Amid escalating exchanges between Tehran and Washington, a fundamental question has resurfaced: Are Gulf states truly prepared for a potential confrontation if warnings turn into a direct clash?
In Tehran, officials are attempting to strike a balance between preparing for military confrontation and threatening to expand its scope.
Iranian Chief of Staff Major General Abdulrahim Mousavi laid down a clear equation: Iran will not initiate war, but if war is imposed upon it, the confrontation will not remain confined within its borders. Instead, it would “extend across the entire region,” inflicting heavy losses on those who planned or supported it.
In the same context, Iran’s Secretary of the Supreme Defense Council, Ali Shamkhani, raised the ceiling of warning even higher, stating that any attack—even a limited one—would mark the beginning of a broad war that would affect energy supplies and the lives of peoples. His remarks echoed earlier statements by Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, who warned of the region sliding into a wider regional conflict.
On the other side, Washington has not completely ruled out the military option. U.S. President Donald Trump hinted at taking “very tough measures” if talks with Tehran fail to reach an agreement. He also revealed that he is considering deploying an additional aircraft carrier to the Middle East, while maintaining an optimistic tone about diplomacy, saying Iran is “very eager” to strike a deal.
Within this landscape, Gulf states emerge as part of the potential conflict. Iran’s attack on Al-Udeid Air Base in Doha during the 12-day war between Israel and Iran last July heightened fears that any escalation could directly impact energy infrastructure and maritime routes—particularly the Strait of Hormuz, through which a significant share of global oil exports passes.
Security and strategic expert Khaled Ibrahim Al-Sallal believes the conflict could “extend to Iraq, the Levant, the Red Sea, the Strait of Hormuz, and Israel—essentially all arenas where U.S. bases, Washington’s allies, energy lines, and sensitive maritime passages are present.”
Under this scenario, Gulf states are implicated in the equation, though not necessarily as direct targets.
“Iran views these countries from two main angles: the presence of U.S. military forces—bases, facilities, and air defenses—and their sensitive geographic position linked to energy and proximity to the Strait of Hormuz and Bab al-Mandeb,” Al-Sallal told Alhurra.
According to him, Iran’s use of the phrase “the entire region” raises the cost of war for the United States and applies indirect pressure on Gulf states to avoid becoming entangled in any escalation.
Retired Brigadier General and military analyst Ahmed Al-Shahri offers an operational reading of the situation. He says Iranian rhetoric does not imply targeting all countries indiscriminately; rather, it signals that any location used militarily against Iran could become a target. In his assessment, major U.S. bases—such as Al-Udeid in Qatar and the headquarters of the Fifth Fleet in Bahrain—would be included in the target bank if a confrontation erupts.
Al-Shahri adds that countries that do not host U.S. combat bases, such as Saudi Arabia, may not be direct targets, but would still be affected through disruptions to shipping and energy markets. Exposure levels, he notes, vary from one country to another depending on the nature of foreign military presence on their territory.
The possibility of a U.S. military strike on Iran has raised concerns that regional states would bear the brunt of Tehran’s response. In mid-January, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Oman, and Egypt warned Washington against launching such an attack.
Gulf Readiness for a Potential War
Regarding Gulf preparedness, Al-Shahri says regional states have invested over the past decades in multi-layered air defense systems, including Patriot and THAAD batteries and early-warning radars, along with the development of electronic warfare capabilities. He stresses that the goal is to prevent total paralysis and ensure the continued functioning of vital institutions even if a first strike occurs.
At the same time, he acknowledges that no defense system can intercept all missiles or drones, noting that damage management is an integral part of any realistic defense strategy.
As for the nature of the Iranian threat, Al-Shahri believes it would be selective and calculated rather than broadly destructive. The focus would be on high-value military targets—especially U.S. bases, command centers, runways, and logistical support facilities—along with naval assets and related infrastructure.
The anticipated strike would not be overwhelming but would come in precise, limited waves, using short- and medium-range ballistic missiles, low-flying cruise missiles, and loitering drones to jam and exhaust air defenses. The objective, he says, would be temporary disruption and command confusion.
He adds that damage would be localized and geographically limited, accompanied by temporary economic disruption in shipping, insurance, and energy markets—effects that could be contained under international pressure to prevent the war from expanding.
Al-Sallal agrees with this assessment, describing Gulf readiness as fundamentally defensive and focused on damage mitigation. He notes that Iran relies on a toolkit that includes ballistic missiles, drones, maritime threats, and cyber warfare, in addition to operating through regional allies to reduce the cost of direct confrontation.
In his view, the energy sector would remain the most sensitive, as disrupting a single facility could affect global markets. Ports, shipping, and electricity and water infrastructure are also vulnerable points that could be impacted by any escalation.
He considers the most likely scenario to be a limited, carefully calibrated escalation—via drones or proxies—aimed at delivering a deterrent message without sliding into full-scale war. Open confrontation, he argues, would be a high-cost option for all parties.
At the Gulf level, Al-Sallal points to growing defensive coordination, whether through collective frameworks or bilateral understandings. The shared objective, he says, is to protect critical facilities and prevent disruption to shipping and energy flows. Gulf states are focused on absorbing any potential strike and responding within a defensive framework to avoid widening the conflict.
Ultimately, Iran seeks to raise the cost of any potential attack by threatening to broaden its scope, while the United States uses military and diplomatic tools to increase pressure. Caught in between, Gulf states remain directly exposed to any escalation—even if they are not the ones making the decision.
The article is a translation of the original Arabic.
Alhurra
Sakina Abdallah
A Saudi writer, researcher, and TV presenter
