire to cement its position as a central Arab actor in crisis management without engaging in competition over roles.
For his part, Ahmadein believes that launching a limited or extended military strike would exacerbate Egypt’s already severe economic crisis, as it would drive up oil prices, reduce shipping traffic through the Suez Canal, and raise the cost of goods imported by Egypt.
A Critical Moment
Despite a relative improvement in communication between Cairo and Tehran, relations have yet to reach the level of ambassadorial exchange. On February 18, Ambassador Mojtaba Ferdowsi-Pour, head of Iran’s Interests Section in Egypt, announced that a decision to exchange ambassadors had been made and was awaiting an official announcement.
However, Egypt’s state-run Middle East News Agency quickly cited an informed Egyptian source denying that any such decision had been taken, stressing that ongoing contacts fall solely within the framework of efforts to reduce regional escalation.
This discrepancy reflects the sensitivity of the timing and Cairo’s insistence on separating the management of the nuclear crisis from the path toward full diplomatic normalization.
Amid escalating military rhetoric, eroding mutual trust, and the complexities of the nuclear file, Cairo is operating within a narrow space between mediation and prevention. Its success in this effort is measured less by securing a comprehensive agreement than by delaying an explosion, buying diplomacy additional time, and averting a potential war whose political and economic costs would exceed everyone’s capacity to bear.
The article is a translation of the original Arabic.
