At the Gate of Oman: How Do We Understand What Is Happening in Hadramout and Mahra?

In the early hours of Thursday, December 4, the name “Wadi Hadramout” echoed once again after fierce clashes erupted on the plateau surrounding the Petromasila oil facilities between forces from the “Hadrami Elite” and armed groups loyal to tribal sheikh Amr bin Habreesh.

According to sources who spoke to Alhurra, the confrontation ended with a number of dead and wounded fighters on both sides and the recapture of the positions. It marked the first significant bloody clash among Hadramis since tensions erupted over what has become known as Operation “Bright Future”—a campaign aiming to redraw the balance of power in eastern Yemen.

Hours later, Petromasila announced the gradual resumption of operations in the Masila sectors. As security improved and the fields were cleared, it affirmed that maintaining electricity generation and fuel supply were top priorities.

Meanwhile, in the governorate of Mahra—the country’s second-largest province that neighbors Oman, the scene was completely different. There were no tanks advancing or exchanges of fire at city entrances, but rather a quiet reshuffling of security and military leadership “under popular pressure,” according to Southern Transitional Council (STC) leaders. The South Yemen flag was raised over the Shahn border crossing between Yemen and Oman, a signal denoting that the “Arab South” project has now reached the borders of a Gulf state for the first time since 1990.

Between these two images—oil-sector clashes in Hadramout and a quiet transition in Mahra—a new picture is emerging of the future of relations among the STC, the internationally recognized government, Saudi Arabia, and the United States.

 

(picture caption: A military parade by STC-affiliated forces days before the launch of the military operation in Hadramout. Source: AIC)

“The method was wrong, but the result is right”?

Just one week earlier, the Hadramout Tribal Alliance announced it was granting “full authorization” to the so-called “Hadramout Protection Forces” to move immediately to repel any forces arriving from outside the oil-rich governorate. It labeled any such deployment an “occupation” requiring resistance by all means. The warning coincided with STC military mobilization and new appointments by the governor aimed at containing the tensions. Presidential Leadership Council (PLC) member Faraj al-Bahsani warned that Hadramout was entering “its most dangerous phase in decades.”

When the STC launched its operation—dubbed “Bright Future”—on December 2 and 3, the situation shifted from threats to action. According to research centers and press reports, including The New York Times, STC forces backed by the UAE advanced through the valley and, within hours, seized Sayun, its airport, and the headquarters of the First Military Region. They then pushed toward Tarim, al-Qatn, and military posts deep in the desert. The NYT described the assault as “a rapid takeover of a strategic oil region,” supported by advanced Emirati equipment, including Chinese-made AH-4 howitzer artillery.

The STC’s narrative

The STC presents a consistent explanation for the operation. STC spokesperson Anwar al-Tamimi told Alhurra that the campaign’s primary aim is “security and that means restoring stability to Wadi and Desert Hadramout, ending lawlessness, and stopping the exploitation of the region by forces that foreign to the valley and the governorate.”

He adds that this lawlessness has harmed both citizens and the whole region. He adds that the valley and desert have turned into havens for smugglers and organized crime, while extremist groups such as al-Qaeda, ISIS, and cross-border groups found the area an ideal location for their activities.

He cites statistics from local security services reporting more than 300 assassinations in recent years—most registered “against unknown perpetrators”. He says international reports, including from the UN Panel of Experts, note that the valley and desert are “among the routes used to smuggle weapons for the Houthis,” and that Somalia’s al-Shabaab group has operational activity in Hadramout.

Amr al-Beidh: The deeper political meaning

Amr al-Beidh, STC’s Foreign Affairs Representative, went further in a briefing to journalists. He described Wadi Hadramout as “a main hub for weapons smuggling to the Houthis and to al-Shabaab,” accusing the First Military Region and forces loyal to the Muslim Brotherhood of enabling the activity through “illegal checkpoints” and “empowering tribal militias” that undermined the local authorities and weakened the state.

In his view, the immediate objectives have already been achieved: Hadramout has been unified under a single operational command, and a major artery for weapons smuggling to the Houthis has been severed.

But the method remains controversial. “Maybe the method was wrong, but the result is right… we had no choice,” al-Beidh said.

He acknowledged that advancing with force into government-held areas was “not the ideal approach” but “we had no other choice amid the prevalent vacuum in the decision-making bodies”. He emphasized that there was coordination and joint operations with the Ministry of Defense “within the framework of the state.”

Behind the scenes, STC leaders understand that what happened in Hadramout will not be viewed solely as a security operation.

A major theme in al-Beidh’s briefing was sharp criticism of the PLC, which he says, “failed to take a decisive decision regarding Wadi Hadramout for a year and a half,” despite repeated warnings about smuggling and terrorism.

