Starlink and Yemen’s Digital Sovereignty: Who Holds the Keys to the Internet?

Most Yemenis won’t be able to read this article!

 “My friend Khaled al-Faqih, a content creator in Lahj governorate, southern Yemen, told me – his voice brimming with surprise and delight – ‘This is the first time I’ve uploaded a full video without the internet cutting out halfway.’” 

He was describing his first experience with Starlink satellite internet service, which he had purchased from a small electronics shop in his city rather than an official distributor – just as many others have done after growing weary of the country’s chronically slow, frequently disrupted terrestrial networks. 

For Khaled, the jump in speed was a rare personal triumph. But for telecommunications experts – and for parties to the conflict – it represents something far larger: a front in the struggle over Yemen’s digital sovereignty, another arena in a geopolitical war where local, regional, and international interests collide. 

“The Houthis have complete control over the telecommunications sector,” says Fahmi al-Bahith, a digital-rights advocate and founding member of Yemen’s Internet Society, speaking to Alhurra. “The internet infrastructure is built so that a single service provider, based in Sana’a, holds all the keys.” 

The Houthis Have the Upper Hand 

“The Houthi militia has militarized the telecommunications sector,” says Raed al-Thabiti, an adviser to Yemen’s Ministry of Telecommunications, accusing the group of using its grip on the industry to track opponents’ movements and target field commanders. Since seizing Sana’a in 2014, the Houthis have placed the ministry and the country’s largest operators – Yemen Mobile, Sabafon, YOU, TeleYemen, and YemenNet – under their direct control. This monopoly has given them unprecedented power to monitor calls, block or throttle websites —including Alhurra’s site—and to cut service to government-held areas whenever it wishes. 

The centralized structure of Yemen’s telecommunications network – its servers concentrated in Sana’a and, according to al-Thabiti, “directly connected to the National Security building since 2006”—has made it difficult for the Yemeni government to establish viable alternatives. In 2022, authorities launched the “AdenNet” project, linking to an international cable via Djibouti and bypassing Sana’a’s network. But the initiative achieved only limited success, hampered by the challenge of building infrastructure to rival the ministry in Sana’a, as well as allegations of corruption. As a result, real control has remained in Houthi hands -control that, according to Information Minister Moammar al-Eryani, generates about half a billion dollars a year, including $240 million from internet and data services alone. Submarine internet cables in Yemen (submarinecablemap.com) 

Limited Undersea Cables 

Yemen depends on just a handful of international submarine cables – the most vital being the “Falcon” cable linking the country’s eastern and western coasts, and the AdenNet connection to Djibouti. This scarcity has left Yemen’s internet fragile and highly vulnerable to outages, especially when compared with neighboring countries, despite more than 15 international cables running through the Red Sea and Bab al-Mandab. In recent years, fears have mounted over Houthi threats to strike those cables – accusations the group denies– as well as repeated cyberattacks on the network, the most recent occurring yesterday. 

Starlink as An Alternative 

In 2021, the Yemeni government began negotiations with Starlink to bring satellite internet service into the country. After years of consultations, the agreement was signed in January 2024, and in September of the same year the American company announced the start of service in the country—making Yemen the first state in West Asia to enjoy full satellite-internet coverage, a step the U.S. Embassy described as “an achievement that opens new horizons.” 

However, the announcement came at a highly sensitive political and military moment, with U.S. strikes on Houthi sites and rising attacks on ships in the Red Sea. This led the group to view Starlink as a direct security threat that would give its rivals the ability to bypass its terrestrial networks. It has continued to run campaigns in areas under its control to confiscate devices and arrest anyone who owns them, accusing users of espionage and claiming the government is smuggling the equipment to serve “U.S. and Israeli intelligence.” 

Many Sides 

The Yemeni government views Starlink as a potential game-changer – one that could loosen the Houthis’ grip on communications and curb their ability to monitor or track opponents, bolstering the legitimate authorities both militarily and in terms of security. But another question looms: what if the Houthis gain access to Starlink? 

William Akoto, a professor of global security at American University, told Alhurra that groups like the Houthis could see Starlink as a battlefield asset, providing front-line fighters with high-speed connectivity that is difficult to jam or intercept. He noted that similar technology has been deployed in other conflicts – in Ukraine, Sudan, and Myanmar – to secure field communications and operate drones, warning that Yemen could face the same scenario if Starlink devices reach Houthi forces. Several sources I spoke to during preparation believe some Houthi leaders are already using the service in secret. 

Rejection or a Smokescreen? 

The Houthis’ declared “fight against Starlink” could simply be a smokescreen, says al-Bahith—a common tactic in conflicts where public rhetoric diverges from field practice. In the Russia-Ukraine war, Moscow publicly attacked Kyiv’s use of the service, while Starlink dishes were found in areas under Russian forces’ control—some captured, others smuggled. 

Al-Bahith points out that Starlink equipment can function even in countries not officially listed on the coverage map. In Yemen, the service was already present—albeit unofficially—before its formal rollout. Devices were smuggled into the country, and some users activated them through the roaming feature, which connects dishes to satellites serving nearby countries where Starlink is available. This opened the door to a thriving “black market,” with devices sold at unauthorized points of sale beyond the government’s oversight.

Controversial Provisions in the Starlink Contract 

The roughly 30-page contract signed between the Yemeni government and Starlink in January 2024 gives the government, under Article 27 – titled “Lawful Intercept, Security, and Network Blocking” – sweeping authority to block websites and intercept electronic communications for security or legal purposes. While framed as measures to safeguard national security, researchers say these provisions mirror the very surveillance practices long condemned when carried out by the Houthis. They also appear to contradict Yemen’s Telecommunications Law No. (33) of 1996, which guarantees the public’s right to free and confidential communications, allowing surveillance only with prior written judicial authorization and in narrowly defined cases. 

The picture is further complicated by Yemen’s lack of comprehensive legislation on personal data protection. “There is no specific law in Yemen for protecting digital data,” al-Bahith notes, despite the contract’s reference to such safeguards. This legal gap leaves many—among them content creator Khaled al-Faqih—wondering whether the agreement could pave the way for expanded state surveillance of the internet, even in areas beyond Houthi control.