Doha Strike: Israel’s Entry into the ‘Third Circle’

For the first time, the conflict between Israel and Hamas has pierced the heart of the Gulf. An Israeli airstrike on a building in Doha has redrawn the map of the war and thrust Qatar, Washington’s ally and longtime peace mediator, into the eye of the storm.

The strike did not come out of nowhere. Just days earlier, on September 2, Alhurra reported what seemed then like a footnote: an urgent Israeli plan to extend the reach of its air power.

When missiles hit Doha last Thursday, that plan was revealed not as ink on paper, but as part of a strategy Israel is now etching into the skies of the region.

The plan includes the purchase of two additional KC-46 aerial refueling aircraft, part of an effort to extend the reach of Israel’s air force deep into what the military calls the “third circle.” That zone stretches far beyond Gaza or Lebanon, encompassing Iran, Yemen, parts of Pakistan, and the Horn of Africa.

An Israeli official described the expansion as “necessary to face a hostile and complex aerial environment” and to secure freedom of movement for the air force in any future battlefield. He added that the government had already earmarked funds for classified programs, without revealing their nature or objectives, saying only that they are intended to “preserve Israel’s qualitative superiority” amid mounting regional challenges.

The implementation of this plan into action did not take long. Israeli fighter jets struck a building in Doha, more than 1,750 kilometers from Jerusalem, killing senior Hamas figures.

Several media reports noted that the jets did not cross Saudi or Emirati airspace, implying they may have taken a longer route to reach the Qatari capital. Others suggested the strike was launched from outside Qatar’s airspace, a distinction that does little to alter the “distance equation.”

Two further details reinforced the message. First, the White House confirmed the Doha strike was carried out solely by Israel. Second, the attack was followed by a wave of Israeli raids on Yemen, notable both for their intensity and for the breadth of territory they targeted this time.

Between Israeli Military Doctrine and the “Gaza Negotiations”

What matters most are the implications of this development, and the remarks made by the Israeli official to Alhurra.

On the military front, the conflict is expanding geographically, potentially reshaping Israel’s combat doctrine and opening new arenas of confrontation in countries that, until recently, lay beyond its operational reach.

The strike may stall efforts to end the war in Gaza and secure the release of Israeli hostages. It came at a critical juncture: U.S.- and Qatari-brokered talks were edging toward a ceasefire and prisoner exchange. By targeting Hamas leaders in Doha, Israel effectively shattered what little trust remained at the negotiating table. As analyst Alon Ben-Meir put it: “Israel targeted people who were sitting at the negotiating table to discuss a ceasefire. This is very troubling for the Qataris and for the Arab states.”

Washington’s Gulf Alliances Face a Tough Test

On the political front, the more consequential one, the strike has placed the United States in a rare dilemma. Its closest ally, Israel, targeted Qatar, a strategic partner that hosts the Al-Udeid Air Base and serves as the key mediator between Hamas and Israel. Crucially, Qatar holds the status of a major non-NATO Ally, making the attack an unprecedented breach within Washington’s alliance system.

Former NYU professor Alon Ben-Meir told Alhurra that the operation could not have taken place without a U.S. green light. “I don’t believe Netanyahu would have acted so boldly without American approval, especially since the strike took place only about 20 miles from the largest U.S. military base in Qatar,” he said.

If Israel did receive Washington’s approval, the implications run deeper. Gulf states’ confidence in the American security umbrella could be badly shaken if the United States is seen as permitting one ally to strike another, particularly one that plays such a critical role in its strategic calculus.

For Gulf capitals, the Doha strike marked an unprecedented breach. Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Bahrain, despite their differing levels of ties with Israel, felt compelled to publicly denounce the attack and voice solidarity with Qatar. Yet beneath the official statements, unease is spreading: if even Qatar, America’s ally and trusted mediator, is vulnerable, what guarantees remain for the others?

Alon Ben-Meir summed up these fears: “The Gulf states are asking themselves: if the United States allowed one ally to attack another, what assurance do we have that it won’t happen to us? They are very concerned about Washington’s commitment to their security.”

Shrapnel from the “Doha Strike” Hits the Abraham Accords

Not far from the battlefield, the shrapnel from the Doha strike seems to have struck the Abraham Accords, the cornerstone of U.S. and Israeli policy in the Gulf.

The operation came on the eve of the accords’ fifth anniversary, a project Netanyahu had hoped would allow him to sidestep the Palestinian question and forge direct ties with Gulf states. Instead, the strike in Doha cast a dark shadow. “This development makes it very difficult for Saudi Arabia or others to join soon. It’s a setback for the Abraham Accords,” said Alon Ben-Meir.

James Jeffrey, fellow at the Washington Institute and former U.S. ambassador to Iraq, describes the Israeli strike in Qatar as “an unwise policy, policy as military gain is disproportionate to the political/diplomatic costs.

He adds: “But I know from my personal involvement that we, the Israelis and others, routinely took this approach ‘don’t bomb, little gain; better to talk’ between 2000 and 2023, and the result was Iran developing a proxy empire and ultimately Oct 7.

Aaron David Miller, a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment, argues that normalization is not dead but tarnished. “Since October 7, more than 60,000 Palestinians have been killed, half of them children, and yet Egypt, Jordan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE have imposed no costs on Israel or the U.S. The story isn’t that normalization has stopped, but that what exists hasn’t been affected despite the scale of the tragedy,” he said.

He added: “Now Israel has bombed an Arab capital. We’ll see whether that changes Arab states’ calculations. I doubt it, but I’m waiting to see.”

What’s Next?

The Israeli strike in Doha has sent reverberations across the region. It pushed the conflict into a new arena within the “third circle” framework and placed Washington in an impossible bind: how to preserve its strategic partnership with Israel without eroding the Gulf’s trust, which has been built on the promise of protection.

Perhaps, as Miller suggests, the deeper story is not only about negotiations or normalization, but about “the region’s ability to absorb these shocks without the entire alliance system collapsing”—and the looming possibility that other states could become the next arenas of conflict.