Officially, PLC Chairman Rashad al-Alimi issued only an impartial statement urging all parties to avoid “any escalation on the ground” and not to disrupt services or drag Hadramout into a new internal conflict. He did not blame any party for the escalation.

This reserved tone drew criticism on social media, particularly from supporters of the recognized government who argued that al-Alimi treated a major shift in the military map of eastern Yemen as a passing local dispute rather than a precedent requiring a clear stance on the STC’s expansion and the weakening of the Yemeni army.

The Hadramout Tribal Alliance: A different view

The Hadramout Tribal Alliance sees things differently.
It considers the STC’s actions “an explicit attempt to seize the governorate and its oil wealth,” labels STC forces as “foreign forces,” and classifies their presence in Hadramout as an “occupation.” It advocates empowering Hadramis to manage their governorate independently of central authority—whether from Sana’a or Aden.

Ironically, although the STC clearly advocates a “southern identity and borders,” its moves in Hadramout and Shabwa have received notable support from northern media aligned with anti-Houthi factions.

For example, Republic TV, affiliated with the National Resistance led by Tariq Saleh, framed the STC’s advance in the valley as an effort to “strike the influence of the Brotherhood and smuggling networks” rather than an expansion of a southern statehood project.

This rhetorical convergence between STC and parts of the northern anti-Houthi camp illustrates how Brotherhood opponents can align tactically—even while fundamentally disagreeing on the nature of the state and the future of unity.

(Picture caption: A military parade of the Hadramout Tribal Alliance (Source: Alliance – Facebook).

What is happening in Mahra on the Omani border?

While Hadramout witnessed a full-fledged military campaign, the STC describes events in Mahra in different terms.

In his briefing, al-Beidh insisted that “there is no military operation in Mahra,” saying what occurred was “broad popular sympathy” and that military leaders inside the governorate themselves declared allegiance to the STC.

According to media reports and local sources, the results on the ground are:

• A quiet reshuffling of security and military leadership
• Day-to-day security conditions remain “the same” for residents
• And, as al-Beidh put it, a “replacement of the project.”

The raising of the South Yemen flag at the Shahn border crossing with Oman was the most symbolic moment in Mahra—a governorate that for years remained far from the conflict. But al-Beidh did not rule out the possibility of military action there.

Asked about Sheikh Ali Salem al-Huraizi, a prominent tribal leader in Mahra, he described him as leading “armed groups that southern forces may have to deal with,” hinting at possible intervention “if necessary.”

In this sense, Mahra becomes another test: can the STC convert “sympathy” and military leaders’ allegiance into stable arrangements that secure tribal and local acceptance—especially in a province that is highly sensitive for both Oman and Saudi Arabia?

(Picture caption: A view of the Shahn crossing on the Yemen–Oman border)

The Saudi agreement: Relief in Riyadh, frustration in Aden

Amid these developments, Saudi Arabia brokered an urgent de-escalation agreement in Hadramout between the new governor, Salem al-Khanbashi, and the Tribal Alliance led by Amr bin Habreesh. The agreement included a ceasefire, withdrawal of forces from around oil facilities, redeployment of installation-protection forces, and commitments to discuss integration and security arrangements later.

From Riyadh’s perspective, the deal is a tactical success—preventing Hadramout from erupting into a full-scale confrontation between tribes and southern forces.

For the STC, the picture is different. Al-Beidh openly rejects the agreement as formulated, describing it as “unacceptable,” because it was negotiated between Saudi Arabia, the governor, and bin Habreesh “without involving the party that paid the military cost on the ground.”

(Picture caption: A photo of the STC office in Washington, Source: STC).

Between Washington and the STC: Security coordination without political recognition

In the background, the United States appears as a decisive—though deliberately quiet—actor.

Al-Beidh says the STC coordinates joint operations with the Yemeni Ministry of Defense and the coalition command, and that communication with the U.S. State Department, the embassy, and CENTCOM takes place “within the framework of the state,” not outside of it.

But when Alhurra contacted the U.S. State Department and CENTCOM, the response in both cases was identical: “No comment,” and “We have nothing to say on this.” The prolonged public silence is intentional.

This reflects Washington’s delicate balance: avoiding the appearance of supporting a unilateral move that could unsettle the anti-Houthi coalition, while not closing the door on a party that claims it is disrupting weapons-smuggling routes to the Houthis and their allies.

In this vacuum, STC presents itself as a reliable security partner, promoting its actions to Western media through three interlinked pillars:

1. targeting the influence of the Muslim Brotherhood,
2. cutting Iranian weapons-smuggling routes to the Houthis through Hadramout and Mahra,
3. and warning against growing ties between the Houthis and Somalia’s al-Shabaab on both sides of the Gulf of Aden.

This language aligns with counterterrorism agendas in Washington, Abu Dhabi, and Riyadh—and gives the STC a wider margin of maneuver than its formal political status might suggest.